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Preface
This is the first full-scale study of the poetry and criticism of Hayden Carruth, and I have 
tried to consider as much of his vast output as possible. The study begins with three 
chapters which describe and analyze Carruth’s development book by book, period by period, 
from 1959 to 1983. Though all of his collections overlap in the order of the composition 
of the poems in them, it has been possible to put the books in a reasonably straightforward 
chronological sequence. Following these first chapters, in "Carruth’s Existential Revisions 
of Walden." I consider Carruth’s response to the New England literary tradition by way of 
elaborating his response to Thoreau in particular, with asides into Emerson, Robert Lowell, 
and Paul Goodman. In the next chapter, "Erotic Conventions," I explore the nature of the 
narrative voice in Carruth’s long poem The Sleeping Beauty. The final chapter is a study 
of recent developments in Carruth’s work since 1984, epecially his critique of cultural 
optimism. There are remarkable consistencies of vision and of verbal effect in Carruth’s 
work, and in each chapter I have sometimes harkened ahead, sometimes backward in time 
in describing these connections. Finally, I have appended a 1989 interview with Carruth in 
which he addresses some of the inquries I have begun here and provides additional 
information about his life and work.
Carruth’s primary importance is as a poet. I have given attention neither to his 
novel, Appendix A (1963), nor to his widely respected anthology of twentieth-century 
American poetry, The Voice That Is Great Within Us (1970). I have also ignored books of 
two types: those which seem to be minor accomplishments -  though as such, coming from
a major poet, they have their own pleasures and attractions. The Norfolk Poems (1961), 
The Clay Hill Anthology (a collection of haiku published in 1970), and The Mythology of 
Light and Dark (1982) are not central to my primary purpose here, which is to show why 
Carruth’s work is important and why it should be read. The second category I have 
omitted is of recent limited editions, Mother (1986), The Oldest Killed Lake in North 
America (1985), and Lighter Than Aircraft (1985). These books are not generally available, 
but as of this writing (July 1989) there are plans for future commercial issues in which they 
will be included. Adynamia at the terminus is unavoidable in considering a writer who is 
still working.
In addition to studying the poetry I have also undertaken to show something of 
Carruth’s critical achievement, which is significant not only in programmatic relation to his 
own poetry but also for its fine style, for its synoptic and attentive scope, and for its 
incisively brilliant readings. I have approached it in two ways. Along with the initial 
narration of Carruth’s career, I have included an exploration of his critical fiction, After The 
Stranger: Imaginary Dialogues With Camus (1965). ATS is an integrated, finished work, 
and it is extremely important in regard to Carruth’s development as an existential thinker. 
Working Papers (1982), and Effluences From The Sacred Caves (1983) are miscellaneous 
selections of essays and reviews written mostly on assignment between 1949 and 1982. 
Despite their heterogeneity Carruth’s visions of the projects in contemporary literature 
emerge clearly, along with his passionate appreciations of great works of the past. Yet, 
because of their heterogeneity, it would be misleading, to treat them, as some of his 
reviewers have done, as if they were a deliberately argued manifesto. Indeed, the fact of 
their spontaneous discursions is philosophically consistent with Carruth’s ideas about the 
improvised nature of existence. So instead of wringing them for a meta-criticism, I have 
selected parts of the most salient pieces and brought them to bear on his poetry. In the 
final chapter I do, however, address certain essays in Sitting In (1986) precisely for their
argumentative consistency. I think this is fair because the essays were written freely, not
on assignment, and over a relatively short period of time.
Having tried to describe my subject, I should try to explain my methods. I have
not included large chunks of biography. Interest in personal activity of artists is ever a
lesser kind of interest; Carruth has himself written about his life in many essays, e.g.,"Notes
About Laughlin’s Typewriter" (Ef), and "The Guy Downstairs" (SI). I cannot elaborate on
his private life any more than he himself has. If this study is successful, readers primarily
interested in the poetry will go to the essays and discover there, in addition to the singular
generosity and erudition of his intellect, whatever he has said about his life.
In summoning other writers and thinkers to help illuminate Carruth’s work I have
tried to limit myself to those with whom he has firm and fairly obvious connections. His
thinking is firmly based in secular existentialism, non-violent anarchism, and Yankee
pragmatism, and I have used a variety of existential writers in an effort to show where
Carruth joins and where he departs from the currents of existential thought. Nietzsche,
Kierkegaard, and Camus, as well as Sartre, have at times appeared under "existential"
rubrics, although I am aware that Camus not only abjured the rubric but also large parts of
Sartre’s existential theory. In this cohort Carruth’s position is closest in substance to
Camus, in the textures of its expression to the puzzling Dane, in force of expression to
Nietzsche, and in its implications for the social polity to Sartre. Informing all his
intellectual feeling is his life-long affection for Kropotkin, Bakunin, Goldman, for Emerson
and for William James.
There are in fact many connections between Carruth’s woric and issues central to
twentieth century philosophy and literature. For example, in Georg Lukacs’ critique of
Marxist dialectics, History and Class Consciousness (Trans, by Rodney Livingstone, MIT
Press, 1971), we find this apothegm:
That genesis and history should coincide, or, more exactly, that they should be 
different aspects of the same process, can only happen if two conditions are
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fulfilled. On the one hand, all the categories in which human existence is 
constructed must appear as the determinants of that existence itself (and not merely 
of the description of that existence). On the other hand, their succession, their 
coherence and their connections must appear as aspects of the historical process 
itself, as the structural components of the present. (159)
This theory of the coincidence between genesis and history describes very well the vision of
the relationship between history and the individual in The Sleeping Beauty, and it is
consistent, or could be shown to be consistent with, Carruth’s ideas of representation in jazz
and poetry. An intensive foray in this direction might clarify my style of textual analysis;
it might suggest in Carruth a synthetic ground of Marxist and existential aesthetics, but it
would also have the effect of leading us away from the poems. Similarly, in the chapter on
Carruth’s criticisms of Thoreau the discussions of relative attitudes on love, death, work,
and guilt might be explicitly connected with Freudian theories. There are, as I say, a
myriad of connections; if I have succeeded in elucidating the poems, readers will be able to
make connections which are accountable to their own understanding.
Finally, while using a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations, I have
tried to be resolutely subjective, and by that to fashion a reproach to the joylessness and
ultimate friability of much academic criticism. I have made a normative declaration:
Carruth is an excellent poet. But ranking or rating poets in regard to one another is
invidious and probably useless. I might be inclined to do so casually, but to pursue that
kind of comparison goes against my amiability toward all serious writing. That amiability,
I hope, means that this criticism, like Carruth’s poetry, is an act of communion with its
subject and with its readers. So I hope that this book will be taken as such an act. I
would not be in regard to Carruth what Pope deplored: one
Who can his merits selfishly approve 
And show the sense of it without the love.
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Hayden Carruth (b. 1921) has reached an advanced stage in his distinguished career as a 
poet, critic, and editor without having received the critical attention which he deserves and 
which has been accorded many of his less able contemporaries. He is a thorough-going 
existentialist, a dyed-in-the-wool Yankee, and an anarchist. The study uses these 
characteristics to explore the importance of his poetry and the nature of his complex 
relations with his chosen traditions. The first three chapters describe and analyze Carruth’s 
development book by book from 1959 to 1983. The fourth chapter, "Carruth’s Existential 
Revisions of Walden." considers Carruth’s response to the New England literary tradition by 
elaborating his negative response to Thoreau in particular, with asides into Emerson, Paul 
Goodman, Robert Lowell, and other regional poets. The fifth chapter, "Erotic Conventions," 
uses a theoretical framework derived from Kierkegaard’s Either/Or to explore the nature of 
the narrative voice in Camith’s long poem The Sleeping Beauty. The final chapter is an 
analysis of recent developments in Carruth’s woric since 1984, especially his on-going 
critique of cultural optimism. What emerges is that Carruth’s work is both an accomplished 
extension of the central line of lyric poetry written in English and a substantial, essentially 
American contribution to the current of existential thought.
Introduction
Hayden Carruth (b. 1921) has reached an advanced stage in his distinguished career as a 
poet, critic, and editor without having received the critical attention which he deserves and 
which has been accorded many of his less able contemporaries. Perhaps one reason for this 
neglect has been Carruth’s relative lack of self-promotion. He lived in northern Vermont 
for twenty years, until 1978. He taught only a few students at Johnson State College and 
gave no readings. Most of his books have been prominently and favorably reviewed, but 
others have been completely ignored. He has published twenty-three books of poetry, a 
novel, and five collections of criticism, as well as editing the influential anthology of 
twentieth-century American poetry The Voice That Is Great Within Us. He has been editor 
of Poetry (Chicago) (1949-50), poetry editor of Harper’s (1977-83), and a current and 
longstanding member of the editorial board of The Hudson Review. He has received nearly 
every major award and grant, including a NEA Senior Fellowship Award in 1988.
Carruth is a thorough-going existentialist; he was exposed to the works of Camus 
during the period when he was reconstructing his personality after an emotional breakdown 
and subsequent institutionalization and electro-shock therapy in the mid-50s, an experience 
which he writes about in The Bloomingdale Papers. His book on Camus, After The 
Stranger, is somewhat autobiographical in regard to the genesis of his own existentialism. 
Carruth is also a dyed-in-the wool Yankee and an anarchist. Yet, it would be misleading to 
assume that given these proclivities Carruth rests comfortably defined. He does not. He is 
a Yankee who has given us some of our most severely negative criticisms of Thoreau. He 
is an existentialist who has heard voices speaking to him from out of the air. He is a 
romantic who has spent a lifetime exploring the destructive consequences of that impulse.
He is a pragmatist who has made his living as a poet, a poet who has given us in his
collections of essays perhaps the best history of twentieth-century American poetry.
There have been many influences on Carruth’s writings, and I will discuss them as 
they appear to be salient. His mature voice is clearly his own, yet one of the pleasures of 
reading his poems is in catching intimations of other voices which he allows to more or 
less coincide with his own. Many occasional riffs of Pound and Yeats. Deliberate and 
respectful mocking of Frost. The high lyricism of Duncan. The formal diction of Paul 
Goodman. The casual courtliness of Cummings and Creeley. The affective music of James 
Wright. The serious sensuousness of Levertov.
Carruth is a peerless poet of the North. It has been suggested that among his 
contemporaries Bly and Ammons come close to him in evoking "the Northness of the 
North," but the range of technique available to Carruth is far greater than theirs. His 
landscapes have some of the cold emotional chiaroscuros of Frost’s most memorable, the 
sense of human history in Thomas McGrath’s, and, to borrow from other languages, the 
eerie incantatory air of Blok and Heine. Yet, all of these affinities considered, the poet to 
whom Carruth seems closest — especially in his books from 1963-83 — closest in diction, 
in pace, in voice and in subject is another rather neglected poet, Conrad Aiken.
Carruth comes from the New England which, as a poetic landscape, has been 
worked as thoroughly as the hills of the actual land. But his poetic ancestors — Emerson, 
Dickinson, Robinson, Frost, Scott -  and his neighbors -- Francis, Lowell, Olson, Enslin, 
Booth, Kinnell — have not depleted the soil of nourishment for Carruth’s particular crop.
In fact, his sense of that tradition, along with the challenge of contributing to a diminishing 
resource, poetry itself, has created exactly the kind of sparse, severe artistic realm in which 
Carruth has been able to prove his worth. It is a product not exotic at all, even though it 
has been heretofore unknown by many. I have tried to choose carefiilly among his works 
here in order to give a sense of their richness and strength, but, wanting also to do more 
than walk through his poetry for the first-time reader, I have had of course to leave many
fine poems out. His Selected Poems is an intelligent sampling, but it contains nothing of 
his very best, Contra Mortem and The Sleeping Beautv. The former is still in print in For 
You, and there are plans now for reissuing the latter with Copper Canyon Press. Along 






The Crow and the Heart (1959)
The importance o f first books o f poetry in regard to foretelling what will follow is not perfect, not
at all. One can adduce for example two radically different books: the brilliant prelude of Wallace
Steven’s Harmonium and the shaky venture of Yeats’s Crossways. Hayden Carruth’s first book,
The Crow and the Heart, is a combination of true achievement and of poems that are less than
promising. In reviewing the book James Dickey, while expressing his general admiration, notes
that Carruth has "a set of mannerisms which . . . seem determined to reduce him to the level of a
thousand other poets who can do, just as easily as he, most of the things he does in about three-
quarters of these poems." 1 This is a fair characterization. Dickey senses that many of the
occasions o f the poems seem not quite inevitable, and the sense of contrivance bears in on the
structure and style o f the poems. Often the verbal effects are simply or very baroquely distracting:
the characteristic dense mode of 50s formalism is choking itself to death. The rhymes are often
cloying. In a much later review of James W right’s work, Carruth himself wrote,
In the late 40s we had an ideal music running in our minds -  for me it was the dirge from 
Cymbcline (Act IV, II). . . if only, I thought, I could get modern experience into that 
measure. In general, our favorites were the poets of the English Renaissance, from Wyatt 
to Marvell, but then we skipped all the way to Hardy, late Yeats, early Pound, Ransome, 
Muir, Cummings. The rhymes are a giveaway.2
"Golden lads and girls all must/ As chimney sweepers come to dust." This is a beautiful music,
but Shakespeare’s song is short; it is difficult for most readers to be attentive to page after page of
this intensity.
3
The influence of Yeats, which, as we will see, is apparenl well into Carruth’s career, is 
evident from the very beginning here. The Crow and the Heart begins with "The Wreck of the 
Circus Train," in effect a continuation of Yeats, in whose end, "The Circus Animals’ Desertion," is 
Hayden Carruth’s beginning.
In a later essay, Carruth, writing about Robert Lowell, asserts,
All young poets...begin, or at least they try to begin, where the mature poets they admire 
left off. They do this in the compulsion of their literary zeal, in spite o f the inevitable 
unfeasibility o f it, owing to the irremediable disparity o f experience.(W P,146)
Yes, the artificiality and contrivance assert themselves to an extreme degree: "a total crash,/ Deep
in the rising surf o f dust." This is metaphoricity out of control. Carruth will spend a lifetime
understanding and ultimately trying to overcome the metaphysical consequences of metaphor. But
the important thing here is that freedom, freedom of spirit, is inherent in the climax of the poem:
three lions, one 
Male with wide masculine mane,
Two female, short, strong, emerged 
And looked quickly over the ruin,
Turned and moved toward the hills.
Perhaps we don’t need to be infonned by, nor does the line need to be padded with, the adjective
"strong." Nor does the omission of a pronoun in the ultimate line do much for the striving toward
a climax, but the image is a symbolic one for Carruth: three wild things moving toward the hills.
It is a vector of almost eerie prevision for his own life.
Crow is a compendious book, a reminder of what poetry "collections" used to be. And it is
chockfull of poems that prove Dickey’s objections. "The Snow" is a symbolist poem, three sections
of seven iambic pentameter couplets each. Dickey sees that the snow in the poem is "a decorator’s
snow." "One nearly can observe, almost believe,/ The servants hurrying behind the snow." Is this
decorative, I mean not like Blake’s ornamental energy, but merely decorative, or is Carruth actually
trying to evoke and evaluate class distinctions? If the latter, it is far too distant. If the former,
aside from its admirable facility, who should care? Yet again it is an early discursion upon a
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subject which later will become the vehicle for some o f his best poetry. But here the language is 
self-consciously clotted:
The sparkling meadows rise to farther hills,
Luring a snowcaped fancy to the rim
Where sun’s profluent aureate flood descends
And gilds the frozen billows.
Ach! Carruth!, the reader might say, as does the speaker of the title o f another poem in this first 
volume (which shows that the speech is self-consciously dense), "Min Eres Aken o f Thy Drasty 
Speche."
The visionary and verbal effects that resonate so strongly within the body of Carruth’s work 
begin with this first book. In "The Children’s Village," the line, "Where sunning blacksnakcs woke 
like whips and fled" is remarkably similar to the final image in "Emergency Haying" (Snow and 
Rock), "whipped by a bleeding snake," and though the relative power o f the latter poem is 
infinitely greater, the verbal energy is evident in each and all o f  these first poems, as arc the 
allusive echoes of other poets, primarily Stevens: "Summer and morning bid the mind to ease/ And 
bend the walker’s hopes to ten o ’clock,/ To chintz-hued coffee time, the casual news,/ And airiest 
speculations," and Frost: The end o f the street turns up to meet the church,/ As if the street and 
steeple were one walk,/ Joined at an angle," and o f Hart Crane in "The Street," whose first line, 
"Invariably dawn seeps stinging in quiet eyes, " reeks attractively o f Crane’s "The Wine 
Menagerie."
I think it serves no particular purpose at this initial point to spend lime explicating the 
excellences o f the many poems; certain patterns emerge. Despite the elliptical and (often merely 
intellectual) tone of most o f the poems, e.g., he refers to Egyptian heiroglyphs in "the Fact of the 
Matter" but he does not incorporate any kind o f hieroglyphic gestures, and the reference remains 
appropriative in a rather naive fashion, there is a restrained sense o f authenticity, of a poignance 
that comes only from felt experience. For example, in "Laura," despite the insistent meiaphoricity, 
the metaphors are brief, asserted descriptively in service o f the image, not as logic; he is not a
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modem metaphysical, but at the same time it is clear, as we sec in the title poem, an allegorical 
ballad about the effect o f suffering on the artistic imagination, there is often a more neo-classical 
than a romantic aesthetic. In feet, the diversity of approaches amounts to a contradictory style, the 
eclecticism with which he has often been charged: romantic lushness in a vocal chiaroscuro with 
logical astringency: severe technical precision in service o f rational articulation, as in "Alice," which 
is reminiscent of J.V. Cunningham. And the rigorous syntax is coupled with an even more 
prevalent envouchmenl o f the mysteries, e.g., in the second poem of "Four Love Poems in A Time 
of Approaching War."
There are many poems such as " "The Storm of Birds: A Recitative" (beginning with 
thunder and volley, "Outlandish ribbons did not rake the sky...") that reveal that Carruth is not 
doing what he must do, but showing what he can do, the Haw in most first books. But the best of 
the poems here are quite line indeed. In "Mondrian," one of many poems about painting and music, 
we find a startlingly concise statement about the formal function of art, one that Carruth will affirm 
and expand throughout his work:
Line
And color make the sign 
That shapes the thought to close 
With being, make the symbols that forestall 
The m ind’s blind rush to madness in the void 
o f essence.
A stark admonition about the vertiginous ascent involved in the Platonic structure of value. Note 
that artistic form "forestalls" but does not alone prevent the outrush of ego into possibility. The 
making of a perfect likeness is impossible, but it is only in these failed contrivances that we exist.
Looking back from the perspective o f thirty years after The Crow and the Heart, it is 
certainly possible to appreciate the virtues o f poems like "The Fat Lady," an extraordinary poem.
A local narrator, somewhat Frostian in his lone, alternates with an omniscient "poetic” voice in 
narrating the grotesque story, the lives, loves, and finally the self-immolation o f a four-hundred-and-
fifty pound woman. It is, at 127 lines, longish, and perhaps this is the reason it is not in the 
Selected Poem s. A shame. Yet it was written in what became rather quickly an obsolete mode for 
Carruth. There are also poems with the voice and the force of his future accomplishment. In "The 
Sound o f Snow," taking a congenial theme, one that, because o f its themes o f remembrance and its 
insistence on precision of image rather than on symbolist impulse rises above the poem,"Snow", 
Carruth reaches beyond his limitations into intimations of his mature voice. The whole poem 
would have to be quoted in order to show how quietly, through the metamorphic memory of the 
estranged speaker, it reaches, genuinely, the final sentence: "The stranger shivers and listens/ To 
the ceaseless unintelligible whispering of the snow." In context, the slight personification is not 
only earned, it is inevitable. There is the same
degree o f compositional integrity in "On a Certain Engagement South o f Seoul." The terza rima is
so expert that, D ickey’s notations on its fluency in evidence, it is naturally unnoticeable on first
reading. Its short declarative sentences, with the pitching forward o f the rhymes, are perfectly
decorous for the theme of pain and brotherhood, helpless commitment and communal sorrow.
And then there are the most accomplished poems in the book, the internal explorations of
emotional illness and recovery. "Anxiety" is terse, and it does sing with the music o f the dirge
from Cymbeline. To the tortured sensibility the canting of the planet toward the sun, April, creates
frightening irregularities in the definitions o f phenomena and of the self. The poem concludes:
But person is gone.
The walker steps on,
Wired by pain 
To his bones, insane 
In the final danger 
O f loss, o f anger;
He runs in the meadow 
Where he casts no shadow.
And the separate wits 
O f his brain are bits 
O f memory falling,
Crying, and calling.
And in the cold spring 
The wind is singing.
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This is his delect, and this is his theme. M emory creates a distance which is perceived both as 
imposed separation, passive and inevitable loss, and, in its pain of longing, as a wrong in which the 
self must have participated, as guilt. And more guilt and pain in the necessity of forgetting, 
forgetting in order to recover and to be free to create a new world. But through all of this there is 
some belief in the creative potential of suffering. That is evident in "Lines Written in an Asylum," 
in "Anxious View of a Tree," in "Reflexive," and, most brilliantly, in the thirteen-poem sequence, 
The Asylum.
The sequential lyric is what Carruth has always done best, here and throughout his career, 
in Journey To A Known Place, Contra M ortem , North W inter, and The Sleeping Beauty. This 
sequence is of thirteen fifteen-line paragraphs, a stanza which was inspired by a poem of Paul 
Goodm an’s, "In Lydia," which Carruth saw while he was editor of Poetry.
In his review, Dickey noted the eminence of The Asylum:
Carruth amuses himself by being playfully skillful with internal rhyme, inventing bizarre 
Sitwellian images, being witty and professionally sharp. And there is much of this. But 
through Carruth’s verses-by-anybody we are led slowly and a little restively, like the true 
mad, into "The Asylum," surely one of the most remarkable sequences of recent years.
Its theme is the disintegration of a personality, the same information Carruth includes in his account
of his institutionalization in The Bloomingdale Papers. His persona appears obliquely here. The
first verse paragraph shows us the asylum, the old Bloomingdale estate in White Plains, what is
now the New York Hospital, Cornell U. Medical Center Downstate Psychiatric Facility. The second
paragraph is a surreal scene of a patrol entering a bombed-out church; the third, a memory of a
former wife; the fourth a deranged, Jacobean soliloquy; the fifth, a rather oblique suggestion of a
connection between Manifest Destiny and personal insanity; the sixth and the seventh describe a
metamorphosis, in Chicago, the anarchism of the speaker’s adolescence becomes a less innocent,
more exacting existentialism; and the eighth poem is about Pound. We see that Carruth’s respect
for Pound, who is not mentioned by name but his characteristics are unmistakable, is now mixed
with sadness and feelings o f betrayal because "he of us all had risen/ To history, taking wide
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compass, curiously,/ And now all hideous, false and false, rotting in w ind’s prison."
Indeed Pound was Carruth’s mentor, though they had never met in person. They did
correspond before and during Pound’s taking of the Bollingen Prize in 1949. The fact that they
both were institutionalized in insane asylums in 1953 must have seemed horribly ironic to Carruth.
In a defense of Pound in Poetry in 1949, "The Anti-Poet, All Told" (WP,1), he writes:
Many generations will pass before a young poet can overlook the work of Ezra Pound; only 
by understanding it and using it -  or perhaps by designedly, knowingly discarding it -  will 
the poet o f the future be able to acknowledge his vocation intelligently and properly.
He reveals later in the essay what he largely learned from Pound;
Poetry is the reason for all things humanly true and beautiful, and the product o f them -  
wisdom, scholarship, love, teaching, celebration. Love of poetry is the habit of wise men 
wherever they are, and when for some reason of social or personal disadjustment they are 
deprived of it, they will be taxed in spirit and do unaccountable things.(W P,3)
This initial idealism provides an interesting contrast to the functional despair about his craft that we
will attend in the final chapter o f this study. Here the defense of Pound becomes a defense of
poetry in general and a statement o f Carruth’s poetic goals, which include, as he writes in a later
essay on Pound, " a vision o f goodness, the good that exists somewhere in the universe, the
excellence at the heart of experience, which is obscured from us most o f the time by the
imprecision, not to say chaos, of our human arrangements" (WP,112). Carruth secs that Pound’s
debilitating forays into economics caused him to distort history, but that Pound’s predicament
should have in the mid-5()s saddened his confined disciple is not surprising.
The Asylum continues in the ninth paragraph with a vision of revelation, which causes
questions about the standards by which one is declared sane, or insane; the tenth is a recapitulation
of the first, a year and a half later; the eleventh, a mythical vision of the arrival o f Europeans in
America, seeking "asylum"; " But what we tied from we shall find." Carm'.h comes in the course
of his miseria to questions about the possibilities of withdrawal as a social strategy. The twelfth
verse begins, "Then ultimately asylum is the soul/ Where reason curls like a nut in wrinkled sleep."
The ultimate vision here is, as Carruth writes in the introduction to The Bloomingdale Papers, of
"the inner condition o f exile as the experience par excellence o f the mid-twentieth century." The 
only hope, if  hope it is, is to find and then find a way to maintain the irreducible self. The 
Asylum ends strangely, with a suggestion of some kind o f eternal, universal, even Shelleyan 
martyrdom: "We lie all nailed and living, love’s long gain." It is a rather fuzzy conclusion.
When the poem was reissued in For You (1970) Carruth had made significant revisions. 
These are not simple rewritings to give the idiom currency in regard to his work of the later 
period. Most o f them are true revisions o f  the original themes, o f the meaning o f those experiences 
in the asylum as they have unfolded in his life. And so what is not revised also takes on added 
significance. Carruth technically reconsidered what his voice in the mid-5()s said about him at that 
lime; the rewriting is an act of critical autobiogenesis, and the revisions are worth noting in some 
detail because they are an accurate indication of the direction in which his writing moved.
Many o f the revisions are away from the overly stylized compression o f his early writing 
and toward immediacy o f effect. In One, "walls" becomes "these walls," "the dense" becomes "this 
dense; "the wind" becomes "this wind"(7), "land" becomes "nation," "this is where" becomes "here 
is where" (11), "a windy knoll" becomes "this windy knoll"(12). The shift toward immediacy also 
occurs in the change o f syntax and mood, again away from the symbolic and toward the 
psychologically acute. In the second verse "across my deference to the stars" becomes the more 
contextually musical and visual "across my catacomb of stars;" "Dispersed,/ Quenched in the 
murk"(2) becomes "dispersed/ In lumps of fume," again a shift toward the sensory.
The first line o f Three has been changed from "Delrital memory shifts in a windy skull" to 
"Wind is a stealth of memory," that is, from the mingled, not to say mangled, metaphorical to the 
more abstract, decorously evocative difficulty of perceiving what memory is. In its elusiveness for 
the poet it is more like wind than like detritus, and this is a more precise phenomenological 
description. "Kissed at the mouth" becomes "mouth to mouth;" "lissome in love," with its archaic 
poetic diction, becomes " a marvel in love," which is much more ambiguous. And the address to 
the woman becomes, again more accurately, an address to memory. The extremely difficult syntax
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o f "Your absolute art/ Was love, the gift o f  the meaning part/ W hereof your touch was history, the
green earth/ Made mythical" becomes " Your absolute art/  Was love, making the meaning part/  of
all madness, myth and history, hard earth/ And its hard cities." This is a substantial revision. ”
Green" becomes "hard." "Making" instead o f "gift" brings in the theme of self-making,
responsibility for action, and then comes the correlation between madness and history that is
thematically crucial to The Sleeping Beauty. The last lines o f this poem give strong evidence of
Carruth’s increasing lyrical powers:
No storm or dearth 
Can harm it. No mortalness incurs 
Its frailty. Times late in madness keep this power 
Thus sweet and classical, and it is yours.
Wrack of wind, wide, wide, but here this flower. (1959)
The romanticism about madness is something that Carruth had knocked out of him by experience;
the oversimplified notion of the classical was changed by his study o f Camus.
No violence or dearth 
Can harm it, nor mortality that stirs 
Like sounds in the wall. You are gone? This power,
So classical, is here and now and yours.
Wrack of the wind, dream-wrack, and then this fiower.(1970)
More flowing and more immediate. In the original "mortalness" had been made to rhyme with
"bodiless" in the previous line and with "madness" in the next, but the internal rhyme was hardly
worth the awkwardness. In the revision he drops the whole chain. But more important is the
effective change in the texture of the vision. "Storm" is dropped for the part of the storm that he
means, not the relief, the nourishment, the beauty, but the violence. "Classical" is now qualified by
"so," not an intensive here but used in the sense of "thus" "therefore," referring to what follows
"here and now and yours," not to the dream-like qualities o f an imagined and past classicism, but
to the actuality of a world with the excess o f vision removed, forced out.
In Six there are equally profound re-visions.
We tried to hurry, breathless, stumbling, sick 
Tried to hurry, tired, but it was all done,
End and beginning, the saint and the heretic.(1959)
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We tried to hurry, breathless stumbling, tried 
To find a way. But everything was done.
Belching, grinning, all the doors swung wide.(1970)
The manic, fragmented, and ultimately inhuman and symbolic extremes o f the first self-image
("saint and heretic") give way not only to more subtle rhymes, but also to a truly horrific vision of
the frenetically exhausted intelligence being engulfed in the maw of the asylum.
All of these kinds o f changes inform, indeed, compel the large revisions o f the final two
paragraphs. Twelve:
Then ultimately asylum is the soul
Where reason curls like a nut in wrinkled sleep;
And here, here on a windy knoll 
This house was built to keep
One image o f retirement and control. 5
We practice, we poor folks, to make us whole;
And when the wind bears hard against
Our walls, and soul and thought are tensed
For bladed terror striking from the real
Into our cells, we try 10
As well as ever we can to know and feel
The natural hopes o f good that die
Last of all; sometimes we find out then
The irreducible self; hopes multiply
And reason wakes, and help is safe again. (1959)
Then ultimately asylum is the soul.
Reason curls like a nut in wrinkled sleep,
And here, here on this windy knoll,
Our house was built to keep
One private semblance where we conceive our role. 5 
Thus when our solemn inspectors come to stroll 
The shadeless halls, our wives and friends,
We seldom mention how the winds
Shriek in their mouths. Gradually we feel
More natural, we try 10
To sink like the silent leaves that slide and reel
In anguish down the windy sky.
Sometimes it works. Sometimes we find out then 
Our tiny irreducible selves. We die.
And after that we die again, again. (1970)
There is much to admire in the original version. Most poets spend their lives getting to a place
where they can write like this. But look how, given more than a decade o f trying, Carruth has
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improved the poem. Instead of the just, but also easy, excoriation of society at large for pressuring
individuals to conform, "To keep/One image," Carruth has posited a "private semblance wherein
each person is self-determining. The narrative is strengthened by the substitution o f personal
agency for malevolent natural force. The speaker’s paranoid response to the institution as building,
to the physical environment as the oppressor becomes rather an acknowledgement of the
pathological horror of being with other people, even wives and friends,, and it is the memories of
that horror, o f  them, through which the inspectors, the doctors, are "strolling" (trolling). The final
lines reflect a profound philosophical revision. In the original there is an optimism, a belief in a
"natural hope," a resolution and consolation in "knowing," as well as some possibility of an
essential, Platonic, self; it is a thing, there, if  he can only get well enough to find it. "Hopes
multiply," and reason, the sentinel against internal chaos, preserves hope. How utterly different
from Carruth’s later thinking. In the revision, if there is an identification with nature, it is with the
natural anguish which comes from the knowledge that all natural things are finally obliterated. The
relief that comes with finding not an essential self but a tiny kernel of genuine personality is now
totally contingent. Because part of that kernel, if it is genuine, is the fact of obliteration, repeated
in perpetuity.
The ultimate paragraph is totally revised.
For rain’s in the wind, lost names bethou my heart,
My lady are you left? I am a breath,
A puff in these white bones of hurt;
Yet my particular death
Still shames me: I sense me: now the general part,
Amor, fleshes in reason: and you assert 
W hat all wounds know and I must follow 
Here shyly. For sweetheart, fellow,
Through you to these, to everyone I think,
My heart’s ruth flows. It fails
Their anguish, theirs fails mine, and we shall shrink,
Down, down, in our particular hells.
But even here tonight in the house o f pain 
Where the small wind spills among the broken walls 
We lie all nailed and living, love’s long gain. (1959)
Persimmon wind, lost names raining. Thwart 
o f forgetfulness! Lady, I ’m a breath,
A puff in bare bones, a dry heart,
A small particular death,
And here I am -- this death, the unquestionable part 
o f reason. Good night. The bones assert 
W hat the bones know, and love will follow,
Follow. My sweetheart, fellow,
I lived with you, but now with these, all gone 
Stark crazy. If  love fails
To soothe such pain and runs like the salt sea down 
The wounds o f these particular halls,
Good night. Good-bye. H ere’s darkness and rain 
And a small wind in broken walls, dear walls.
Here I am, drowned, living, loving, and insane.
Again the original is a very fine poem. The last phrase in the first sentence is amazingly 
previsory o f later poems (see the discussion of "Names in the final chapter). "My death shames 
me" (1.5), introduces a peculiar connection between death and guilt. And again the poem is 
improved in revision. Names are changed from raindrops to wind scented with persimmon And 
they must be ripe-rotten, sweetened and grounded by the frost in that case, astringent bitterness 
changed in death, the death which one does not have, but which one is. As Carruth writes in a 
later essay, "Every natural thing is transitory and contained in its own non-existence."3
At first it is the love of woman which makes the speaker’s "ruth” (he can’t resist the pun) 
flow to mankind, with the inevitable anguish both o f the initial love and the metaphysical agony of 
the consequential involvements. In the revision there is a simple fact -  he is other than her — and 
a conclusion -  if he cannot love himself despite that, then he is done, sooner rather than later. In 
the original the crucifixion image in the final line seems to claim from that act martyrdom for a 
higher purpose, "love’s long gain." This is hard to take. In the 1970 version the terminus of 
experience is in the present, where the speaker is drowned in his elemental need to love, and where 
to understand is to tolerate insanity.
Journey To a Known Place (1959)
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If Carruth’s "eclectic" poetics have made him quite unclassifiable in regard to schools and 
movements in twentieth-century American poetry, they have also caused extravagances 
vis-a-vis the developments in his own work. His long poem Journey To A Known Place 
(New Directions, 1959, reprinted in For You New Directions, 1970) is an extraordinary 
wandering away from the formal conventions in his other books of the same period. It 
seems nearly incredible that the poem was written by the same man who wrote The Crow 
and the Heart and The Norfolk Poems. In a review of a later sequence, North Winter, Jim 
Harrison noted with some astonishment at the stylistic range o f Carruth’s work that Journey 
"is harrowing, violent, expansive, and deeply individual." 4 Richard Howard wrote a year
after the publication o f the poem that Journey "is one of the finest -  most focused in
design and finished in detail -  long poems written by an American since The Auroras of 
Autumn." 5 In his review James Dickey wrote, "I can only give an inadequate, betraying 
sketch of this beautifully conceived and imagined poem, into which Carruth blends his 
tremendous and sensitive vocabulary (surely the largest and most precise since Hart Crane’s) 
with a mixture o f cold, steady fury and nightmarish passion in the presence of which I can 
do little more than record my amazement and gratitude." 6 Dickey goes on to note that the 
poem "is bound to be discussed and reread for many years." Perhaps. But that the 
discussions have been largely private is as astonishing as the poem itself. These reviewers, 
a small audience of peers, praise both the conception and the execution o f the poem.
Indeed, Carruth has always had a reputation among poets as a virtuoso. As they suggest, 
the virtuosity o f this poem is in both its execution and in its general design.
Journey is a poem in four parts, the natural world experienced in its classic
elements: "Terra," "Aqua," "Acr," and "Ignis." This is not a surprising way of structuring a
poem about psychic travelling; in this case there seems to be a detectable source for the
structuring. In a review of Book Three of W.C. W illiam’s Paterson (The Nation, April 8,
1950. Rpt. in Working Papers, p.7.), Carruth writes that the landscape in Paterson is
symbolic and the elements are symbolic:
water is a sexual link and has the further significance o f flowing time and 
o f language, usually the fundamental or premental language of nature. Earth 
is the speaker that knows this language, the chatterer. Fire is the creative 
act,in love or art. Wind is, if my reading is correct, inspiration, the 
interrogator, the carrier o f sounds and smells.
It seems that this is roughly the kind o f symbolic valence that Carruth has given to the
elements in Journey. In each section the speaker enters the element, inhabits and is
inhabited by it, and then moves into the next element, until the purifying arrival and return
in the final section, "Ignis." The speaker is at first one of a group o f refugees in exodus
across a desolate landscape ,to ships, where, in the melee of departure, he drifts apart, into
the sea. He is taken out to sea, then down through successive depths to the cave o f "the
great beast o f the sea," which seems to be a giant octopus. This encounter produces sleep,
and upon waking he finds himself on shore at the foot of a mountain. With the help of an
eagle he rises toward the summit. As he climbs "toward the "dome of brilliance," he is
united with his former wile, and, continuing upward, they come to a Byzantium-like city of
community, love, and rebirth.
But the narrative armature is the least impressive part of the poem.
Dickey’s statement o f critical inadequacy is not merely avoidance. The acuity of imagery,
the fecundity of vision, the rhythms and the emotional energies o f the poem nearly defy
description. There are nonetheless aspects that can be talked about in regard to the poem ’s
huge importance in Carruth’s development. First, the poem shows more forcibly than any
of Carruth’s other work his debt to Williams and, secondarily here, to Stevens and Pound.
The first section, "Terra", is composed o f strophes with long lines, occasionally rhymed,
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which are interrupted by centered couplets. As one might expect at this point in Carruth’s
career, the rhythms are strongly Poundian, with W hitman’s influence behind that, and one
can also hear Yeats, Tate and Aiken. The imagery is stark, cold, the voice stern:
At night the moon shed a shadowless whiteness,
And I wondered if  this were the color o f lunacy,
Or if the low fiery sun, glowing without warmth,
Resembled the day of our ultimate despair.
We spoke in the voice o f our fathers,
Utterance laden with prophecy, clinical and severe.
This earth is the realm of dissention, argument, antagonism, a brutal, carnal chaos:
Men fought, often with women and children cursing and struggling,
Often with one another in explosions of fury,
Claiming here historical necessity, claiming there the divine will
and we had no unreadiness 
of combative slogans.
Earth is hell; l ’enfer c ’est les autres; the world is a carnival, a came-vale, veil o f meat: "In 
the gray sloping waters heads bobbed like rotten fruit." Men are gobbets in 
a foul slew o f their own making. From this, the pilgrim is delivered by accident into the 
sea.
The next section, "Aqua", is one o f the most amazing stretches o f poetry 
Carruth has written -  pure poetry if  that term means anything at all. Again, there is a 
symbolic valence to the element: the sexual, the source of flowing time and of fundamental 
language. The sea moves without exhaustion "heaving/ in tidal energy"; it is the realm of 
primal independence. The rhythms and the imagery here are singularly brilliant, reminiscent 
among my own reading only o f Neruda, whose work I can only read in translation. The 
section is composed o f tercets, lines variously end-stopped and enjambed, enjambed on 
words such as "the", "a", "and", and "which.” The primary measure is not the line but the 
set o f lines, the tidal stanzas. The only interior stanza that has terminal punctuation is the 
fifth: "And downward the dimness o f the interiors opened before me." This is a dramatic
pause, allowing the reader to breathe before the fantastic beholding.
But these are pedantic notations. This is phanopoeia, logopoeia, melopoeia, of 
the first order.
Wavering fishes, the febrile schools, silver and gold,
Shone gloomily beyond my fingertips, which extended
Willessly in the waters, bending in the cadences o f a
Dream. And the lobster flounced on the sand, mad
Claws dragging a wasps body; the grampus plied there
In the unctuous waters, and the blowfish stuffed with 
fear;
I saw the manatee browsing, imperturbable, obese;
The halibut, twisted and anguish-eyed, fled from himself;
Ten thousand herring marched right oblique at unison’s 
mute
Command. Down, down to the stiller mid-regions
Where giant sea-snails hung torpid in copulation,
Half out o f their shells, white flesh rolling, exposed
Obscenely in the slow coiling and cramping of a cruel
And monstrously deliberate ecstasy. And I looked away
In my boredom, but other snails hung also before my 
eyes
Everywhere, coupling identically, an abhorrent multitude.
Read this again. It is overwhelmingly horrible and beautiful. The description o f the snails 
coupling is in the grand style. The vocabulary, in fact reminiscent of Crane’s, is working 
precisely even in a passage of visual and sonoral liquorishness. Carruth bodies forth 
Pound’s dictum: phanopoeia must include the moving image, otherwise "you will have to 
make a needless division o f fixed image and praxis or action." That is, make it move.
Note the affective abstraction, "Blowfish stuffed with fear," and the halibut’s visage making 
him appear to flee from himself. And the attention to etymologies: the sea-snails "half out 
of their shells" (or half out of their skulls) in a "deliberate ecstasy," i.e., in ek-stasis, out of 
place. The sensuousness o f the language and the sinuousness o f the lines is stunning. 
Another passage, further on, will serve as evidence o f Caruth’s melopoeic genius.
18
Every carnality, slithered and lurked on the primitive rock.
Massive eels upheaved and subsided. Blind mouths, vulviform,
Maneuvered in the lewd ingestive suck. Brilliant 
anemones
Took down their prey convulsively from the waters.
Still I moved downward drifting unharmed in the carnage.
The "r" sounds in the first line, give way to "v", anticipated in "primitive" , to "u", "eu"
sounds, and the nominal "suck" reinforces the vowel. The Miltonic "blind mouths,
vulviform" gutters the end o f the line, the terminal "m" flows into "maneuvered" and
chimes with "anemone."
This phantasmagoria is from the poet who was, at or near the same time, writing
The master grieved with age,
Said discourse of art and song 
Is pastime for dotard men,
Love being for the young;
He said moreover they
Will not have it long. (Nothing For Tigers)
The Yeatsian voice is clear in this. Both styles are made expertly. There is no need to
say that, given the variety of his voices during this period, Carruth had not reached a
"mature voice." This gives loo much emphasis to originality. We shouldn't cleave
Carruth’s career or anyone else’s into the good and the bad. It is valid to say that after
Nothing For Tigers, in the mid-60s, there is a more compact identity to the voice in the
poems. But even since then Carruth has experimented continually with personae, sometimes
with ridiculous masquerades, see, e.g., "Songs about What Comes Down" in Pulpsmilh, v.7,
no .l, by a poet, Septic Tanck, aka Carruth.
In section three, "Aer", the poet begins his ascent o f the mountain, aided by wind.
The elemental contrast with the densely fecund sea is attended by a drastic shift in 
typography and diction. Instead of the rolling verbal surface, "Aer" is in broken, staggered 
lines reminiscent o f Williams. Inspiration indeed. In the same review of Paterson in which 
he discovers the symbolism of the elements Carruth notes that Williams used "the short,
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oddly broken line to obtain the effect o f speed in a lyric poem." It seems that is the 
intended effect here: speed, lightness, winds flowing




The wind is "humming with spice", the simoon is "heavy with sweet dew,/ pungent." He 
meets an eagle, symbol o f loneliness, o f freedom, poetic voice "singing/ The whole selfhood 
of loftiness/ And of rock." Carruth is obsessed by rock.
The rhythms and the typography o f this section don’t exactly fit Carruth’s 
lush vocabulary. The lines are an experiment. In the same review Carruth had asked, " 
How is aural structure to be sustained in a long poem in which the line-values are 
suppressed?" It is difficult, and though this section is not a long poem, it seems that the 
attempt to give a rhythmic tension to the abstract element, decorous though the relative 
abstraction may be, is made at the substantial expense of force. Carruth uses this 
typography later, but only in short poems, in sections of North W inter, in "Fear and Anger 
in the Mindless Universe" (in From Snow, Rock, from Chaos, strange poem indeed), and 
in paragraphs in The Sleeping Beauty.
The final section, "Ignis", is composed of alternating meters and lines, mixed 
as fire is a mix o f air and fuel and heat, blank verse narrative and tightly controlled, 
pristine songs. Both of the measures are lapidary, finished, conveying a sense of closure, 
calmness, and completion. The end o f the journey is unity, o f love and of art. There is a 
touch of Yeats again here, of the climbing Chinamen in "Lapis Lazuli,” of the lapidary 
polis o f Byzantium and also of the land evoked in Baudelaire’s "L ’Invitation Au Voyage 
("La, tout n ’est q u ’ordre et beaute,/ Laxe, calme et volupte.") But the luminosity of the 
landscape, the radiance, is closest to Pound, e.g., Canto XVII 
And the wave
green clear and blue clear,
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And the cave salt-white, and glare-purple,
cool, porphyry smooth, 
the rock sea-worn . . .
and Canto XX:
Jungle:
blaze green and red feathers, jungle,
Basis o f renewal, renewals;
Rising over the soul, green vivid, of the jungle 
Lozenge o f the pavement, clear shapes,
Broken, disrupted, body eternal
And from "Ignis":
I mounting, going where stout clumps 
Of wild wheat purply ripened, among rocks 
Glowing like porcelain now, like jade among 
Silken grasses flowing in flame-like waves . .
And the gem-like rock glowed under the mosses,
And ferns splayed like cool flames, and trees 
Lifted, arching and strained to the august sky.
Can one be derivative and also quite as good as the original? This is the goal o f the
apprentice on his way to becoming a journeyman poet, o f the journeyman with luck on his
way to being a master. In this case the answer is yes, and it is an important step for
Carruth. Read the comma after "now"; Carruth’s control of the syntactical rhythms is
expert. Other parts of this final section, in a completely different style, also give evidence
of Carruth’s increasing power:
Proven never,
Being riven 
By a steely word 
That seals and deafens,
Till, until 
One is but one 
And all afrighted,
Lone, alone -  
Still no treason,
Time or distance,
Quells the quick 
Supposing faith;
Will and reason 
Drive the breath:
You, you, you.
I don’t believe there is any way to read this without a sense of its beauty. It is marvelous 
music. If there are definite echoes of one of Carruth’s favorite poets, J.V. Cunningham, 
there are also strong echoes o f an older poetry, o f Shakespeare, o f the influences that 
Carruth admitted above, "of Hardy, late Yeats, early Pound, Ransom,
Muir, Cummings. The rhymes are a giveaway."
This passage shows these influences, and it is much more effective in brief than 
it is poem after poem, the way it comes and cloys in The Crow and the Heart. This 
passage includes the themes of "Ignis"; Carruth will attempt them over and over; the sweet 
impossibility of perfect representation of human absurdities in language, the absurdity of the 
effort, the inevitable loneliness, and, in that consequent universal condition of existential 
sorrow and despair, with will and reason irrationally but not unreasonably attempted, we 
look lor the strength that love gives to lucidity.
The final vision comes in the central square of the city o f gold, a Dantesque 
vortex o f intense light. There is a great wheel that Carruth will see again in Contra 
Mortem
Where the people rode in their 
Separateness all together, ascending and equally 
Descending in the light
The wheel creates sexual unity, the unity o f all opposites, "the real urbanity’" and the
pilgrim sees how the
Bitter biller shame, terror, quick retaliation 
And lust, yes, even ignorance that is called evil,
The enormous relative compassment complete,
The rebellion loo, the heart’s grand assertions 
Against the ruin o f broken works and days,
All fact, all dream -  how from this we make,
Each in his only ascertainable center,
The world of realization, the suffered reality,
Through which comes understanding; or, if  not 
Understanding, at least the person fleshed 
Sufficiently in love’s fragments 
That gleam in the rubbish o f cruelty and wrong:
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To know what it is to receive what one has given,
As in a kiss, to bear and to be bom,
To see the earth beneath the heron’s eye.
The enlightenment in the city o f gold is the poetic and philosophic nebula that will inform
much of Carruth’s future work. The first two lines evoke the atmosphere of the poem ’s
beginning, then comes the contingent and accidental freedom, then conscious rebellion that
creates personality, a personality complicated o f guilt, fear, anger, lust, brutality, of every
human emotion and o f the heart’s rebellion against its own incapacities. "Personality,"
Carruth has written, is the plasmodium o f endurance/ A scarecrow in January." And also
he’s written that "Politics is love, anger is love, and poetry is love. All human acts are
loving one way or another." This, of course, takes into account that erotic acts arc the
hotbed of human error. It is a profession that echoes Carrulh’s strongly influential friend,
Paul Goodman: "What they do not express they display. There is no one who has nothing
to do with love." It also sounds like Pound, Canto LXXVII: "Nothing matters save the
quality o f the affection." The act o f creating a personality out o f chaos is an act of love,
self-love, the prior condition of community. Suffering is undeniably a part also. The result
is not wisdom, not truth, but a tenable personality which, in love, by loving, attests to the
joy  and agony o f its own making.
In Journey, particularly in the last passage quoted above, we can catch 
definite forerenderings o f Carruth’s future diction and methods, as well as the romantic and 
erotic genesis o f his existentialism, "the rebellion too, the heart’s grand assertions." In 
After The Stranger and in Contra Mortem rebellion will be elaborated more fully, especially 
in the way that Carruth understood Cam us’s definition: as "a claim motivated by the 
concept of complete unity, against the suffering of life and death and a protest against the 
human condition both for its incompleteness, thanks to death, and its wastefulness, thanks to 
evil" (Camus, The Rebel). It is a kind o f rebellion expressly not o f the Rousscauvian and
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the Thoreauvian variety. The assertion is the assertion of personality against the forces of 
depersonalization. On Carruth’s account, to be a person is to be an artist, subjective and 
tree, creating and denying freely. To deny "the ruin of broken works and days" both 
denies death and evil and affirms the possibilities of human creation, the ability of the mind 
to impose subjective order. Again, this means the creation of a style, a literary style. As 
he write in Contra M ortem. "Scan/ this circle vanishing across the deep/ it is contrived it is 
actual it is a man." This is an existential aesthetic: Camus again: "Style supposes the 
simultaneous the simultaneous existence o f reality and of the mind that give reality its 
form" (The R ebell. Artistic rebellion demands a toleration of this exchange, as well as a 
responsibility to try to understand as much as possible of reality, o f the human condition, 
especially as it has evidence in history, in the works o f say, Hesiod, to which Carruth 
alludes above. He proposes a rebellion with, not against history. This is what it means to 
be bom, as the Sleeping Beauty is bom  into Carruth’s finest poem, by a kiss.
Journey is nothing less than an artistic triumph. It would have been understandable 
had Carruth tried to stay within the same general style. But that would have meant stasis, 
or the illusion o f stasis, and the consequent morbidity in personality. Carruth is serious; he 
believes that the great wheel o f being turns. In his next book, Nothing for Tigers, he shifts 
again, walking back over, cutting into his previous moods and voices in the attempt to find 
himself, on the page.
Nothing For Tigers (1965)
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The first two sections of Nothing For Tigers (NFT) were written just after the poems in 
The Crow and The Heart. Even though the book won the Virginia Quarterly Review’s 
Emily Clark Balch Prize, the number of accomplished poems is small compared to the 
derivative, though workmanlike, poems. This is especially apparent when the book is seen, 
as I inevitably have to see it, after having read his later, extremely original collections.
In a recent essay, "Suicide," Carruth writes,
I could never find so distinct a voice [as Yeats’s] in my own work, which seemed 
to me to be a disconcerting concatenation of other voices, other people’s voices 
mimicked or faked, including in some poems the voice of Yeats himself.
The poems in the first two sections of NFT are starkly derivative: of Pound, Frost
("Comforts of Granite), Ben Jonson via J.V. Cunningham, Stevens ("The Carpenter’s Flute"),
The King James Bible, J.C. Ransom ("The Saving Way"), M allanne, and behind them all,
even more than in his first book, the influence of Yeats, both rhythmically and topically.
Yet, even in borrowed modes, Carruth’s personal voice can be heard. In "The First
Snow," a favorite occasion, the speaker concludes,
And now 1 have written -  certainly not a poem,
Only a marginal note
On the long book o f the snow.
Well, it certainly is a poem, a good one. The challenging irony of this disclaimer is
another indication o f Carruth’s poetic stance in the late 50s. A poem is something highly
and intensely wrought. The speaker must be masked as a speaker. The occasion o f the
poem should be effectively organic insofar as it must seem to come inevitably, as a natural
part o f the speakers self-evaluation o f the phenomenon. It must seem to be perfect, as if
the subject had created its own form. The poetic event should be expressed in the poem,
without a seam between the event and the meter, stanza, rhyme. Artifice is primary. But
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this is congenial to Carruth’s mode of developing his voice. These personae sound the
themes that Carruth will continue to develop. In "Abelard at St. Denis" the philosopher,
contemplating his "recent misfortunes," realizes "love is the loss, the disparity,/ The gain.
A ll’s told. Hurl is all understanding." And the next morning he does understand that
The fuel here is affections. Our motive is
Our love, love being the ground from which all other 
Affections rise by differentiation.
If newborn infants tried to say "I am,"
Could it be anything except "I love"?
Feeling, like the heat of fire, combusts,
In first necessity, the actual spark 
Or node of consciousness, yes, is that spark 
Constantly burning and escaping, spread 
In resonant ego’s
Lord I ’m out of breath!
W hat was it you desired when you created 
The philosophical temperament?
Abelard’s voice here is one which Carruth will find increasingly attractive; it is questing,
abstractly oriented, lucid, rhetorical, not merely rhetorical, but made with the dense and
inevitable rhythms of querilily. The poem ’s calmness, abbreviation, and concentration allow
us to be enjoined by a responsive human intelligence which must to itself give an account
not just o f its products, but o f its very nature.
Abelard’s theme is of the nature of the metaphysical agonies arising from love. His
method is a subjective one which is tempered by the objectivity to which one must accede
in a medium of rational discourse, in language. Abelard of course is Carruth. From a
much later essay:
My curiosity is not the kind that can be satisfied by objective knowledge. Plato 
said that opinion is worthless and that only knowledge counts, which is a quite neat 
fonnulation, attractive to Mediterranean temperaments, including Yeats’s. But 
melancholy Danes from the northern mists understand that opinion is all there is, 
ultimately. The great questions transcend factuality, and discourse is a procedure of 
personality. Knowledge cannot respond to knowledge. 7
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Discourse is a procedure o f personality, and Abelard’s is a mixture of asceticism and 
voluptuousness, as the misfortunes o f the historical Abelard attest. He found "philosophies 
in each soft inch" of Heloise. He realizes that he is " a -  well sentimentalist/ With 
something lacking (God!), and hence driven/ in guilt’s awful contraries to submit/ Desire to 
its opposing reason." This tense dualism has destructive consequences: "the person/ Stands 
gaped and shredded like a poor comical ghost/ Caught in a collonade." But love, even (or 
especially) socially illicit love (for which Abelard was castrated!) is the occasion of "one 
scanting glimpse o f something." Abelard’s poem is the most successful of the lirst two 
sections.
The erotic genesis of Carruth’s existentialism is evident in two poems, together, near
the end o f the second section. In "Ontological Episode o f the Asylum," the speaker,
literally prevented from suicide by conditions in the asylum, prays for "light in the mists/
O f death," and then he realizes that "God doesn’t care./ Not only that, he doesn’t care at
all, One way or the other. Thai’s why he exists." In the following poem, "Existence
Before Essence," sexual intercourse is the cause of terror and of world-weariness:
We rolled apart on the forest floor 
(Remember?), each in a sighing terror,
As Hector after one battle more,
Sighing, turned the armor-bearer 
With his black lance in that black war.
Darling, then as the leaves plunged down 
I knew the peril of such deep giving 
(Leaves o f aspen, leaves o f rowan)
And the uselessness o f such retrieving 
Under a woods gone all nut-brown.
This is a most beautiful poem, a compression of one o f Carruth’s obsessive themes, which
finds its ultimate elaboration in The Sleeping Beauty. Lovers in a pastoral setting
experience what they have created in the paradoxical energy of their union; love is war, as
far as we know. What is given? Has Hector given love? In love has the speaker given or
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been given anything but an inkling of obliteration? Has the poet given us anything but an
inkling o f dissolution?
These questions are historical and personal. In paragraph seven o f The Sleeping
Beauty we find Helen who has "caught the coupling habit, torrid/ Duplexities o f love and
death (or facl/  And fancy, real and ideal)." She is followed by a man:
No innocence was his
Whom Homer called not brave
But more than brave, who in this world that is
Knew him self victim, dead to save
The stupid heroic pride o f the prime defector
In history, and still went out and gave
His life without hope or despair. His name was Hector.
Hope is illusion. Despair is useless and self-fulfilling. Carruth’s admiration o f the
resistance o f these emotions is consistent with his refusal of optimism and o f nihilism. The
destructiveness o f romantic love in history and in person necessitate an ethic of unmitigated
personal responsibility. Otherwise we accede to murder. In "the world that is" it is not
enough to be brave enough to love and to kill.
Here Carruth has already begun to write, if not at the level o f mastery in his later
work, certainly, with the clairvoyance into the traditions of romance that make his work a
significant contribution to that tradition. His concerns are natural for a disciple o f Pound.
Helen. Hector? The allusions arc not gratuitous. In fact there is a fine parlay. In Canto V
of the Inferno, in the second circle with the carnal sinners, scourged by the black air, is
Helen, "per cui lanto reo/  tempo si volse." "For whose sake so many years o f ill resolve"
(trans. by John D. Sinclair). Dante has put her there, with Achilles and Paris, because she
"subjected reason to desire." Pound admired intensely Dante’s "epithets o f ’emotional
apparition’, transensuous ... Dante’s coloring and qualities of the infernal air."8 The same
qualities of this canto are evoked in Pound’s Canto XIV, with its first line from Dante’s
Inferno V : "io venni in luogo d ’ogni luce muto." This is Pound’s canto where the
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"Profiteers [arej eating blood sweetened with shit" and "sadic mothers driving their
daughters to bed with crepitude," canto of the monopolists, "slough of unamiable liars."
Pound’s canto takes its first line from Inferno V, but the imagery, the rain o f feces, for
example, comes from Inferno XVIII, the eighth circle, inhabited by pimps, seducers,
panderers. Here is the central line o f the Inferno: "Via/ Ruffian! qui non son feminine da
conio." "Off pander! here are no women to coin." "Conio" comes from the Latin
"cuneo", to drive with a wedge, to stamp as on a coin; cognitive with cuneus, with "cunt."
This is the circle o f the reifiers, who treat people as things, women as cunts. As we will
see in a later chapter, this is the place for Kierkegaard’s seducer, and for the addressee in
the seventh paragraph o f The Sleeping Beauty:
Why dost thou tear me? Had I done thee hurt?
For my name you took me
which was Lilith.
Cunt
Was my name, the sweet thing wild and furtive 
On the grass plain and the mountain.
Woman was my name.
Perche mi scerpi?
Perhaps she is talking to Adam, for in Hebrew myth Lilith was A dam ’s first wife. The 
first and last lines here come from Inferno XIII, 1.35; it is in the second circle, the place 
for those who sacrifice themselves -  the suicides. It is spoken by Pier delle Vignc, who is 
now a tree in the contrapasso o f the hell o f suicides, which is suicide itself repealed every 
moment, for eternity. As Carruth’s Lilith says,
Here
I am death. You made me. Now 
Why do you tear me?
To idealize under the impulse o f romance is to destroy the other. It is also suicide.
Carruth’s Abelard finds Heloise "so genial in every coign" that he suffers social isolation
and castration as a result of his momentary possession of her.
After writing the first two sections of Nothing For Titters Carruth moved from his
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fam ily’s home in Pleasantville, New York, to Norfolk, Connecticut, to a house on the estale 
o f James Laughlin. There he wrote The Norfolk Poems and the third section of NFT. The 
epigraph for the third and final section o f NFT comes from The Norfolk Poems. Krsna, in 
the Bhagavata Purana chides the milkmaids who have come to him: "What! Have you 
come in the night? Through the forest? Then you care nothing for tigers?" The 
significance of the scripture is that a lesson in control is taught via erotic desire, that of the 
milk maids for Krsna.
The natures o f the poems in this final section o f NFT perhaps compel Carruth, 
while he continues within a strict versification, to write poems more like what will follow 
in his next books than like what has come before. The voice o f the poems here is much 
more assured, more personal. The austere lucidity, always astringent in regard to the 
voluptuousness o f literary incarnation, is often now informed by a sweetness.
Carruth had married Rose Marie Dorn . In "Essay on Marriage" he writes about
being
Married twenty-two days.
Not long, but considering the nature of 
Joy it was long enough. Because 
We each had known
Many bitternesses and disloyalties, and so 
Recognized the advantage that loving brought to us 
After the ugly hope o f solitude.
We were very successful.
I was content to die.
Before this in the poem Carruth says he had been "studying Dr. Williams on the ’variable 
foot’." It is possible that this stanza is Carruth’s variation on the variable foot. It is a 
stanza he will employ in many other "Essay..." poems, two lines o f pentameter, flush left, 
followed by a tetrameter line, indented, and then a three-beat line, indented from the third. 
Apparently Carruth feels that the architectonics of this form have some possibility or
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evocation o f argumentative consistency. 5,5,4,3: from the general to the particular? At any
rate, the really remarkable aspect o f this poem is its discursion on the relationship between
love and writing, its explorations o f how the joy of loving can inform the poetic act. With
the Yeatsian relationship between beauty and poetry definitely understood here, Carruth
advances into his owr. stark world o f  inquiry:
Poems will come inevitably like the seasons,
Imperfect and beautiful like the deathly woods,
Expense o f labor and expense o f time,
Like seasons and woods,
Like mechanisms, parts o f a universe which means 
Nothing, I guess, but simply moves, on and on,
Imperfect and beautiful as only things 
May be that have no minds.
Again the pessimistic attitude about the nature o f the mental aberrations that make us
human, and the enhancing beauty of the language working against the self-abnegating
content o f the thought. Despite his admiration of Williams, Carruth obviously does not
believe that poetry cannot accommodate abstract thought, "large" issues.
In "August First" (Brothers) he looks back to this poem.
I
remember a poem I wrote 
years ago when my wife and 
I had been married twenty- 
two days, an exuberant 
poem of love, death, the white 
snow, personal purity. Now 
I look without seeing at 
a geranium on the sill; 
and, still full of day and evening, 
of what to do for money,
I wonder what became of 
purity. The world is a 
complex fatigue.
Personal purity may be intermittent, but poetic purity, if by that we mean a sense of 
perfection (per-lacere), of being thoroughly made, is something that Carruth has begun to 
grasp firmly by the end o f this book.
In "Freedom and Discipline," a poem he included unrcvised in his book of essays 
Sitting In, Carruth is nearly perfect in the movement of his couplets, as he writes about 
how he learned both technique and artistic discipline from musicians, from Rachmaninoff, 
Coleman Hawkins, Vic Catlett, Lester Young, Thelonious Monk, Frankie Newton, from 
Berrigan, Fasola, Papa Yance ... and from Yeats. The poem is full o f the poignancy o f his 
loss of the possibility of life as a professional musician. Carruth was an accomplished 
clarinet player and actually played with some of these musicians in Chicago in the late 40s, 
but part of his emotional debility was the inability to play in public.
Why I went to verse-making
is unknowable, this
grubbing art. Trying,
Harmony, to fix your beat
in things that have none
and want none — absurdity!
Let that be the answer
to any hope o f statecraft.
As Yeats said, fal de rol.
Freedom and discipline concur
only in ecstasy, all else
is shoveling out the muck.
Give me my old hot horn.
The absurdity in writing poetry is an existential absurdity. The impossibility o f final unity 
mocks existence. Carruth’s dictum about freedom and discipline would be perhaps 
inconsistent with his other thoughts on the topic had he written "occur," rather than 
"concur." Ecstasy is a loss of identity and there is neither freedom nor discipline in that. 
And the "lyric convention," he writes in Sitting In. "is a freedom, not a restraint." I think 
what he means is that true ecstasy is an illusion, albeit an attractive one, and that an 
objective self is an illusion and an impossibility. Therefore freedom and discipline never
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completely concur, but the effort toward making them concur is the positively valuable
function o f the process o f art -- the artist at work in a state described by Jaspers: "In
infinite passion the immediate leeling, which is held fast and genuinely true throughout the
questioning, is grasped as free."9 All else is drudge work, "shoveling out the muck."
The relationship between music, especially jazz and blues, and poetry will become
increasingly important to Carruth’s poetry. In Sitting In, he writes,
The great contribution o f the twentieth century to art is the idea o f spontaneous 
improvisation with a detennined style, a style comprising equally or inseparably both 
conventional and personal elements... It means the final abandonment of the neo­
classical idea of structure as a function o f form, which the romantic and the post- 
romantics of the nineteenth century had never given up. Instead structure has 
become a function o f feeling.(47)
Carruth finds this stylistic determinant in the clarinetist Pee Wee Russell and in Yeats. It is
an extension o f Poundian theories on style, e.g., "Emotion is an organizer of form." 10
Russell, Yeats, and Pound are his heroes. From this point forward, this is how Carruth
tries to work -  in a mode o f "improvisation within a detennined style,” personally and
conventionally. Carruth is not, as some critics seem to have believed, a formalist,
dependent solely on convention. For he did not continue in the m anner of his first book.
He is not an "academic" poet, that is, he does not adhere to any particular "school" of
poetic thought. He has made his living by teaching in the academy, but this is not what
the rubric "academic" means. Many writers o f popular fiction, independent financially
because of the marketability, pre-planned, of their stories, lit under the rubric much better
than many o f the poets who are accused of being "academic," meaning, pejoratively, not
that they adhere to a program but that the poets can think and write at the same time, insist
that the reader do the same, and thereby that they somehow impede enjoyment. Carruth is
not a shaggy Nemerov or a rusticated Hecht, much less a John Irving who happens to write
in verse.
The relationship between personality and convention is expressed concisely in a later
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poem, characteristically concerning jazz, a poem in Brothers, I Loved You All. It is a
statement o f leeling that informs all o f  Carruth’s mature work, and it is an example o f his
profoundly considered lyricism; a statement o f purpose that sounds over and over, each time
with valences of different quality, subtle variations, so that, even in the variety o f "forms,"
one can sense that Carruth’s work may be one poem, one lyric. The repetitions are burdens
and refrains extended over a space greater than the modem reader is used to spanning: his
work is an epic o f lyrics, which is a contradiction in terms if  one adheres unswervingly to
generic classifications. (I don’t.) The poem is "Late Sonnet."
For that the' sonnet was no doubt my own true 
singing and suchlike other song, for that 
I gave it up half-coldheartedly to set 
my lines in a fashion that proclaimed its virtue 
original in young arrogant artificers who 
had not my geniality or voice, and yet 
their fashionableness was persuasive to me, -  what 
shame and sorrow I pay!
And I knew 
that beautiful hot old man Sidney Bechet 
and heard his music often but not what he 
was saying, that tone, phrasing and free play 
o f feeling mean more than originality, 
these being the actual qualities of song.
Nor is it essential to be young.
He uses the convention of the sonnet to teach, to show something about the sonnet, to
display by example what he sets forth in theory. Did he really abandon the sonnet? In
The Asylum. Contra Mortem, and The Sleeping Beauty he adds a line to the traditional
fourteen. In order to proclaim the virtue o f his individual voice? Or to proclaim the virtue
of the sonnet, an improvisation which calls attention both to his form and back to the
standard form? Certainly he is using the convention rcllexivcly, beyond its original erotic
theme, to comment on itself. But isn’t this also erotic? The passion of a poet for his
metier? "Late Sonnet" and "Freedom and Discipline," are professional epistles, as
W ordsworth’s "Resolution and Independence" "Late Sonnet" is a reprisal o f a poetic career.
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"We poets in youth begin in gladness/ (But thereof come in the end despondency and 
madness.")- There is a similar warning in Carruth’s admonishment about the urge toward 
mere originality, mere novelty, the Romantic impulse. "Tone, phrasing, and free play of 
feeling" are the determinants o f poetic structure, inner determinants.
The final poem in NFT is "Michigan Water: A Few Riffs Before Dawn (in 
memory of Richard Wright)." It is also included unrevised in Sitting In. In seven sections 
o f seven tercels each Carruth’s song combines the conventional elements o f his influences in 
a poem about Chicago, about aesthetics, race relations, and the cruelty of urban ugliness.
In a 1965 omnibus review of Carruth’s work in Poetry, Richard Howard found in 
"Michigan Water" a "perfected" equipoise between formal demands and personal voice, 
between the person and the persona."11
Again there are clear influences: in the first three sections o f Eliot, in the fourth of 
Muriel Rukeyser, in the fifth o f Jarrell perhaps, and o f the blues ("The sun will shine on 
my back door/ someday"); in the sixth of the Hebrewisms in the Bible, that rcpctitiousncss 
via Pound, and in the ultimate section there are clear echoes o f Paul Goodman. It is what 
jazz musicians call a cutting session. You get onto other people’s style and imitate, mutate, 
and extend them. Carruth does this often, as here, partly satirically, but with the respect of 
a virtuoso who himself naturally understands the personalities that live within the other 
styles. And even if it seems a concatenation, the ultimate effect is Carruth, a mixture of 
lyricism, somber, austere inquiry, and a hopeless yearning for human love, a style which 
will sustain him into the period o f his finest accomplishments:
Gray dawn seeping through stone -  
see, the room blenches. Let the beat 
intensify. Between bone and bone
the little blood aches with rain 
and the tones deepen. Music!
Given all to Saint Harmony, all
the pain, the awareness o f the pain. 
That is all. Music is heard 
in one heart, harm ony’s great chord
in one conscience only; and yet 
there is this not explained reaching, 
touching, extending, as if  the pain
could gather each o f us to its own 
being. Is it possible?
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Chapter Two
"Scan/ this circle vanishing across the deep/
It is contrived it is actual it is a man."
North W inter. After The Stranger. Contra Mortem
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Even to those who generally know the body of Carruth’s work it has seemed at times 
almost incredible that a poet so personally distant in so much of his early work could have 
evolved into the writer of the past twenty-five years, a writer of extreme flexibility, a 
writer o f "free verse so invisibly artful that under its spell we seem to be not in the 
presence o f a poem, but of the world." 1 At the same time, he has continued to write in 
the tightly controlled lyric forms of his early work, but these too have become more subtle 
and more personal. And he has written hundreds o f essays and reviews, many of them 
astonishing not only for the quality of the writing — he is always "on" -  but also lor the 
scope o f their information and for their amiability. There were of course, as 1 have noted 
above, many first-rate poems in each of his books, the result of an a gifted sensibility at 
hard work: many beautiful short lyrics, The Asylum, and the most accomplished piece 
from his early period, Journey To A Known Place. Yet, even considering the promise of 
Journey, after 1963 there is a change in voice, an assurity of movement so definite that one 
asks, is this the same poet, the same man? Poet Brooks Haxton has suggested that the 
change had something to do with a kind of public resignation on Carruth’s part. His first 
books had received some attention, but not the kind of acclaim that he might have wished. 
In a situation similar to Aiken’s, whose first collection appeared in 1922, the year of The 
Waste Land, he came out at the time when Lowell was ascending. That he was able to 
withstand and to understand Lowell’s public preeminence without lasting bitterness is clear 
from his critical response to Lowell (which I will address at length later in chapter four) 
and from his piece in Harpers’ in December 1977 on the occasion of Lowell’s death. 
Explaining his own upset over Low ell’s early death, he writes,
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It is because I see m yself in Lowell. I see all o f  us -  poets of later-day America - 
in him. He was truly the figure o f the embattled artist (though one uses such post- 
romantic terms with a reluctance now), the artist fighting in a degraded society, a 
cruel history, an absurd universe, and most o f all a sense of lack in his own being, 
fighting in complete honesty and utterly refusing to compromise. With less talent 
and far less knowledge, I am doing the same thing. So arc my friends. What else 
can we do?
By dint o f his talent and his immense knowledge Carruth was and is more aptly comparable 
to, I mean the equal of, Lowell than many poets who have asked, begged, or have been 
publicly presented by prominent critic-champions for even second-ranking. The personal 
incapacities that prevented Carruth from promoting him self ultimately forced him to create a 
life, out of the public eye, which led him to a place where he did achieve his own 
particular excellence. At the same time perhaps it recruited him from his early public 
ambition. If Carruth thought, as he no doubt did, that he was writing poems that descivcd 
more attention than they got, he was able to keep that resentment out of his own writing, 
out of his critical work, his reviews, which are singularly remarkable for their generosity, 
even when attending to less able and more popular writers than himself.
Certainly, Carruth’s move to Veimonl had something to do with the "opening up" in 
his poetry. After writing NFT, Carruth and his new wife, Rose Marie Dorn, moved to 
Johnson, Vennont, a village in Lamoille County, on the Lamoille River, between Stowe and 
Burlington. With a population o f two thousand it was the home o f Johnson Woolen Mills, 
a small branch o f the state university, a talc mine then employed but now defunct, and the 
village center of many small family farms, also now gone. The Carruths bought a house on 
Clay Hill, in a gulf above the village to the north. Their house, a "laborer’s holding", as 
Carruth writes in "Marshall Washer," is between a gravel back road to Waterville and 
Foote Brook. From the hill across the road on W asher’s farm they could see Johnson 
below and across the valley, above the staggered notches of the Green Mountains, the top 
o f M ount Mansfield. It is a singularly beautiful place. Not only did it bring Carruth into a 
close relationship with the natural world where he had to get his wood, shovel his road,
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clean his spring, plant his garden, chores ad infinitum, he now had his own house, a family,
a plot o f ground. The majority of his poems for the next fifteen years concern this place,
which he called Crow ’s Mark. And so he continued, as he had in Chicago, in New York, in
the asylum, at his family home in Pleasantville, on Laughlin’s estate in Connecticut, to
write, now in a renovated cowshed out in the yard, by the brook.
The move to Vermont was crucial in the development o f Carruth’s poetic
personality, and intellectually he was maturing rapidly. Throughout the early 60s he had
been assigned many reviews of many different kinds of books and had done various kinds
o f editorial work. In 1963 he reviewed Genet’s Our Lady of the Flowers and Sartre’s Saint
Genet: Actor and M artyr. Sartre wrote that he had tried in his book on Genet
to indicate the limit o f psycho-analytical interpretation and Marxist explanation and 
to demonstrate that freedom alone can account for a person in his totality; to show 
this freedom at grips with destiny, crushed at first by its mischances, then turning 
upon them and digesting them little; to prove that genius is not a gift but the way 
out one invents in desperate cases; to learn the choice that a writer makes of 
himself, o f his life and the meaning of the universe, including even the formal 
characteristics of his style and composition, even the structure o f his images and of 
the particularity o f his tastes; to review in detail the history of his liberation.
This is an uncanny description also of Carruth’s aesthetic endeavors, though it aims at
description rather than true autobiogenesis, nor would Carruth says that there is some
original state o f freedom from which one can fall away or be taken by chance; freedom is
created by action. Like Sartre’s, Carruth’s emphasis is on writing as personal action,
especially the personal genesis of "the formal aspects of his style and composition." This
"choice in desperation" "that a writer makes of himself" goes to the heart o f Carruth’s
morality o f aesthetics. In an essay entitled "Authenticity in an Age of Massive, Multiplying
Error" (SI,73) Carruth expresses the same view o f the potency o f the act of choosing; he
agrees with Wendell Berry
that agony of choice, whether mindful or unmindful, is what distinguished the living 
from the dead, and not inventiveness or a desire for expediency ...and that from this 
it follows that the only alternative to suicide, the only way to assert a positive value 
against a negative one, is to choose the course which we think -  or feel or 
imagine or whatever -  may give us the opportunity to make further choices.
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Freedom is choice, not freedom to choose but freedom in accepting the necessity of
choosing. The only optimism is the assumption not that we may choose a good
consequence, but that choice may continue — that we may choose to continue living. And
this is not accomplished in a social void. On a blank page in the back of his copy of
Sartre’s book on Genet, Carruth has written this quotation, which I happened to sec:
Unless one is a god, one cannot make oneself happy without the help of the 
universe; to make oneself happy, one needs only oneself.
As I will point out in later chapters, this admonishment informs Carruth’s critique of 
Thoreau’s isolationism; the refusal to admit the other connects with many kinds of 
irresponsibility which Carruth finds destructive.
In his review of Saint Genet (WP,72) Carruth wrote that
Sartre’s method begins in simplicity itself, with the basic opposition o f Self and the 
Other...But this basic opposition quickly opens up into a spiraling, or helical series 
of dualities: being-becoming, essence-act, eternity-time, nature-freedom, beauty- 
happiness, form-content, and so-on.
These are the dualities whose consequences inform the dramatic action in The Sleeping
Beauty. He concludes that Sartre’s book reveals that the criminal, Lhe aesthetic, the
religious are one. And he admires the book immensely as a critical act; it grants what
scholars and critics seldom do, that art is not a product o f the objective world but a
communication between the artist and god, or the ego and the unknown.
Another of Carruth’s reviews of this period that is particularly revealing is
"Materials From Life," a review of Irving Singer’s The Nature o f Love: Plato to Luther
(WP,121). Carruth had already reviewed DeRougcment’s Love Declared, calling its tracing
o f Eros from it entry into Western Civilization (according to DeRougemeni) in the 12th
Century, its dissemination by the troubadours, and its progress, through the Tristan legend
and into our time, a "pious intellectual fraud" (WP,76). Carruth points to DeRougement’s
spurious analytical stance, which assumes that eros is destructive but yet pretends to discuss
eros critically. DeRougement ties the problems o f marital love to heresy, and Carruth finds
this, along with DeRougement’s basis in Catholic dualisms, unacceptable. In short, Carruth
objects to De Rougement’s analytical simplification, preferring the rational "realism and
relativism o f writers like Camus," who, Carruth thinks, "had an attitude toward love, which
may be worked out in more or less detail from suggestions contained in The Fall, but I
doubt he had a concept o f love." So, neither DeRougement nor Camus is quite satisfying
on this topic. He also finds Sartre’s "theory o f existential psychoanalysis" "awkward,
difficult," the freedom that it proposes "elusive and obscure in the experience o f our lives,
particularly in the experience o f falling in love." But Singer’s "phenomenology of love,"
beginning as it does, not like Sartre’s, with man in alienation, but with man in love -  the
more existential ground in being -  he finds more useful, particularly Singer’s notion of
"bestowal" as a part of love.
On Singer’s account, love has two operations. The first is appraisal. Appraisal is
the finding o f value, both objective and subjective, in the beloved. The second operation is
love-as-valuation, the bestowal of a value to the beloved that the beloved does not pieces in
"reality," though the bestowed values are not only real, they are essential.
Carruth finds at least three "important consequences" issuing from this concept.
First, bestowal is gratuitous, the value is a free invention of the lover; it proceeds "directly
and solely" to the beloved as
a person, a someone...and the concept therefore attacks the Freudian deterministic 
concept of love as sublimated narcissism. Singer gives love a content beyond 
necessity.
Second, the invention of value is itself "an augmentation" of the lover’s own creative 
capacity. This is less freedom of choice (of the beloved one) than it is freedom of 
invention, "freedom of making rather than freedom of affirming, of initiative rather than 
response." Lile-force itself, or eros, becomes a function of living. Carruth’s elaboration of 
this, as we will see in his poems, has social implications; it translates into a practice of
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non-violent anarchism.
Third, bestowal is imaginative; "love is functionally aesthetic." The danger here, of 
course, is that imaginative idealization is essentially reification, or, in literary terms, the 
appropriation o f the allegorist who robs the object o f his attention of whatever unique 
qualities it might have in order to imbue it with his own. (I use the masculine pronoun 
automatically, but it is not, I think, completely without weight in considering, historically at 
least, the impulse. In The Sleeping Beauty (58) we see a classic case of ovcrbeslowal from 
Heraclitus, whose gigantic passion beautifies and develops the beloved, who flushes,
"molten, undulant/ conceiving/ the whole of the universe.") Carruth believes that this kind 
of idealization may not be inevitable — or inevitably destructive; it could lead toward 
"reinforcing" the personality of the beloved. This is possible if love can escape religious 
and naturalistic traditions which direct it toward the ideal, toward God or toward Nature, 
away from the person and therefore away from its ability to bestow value. "To love 
without external sanctions" is the requirement for the development o f " an affirmative 
philosophy of love." Carruth hopes that Singer’s projected volume on m odem  love will 
lead to "the consideration of the role of existential idealization in human love and in life 
generally." In fact, Carruth himself will make precisely this kind of consideration in many 
of his poems, most cogently in The Sleeping Beauty.
Why was Carruth particularly attracted to Singer? In earlier works, in "Abelard at 
St. Denis," in "Essay on Marriage," the ground of Carruth’s account o f the necessity of 
personal responsibility and o f creative affirmation at all levels, was erotic, generated out of 
the moral, psychological, and metaphysical agonies of loving -  o f loving women and of 
loving nature. These agonies come from the love of beauty, and they are a result of the 
human consciousness "striving to create value and getting beauty instead/ Dripping with 
blood" (SB). Yet, the erotic impulse is, in the face o f individual alienation and universal 
meaninglessness, the only way to act with a full human capacity. In this is the possibility
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of action not based on Sartre’s Cartesian divisions between self and other, "with all o f its 
supervening burden o f self-divisiveness consciousness." Again, Carruth thinks that Singer’s 
concepts o f love begin with love, not alienation.
Singer’s concept o f bestowal also partakes o f the aesthetic and literary tradition 
which Carruth had thoroughly assimilated, the Romantic, with all of its Keatsian equations 
between Beauty and Truth. In regard to this tradition though we must ask the questions, to 
what degree can we safely bestow beauty on the objects of our attention, and then, having 
bestowed more or less, what kind o f truth is it that we can find in them? These questions 
are as much at the heart o f Carruth’s "considerations o f existential idealization" as they are 
central to Stevens’s poetic examinations o f metaphor (in,e.g., Notes Toward A Supreme 
Fiction) and his constant tug-of-war with the romantic tradition which one can find in 
almost any of his poems (se,e.g., "Sailing After Lunch"). If the spirit of man is a part of 
reality, to what extent does it share characteristics o f the other parts? At what point does 
the unifying impulse of the imagination begin to distort rather than inform? At what point 
do conventions, human conventions, expropriative in essence, create illusions? And, 
practically, if there are correspondences between nature and self, as there are in Carruth’s 
North W inter, between winter and the winteriness within the poet, how can these 
correspondence be represented as equivalences o f value rather than in the traditional Platonic 
scheme of anthropocentric representation? For Carruth, moral feelings precede aesthetic 
feelings, and the representation o f the world in anthropocentric terms is a symptom of 
human willingness to appropriate and destroy the world at large.
Cam us’ concept o f lucidity, as Carruth reveals his understanding of it in After The 
Stranger, is a moral and aesthetic antidote to romanticism, to over-bestowal. Lucidity finds 
limits. It refuses mystification, even, or especially, the mystifications of nihilism. It finds 
limits in reality which create the necessity without which freedom cannot exist. Camus 
writes, "Genius is a rebellion that has created its own limits." Singer would say genius
45
bestows creatively; Keats might say it has "negative capability."
Keats in fact shows clearly how existential concepts can inhere in a sensibility
which, like Carruth’s, is essentially erotic in its impulse to imbue nature with human
characteristics. Keat’s awareness o f this impulse issues in an understanding o f his own
writing, an understanding which in effect is a phenomenology of love, as a quest for the
ground of being, a poetic ontology. And since one of the goals o f this quest is to find
m an’s place in relation to other elements o f the universe, the act of writing, existential in
its choosing in unqualified freedom, is also a religious act.
In an 1817 letter to his friend Benjamin Bailey, Keats explains his commitment to
poetry as the means not of expressing but o f finding truth and his belief that the sensuous
world is indispensable in the search. Yet, he is not absolutely sure about poetry’s ability to
actually convey truth:
I am sometimes so very skeptical as to think Poetry itself a mere Jack a lathem to 
amuse whoever may chance to be struck with its brilliance - - As Tradesmen say 
every thing is worth what it will fetch, so probably every mental pursuit takes its 
reality and worth from the ardour o f the pursuer -  being in itself a nothing.2
Everything is nothing unless value is bestowed by a pursuer. What can the poet give, what
can the reader bring to the poem in order to make it beautifully true, truthfully beautiful?
What is the place of the poem and o f the human intelligence of which it is the product in
the phenomenal world? Keats continues,
Ethereal thing[s] may at least be thus real, divided under three heads -  Things real 
-  things semireal -- and no things — Things real -- such as existences of Sun Moon 
& Stars and passages of Shakespeare -- Things semireal such as Love, the Clouds & 
c which require a greeting of the Spirit to make them wholly exist — and Nothings 
which are made Great and dignified by an ardent pursuit -  Which by the by 
stamps the burgundy mark on the bottles of our Minds insomuch as they arc able 
to "consecrate whal’er they look upon."
This curious taxonomy o f phenomena displays the connection between the romantic
sensibility and Carruth’s understanding of bestowal. "Real things" are relatively autonomous
in their reality; they require little or no bestowal on our part in order to have full existence,
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for they are more generous than mere human intelligence. Shakespeare exists in this
celestial realm because he is an unacknowledged legislator; he has
promulgated laws that cannot be recognized as having positive (human and 
subjective) force because they act on us like natural (unconsciously or inescapably 
suffered) events.3
Love is semi-real; it requires "a greeting o f the Spirit," which in turn, or simultaneously,
frees the Spirit in self-creation. It is the freedom of making rather than the freedom of
affirming Things Real. Love shares this category with the Clouds; they both have a
heterogenous identity which is constantly in flux.
The third category is o f the completely abstract, "Nothings which are made Great
and dignified by an ardent pursuit." What exists here? If things real are external
phenomena, existing without our bestowal, if things semi-real achieve reality (if only for a
moment) by means of our bestowal, then perhaps the Nothing is really the agency or the
power of bestowal, perhaps it is the Nothing o f the human intelligence, which, quite
impossibly but quite actually, that is, quite absurdly, exists only when it is bestowing, in
that moment when it is "able to consecrate what it looks upon." This is a principle of
Romantic aesthetic which also runs deep in Carruth’s master Yeats:
While on the ship and street I gazed 
My body of a sudden blazed;
And twenty minutes more or less 
It seemed, so great my happiness,
That I was blessed and could bless. ("Vacillation")
In fact this momentary empowerment of the Spirit is what Carruth’s writings about
personality also assert: that it can exist only if it grants and actively participates in the
claims of other personalities to existence, in an equal existence.
The idea of the contingency of the personality, whether it exists in "erotic
bestowal," in "artistic" activities, in plowing a field, whatever, that idea functions in much
of Carruth’s poetry as a counter to both Romanticism and to depersonalization. On one
hand, by making the ego available as an object which can be mediated by experience, art
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can resist the egoism o f an uncontrolled, merely individualistic self-assertion. On the other 
hand, the freedom of choice in bestowal, in this case a part of artistic composition, resists 
the effacement o f the individual by the crowd. The idea of this second function is, of 
course, not new; it could be derived from Schiller, as well as from Keats. At any rate, the 
Romantic characteristics o f Carruth’s poetics lead to a question which we might well 
address here before going on to examine the poems themselves. It is not an inevitable 
question, or one which can be profitably applied to most twentieth-century poets. Given 
what we have said about Carruth’s relation to conventions and given his Romantic affinities, 
is Carruth a modernist?
One o f the requirements for an act o f creative bestowal is the acknowledgement of a 
phenomenal world. For Keats it was a personal solace as well: "The setting sun will 
always set me to rights — or if  a Sparrow come before my window I take part in its 
existence and pick about the gravel." For Yeats "the shop and the street" because they are 
quotidian in extreme require a bestowal so deep as to be a blessing. For Carruth, ■«. 
acknowledgement of the impersonal world issues not as realism, "the means of expression 
o f religious genius...or, at the other extreme, the artistic expression of monkeys," realism,
"the official aesthetic of a totalitarian revolution,"4 but rather, Carruth assents to the 
phenomenal world, which includes experience and memory, as one limit to aesthetic 
reflection. His is a style which "supposes the simultaneous existence of reality and of the 
mind that gives reality its form ."5
Carruth depends more upon experiential reality than upon alternative, merely 
aesthetic realities. There is indication that he sees the later attempt as one o f the failures of 
Modernism, a kind of failure exemplified, for example, by Gottfried Benn and Wyndam 
Lewis, "who would invent Being from the misapprehended dynamics of aesthetics" (WP,94). 
To Benn’s contention that "art as a means o f producing reality... this was the productive 
principle of the new art" (WP,94) Carruth responds with the assertion that the consequences
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in the social polity of this kind o f aesthetic stance have been murder, the warring that lias
characterized our century, the age which has left us
beyond all play-acting and romanticizing, recognizing (his) own true damaged soul.
W hat is left but to be sensible? We begin to confess that at last wc have gone 
backward, not forward; into the old reality, not the new; backward to an existential 
origin in the lowliest domain of experienced fact -  substance itself. Poetry’s 
misfortune is that it has not gone with us.(WP,94)
In his review, Charles Altieri writes that WP "may be one o f the best histories of twentieth-
century poetry we have," that "‘The Act o f Love, Poetry and Personality’ is the best
discursive essay by a contemporary poet."6 In criticizing what he assumes is an implicit,
linear argument in this collection (of assignments, written over a period of twenty years)
Altieri finds that "Carruth . . . becomes a symptom of the history he simultaneously reveals
and covers up." Carruth holds that a work of art is a life, "provided it be true to the
experiential core." Altieri finds this idea self-defeating as an attempt to overcome the kind
of modernism Carruth assigns to Benn and Lewis. Altieri writes,
Unless one invokes empiricist criteria which Carruth abhors, experience becomes a 
tautology for conscious life in general...This claim to truth is perhaps the most 
dangerous antireality because it allows no criteria to check the chain o f evasions it 
licenses.
Altieri thinks criteria can check evasions? Why is "experience” synonymous with "no 
criteria”? Carruth’s grounding of aesthetics in phenomenal reality is a function of his basic 
Yankee pragmatism. It is in no way an attack on the undefined (and thus monolithic) 
Modernism that Altieri praises for its "efforts to exemplify mental powers," a word, by the 
way, "exemplify," that suggests Altieri’s ideas of representation partake heavily of the 
symbolic, the distant, the spectatorial. Art, for Carruth, is human. Jazz is misery. When 
we read Carruth’s introductions, his reviews and essays, his introductory paragraphs in his 
anthology, wc see that he is an affectionate student of Pound, Eliot, Williams, Stevens, 
Zukofsky.
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In the mid-60s Carruth was learning more about the difference between the great
modernists o f enter-deux-guerres and the mid-century existentialists. That was in effect the
difference between his own education and what he himself was trying to do. Along with
the other secular existentialists of mid-century , Carruth tried
to move the affirmation implicit in consciousness back from the imagination to 
perceived reality, tried to reconnect the work of art to the historical fields of value, 
meaning morality, and to make artists responsible again ... For|the existentialists] art 
was not a thing, an object, a masterpiece, but an action, a continuity o f human 
assertion in the face o f the meaningless -- never self-sustaining but instead 
significant only and precisely in its ongoing expressive derivation from human 
suffering.(SI,89)
This is not in the book Altieri was reviewing, but the are plenty of expressions there of the
same idea. Altieri apparently finds suffering theoretically tractable, but for Carruth it serves
as a distinct fact. Carruth attacks the optimism underlying Altieri’s urge to fulfill his own
theory, and so too the kind of subversion that underlies Altieri’s ignorance of Carruth’s
acute qualifications. Altieri’s is the same optimism that assumes, as in the case o f Benn,
Lewis, and of Finnegan’s Wake, that a purely verbal antireality can be created, which will
"exemplify experience," and which will ignore the facts we actually have. What Carruth
says is that the poet at work is "spontaneously engendering imagery and verbal compounds
from the imagined structures o f remembered experience," with all of the freedom and error
in "imagined" and "remembered." Does, as Altieri suggests, Carruth omit from experience
"depersonalization or anti-realist formalism"? Hardly. This is what Carruth says in WP,
Poetry moves toward its own center, where the fount of language flows most freely. 
That is its going ahead, its renewal. It returns from the frontiers o f experience 
bearing chaos and revolution, the rawness of events, which it submits to the 
regulative conceptualizing of our permanent, concrete, basic human modes; that is to 
language.
This is the same dynamic Aspen describes in After The Stranger, making his "working 
definition o f personality: immense fluid congeries of experience, mnemonically constituted 
and metaphorically integrated." (ATS,101) This is not an attack on modernism.
Nor is the following, from WP, a "covering up"of history:
50
If theism was anthropomorphic, if humanism was anthrocentric, then our era is 
anthropo-eccentric; we exist on the edge o f reality. This is no intellectualization, 
but a profound and popular ethnological retooling. The consequent shift in values is 
immense. Now we recognize that in meaninglessness wc are our own sole value, 
and that art is our chief instrument in the imaginative creation of this value, the 
turning o f human experience into human meaning, the making of selves.
Carruth, like Dante, Pope, and Pound, insists on "the corrective function o f poetry, both in
language and in society -  in basic morality "(WP,200). Art is an instrument in becoming
human. He also insists,
Art is also our mystery...So be it...If the mystery is ever penetrated and art 
becomes a matter o f objective or a priori understanding, that will be the end of 
seriousness and the end o f humane, as distinct from technological, civilization. 
(Humane civilization began in the caves o f Lascaux.)
Carruth is not a theorist but he is communicative enough to speak directly about the high
seriousness and practicality o f his art - a s  well as about the implications o f his stance; he is,
as he admits in another essay, as much a product o f Amoldian cultural optimism as was,
say, Pound. This makes him seem available to A ltieri’s true objections, which depend on
the unstated critique o f what he perceives to be Carruth’s humanism, Carruth suffering from
his "pathetic need to find some haven from scientific versions of that |experiential| truth."
His point is the same one that Marcuse makes in his critique of Sartre, "in short, to say,
’Reality alone counts’ could be the motto o f total conformism; or worse: of a ’healthy’
acceptance o f rcalily."7 Marcuse calls attention to the idealizational qualities of Sartre’s
philosophy; it "must of necessity explain the inexplicable, rationalize the absurdity and thus
falsify its reality." Perhaps this is an inherent danger in the optimism that assumes a
coherent (man-made) system is possible. Camus rejected Sartre’s philosophy at least in part
because o f this tendency. Carruth, in turn, is particularly attracted to Cam us’ stoic,
pessimistic concept o f lucidity, to his clarity "which refuses all short-cuts and escapes, the
constant awareness that life has to be lived without appeal and without protection ... Man
accepts the challenge and seeks his freedom and happiness in a world where there is no
hope, sense, progress, and morrow."8 This is how Marcuse describes Camus. In Cam us’
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writing Carruth found a strong counter to his own tendencies to optimism and romance, and
we will discuss his interest further in a consideration of After The Stranger, directly.
Carruth answers Altieri’s objections to his dependence on an "experiential core" in
"The Defeated Generation," (SI) where he defines his ideological predicament. I quote at
length because many are unhappy about this and few communicative enough to say why:
How is it that those who wished forty years ago to desanctify the imagination, 
reduce it from the vatic role it had acquired in the romantic idealization o f human 
intelligence from the fourteenth century to the early decades o f the twentieth, how is 
it that these writers are today derided as Humanists by the advocates of 
deconstructive criticism, those who now call themselves Theorists? This is an old 
Marxists ploy, o f course, though Theorists are not all necessarily Marxists; yet, for 
most o f them, anyone who is anti-Hegelian enough to speak up for individuated
consciousness is a de facto Humanist with a capital H. (90)
H as in Hayden. This is not an attack on theory per se, or on Modernism or on the
academy directly; it is part o f an attack on meaninglessness and ugliness in society and on
the affirmation of that meaninglessness in theory and in action. Theorists may accept the
idea that a meaningless society must produce a meaningless art, but for Carruth writing is
an act of love, a bestowal toward wholeness, action in service of peace and restraint.
###
North W inter (1963)
North W inter, a poem in 58 parts, is a powerfully painterly vision o f the outer and the
inner north, a poem one might expect from a writer who had just moved north into the
woods of northwestern Vermont. In NW the bestowal of Keats and of Singer is evident in
the co-penetrations of human mind and landscape. Winter, like personality, is defined by
its particular qualities as they exist in relation with other, in this case natural and climatic,
states o f being.
In spring this mountain was a fish 
with blond scales 
in summer it was a crab 
with a green shell 
in fall it became a leopard
with a burnished coat 
in winter the mountain is a bird 
with lavender feathers 
and a still heart. (2)
This is another indication of what Carruth says about the textures o f his imagination in
"The Ravine" (Snow), "Unlike my bright admonitory friends I see relationships I do not see
things." As in the poem above, changes keep the time. Though W.C. W illiams’s music in
informative o f these short apercu, they are far far from his objectivist diclums (as far as
some of his own best poems).
The visual imagery in NW is startling in its brilliance and in its service of a
palpably and tenderly curious imagination:
Caught in the briery stars 
a lunar scrap
blurred
like paper flickering in a gale 
carrying away a scarcely remembered 
poem of a summer night. (6)
In his omnibus review Richard Howard, along with is praise for Journey, wrote that NW
was a "humanist recuperation of nature." One might say instead it is a "co-recruitmcnl," in
the way that Meriwether Lewis uses the word in his Journal, "We stopped to recruit our
m en " that is, to restore them. This recruitment however seems to be a restoral to
lucidity, rather than a sentimental, fantastic restoral to some essential stale of natural grace.
Yet, the co-penetration of the poet with the season and with the place is profound. Is this
a case of over-bestowal? Is it personification, that anthropocentric trope, to assert, "the
stove/ nibbles a few frozen slicks?" To write, beginning as he will extensively in Contra
Mortem, two words together, "snowapparelled" (a gambit which has here at least three
effects: the musical sound o f the word; then the logopoetic, that is, the snow on as tight as
apparelle, so the space is omitted; and then the visual double "1", 11, in apparelle, ideogram
of spruce trunks.) The speaker recognizes
A winter’s tale is told in
rumors o f snow
53
sneaping winds
the frail flux of identities 
tardy recognitions
the living stones.(ll)
Are we like the natural world in our "frail flux o f identities," which are full of "tardy
recognitions;" by the time we have named ourselves, have we already changed? What are
"living stones"? Is this a symbol, or an objective evaluation, o f the intractable nature of
any other identity, blank as a stone? How does it echo Y eats’s "The stone’s in the midst
o f all?" What are we to make o f the affective abstractions and the metaphorical qualities of
The song of the gray 
ninepointed buck 
contains much contains 
many contains all 
a whole north for 
example the sweet 
sharp whistling o f 
the redpolls caught 
overhead in the branches 
of the yellow birch 
like leaves left over 
from autumn and at 
night the remote 
chiming o f stars 
caught in the tines 
o f his quiet exaltation.(13)
Can a deer have "tines/ o f quiet exaltation?" Too metaphorical? ... unless... "tines" is
accurate in describing antlers. " O f  is the key. If an animal exalts, and that’s given, how
would that exalting, in self, be bodied forth? In a mammalian dendroanatomical structure
like antlers? An attractive proposition. This speculative empathy is somehow an
affirmation o f "the facts we actually have." And the poem is full of this kind of acute
poetic inquiry-through-the-limits-of-description.
In 11, an arctic owl is "the arctic owl" only for the moment when he is acting as
such, "a white thought o f love/ moving moving over the pasture to home." In 16, the snow
is seen as a sea, and in 19 there is a "time-lapse" image o f a fallen doe as she is eaten and
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disintegrates; the normal apperception of human time has been informed by earth-time, so-
called "geologic" time, change occurring across a longer space than the objectivist eye could
admit. These "tardy" recognitions allow a seeing-into, a introspection of phenomena, in
which, it seems to me, identities are discovered, rather than asserted. If there is meaning
for man, it exists in this world:
Blizzard trampling past has left 
the birches bent as in humiliation 
the soft scotch, pines laid down 
as in subjection the beeches snapped 
at the top as in a reign o f terror 
the balsams scarred but upright 
as in the dignity o f suffering an all 
the woods in sorrow as if  the world 
meant something.
The speaker surveys the damage from the storm as if he cares. The choric "as" mitigates,
in the poem, the appropriations of a metaphor; "as" functions as a grammatical limit to the
violent appropriation that the equivalence metaphor might have made. These perceptions
seem more like metempsychosis than expressions of a romantic doctrine of correspondence.
They are ironical, functioning as a riposte to the metaphorical impulse, especially in the
subjunctive tone o f the ending.
Section 29 is a perfected example o f "Natural surrealism," if  that term means
anything at all:
Tracks o f the snowshoe rabbit across the 
snow
are a ridiculous ominous alphabet of 
skulls.
The concern with tracks, with visual evidence results in one o f Carruth’s only "shaped"
poems, 32, a descending right to left, slanting poem about the vertical layers of vegetation
on "the wintering mountain." And the supernumerary quality of human intelligence is
evident in another section concerning, spoor-evidence:
In freshfallen snow 
marks o f pad and paw 
and even partridge claw
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go delicately and distinct 
straight as a string o f beads 
but marks of a heeled boot 
waver shuffle wamble 
ruckle the snow define 
a most unsteady line
then spell it out once
so
death knowledge being heady 
it hath not the beasts’ beauty 
goeth tricksy and ploddy 
and usually too damn wordy 
but drunken or topsyturvy 
gladhanding tea’d or groovy 
it arriveth 
it arriveth 
o you pretty lady.
As in all the other poems in NW, he has not made any punctuation marks except at the end 
o f the poem. The speed of voice created by that lack o f graphic punctuation is accentuated 
by the articulated words, like "freshfallen." The punctual notations are controlled from the 
inside, by the diction and by meter and by line -- and Carruth uses them all with an expert 
variety. In this poem we see the terseness of tone in the first strophe, a terseness which 
accentuates the pun o f "heeled boot," give way to an anglo-saxon logomachia worthy of 
Joyce or Cummings, but actually more reminiscent o f Roethke or Patchen.
NW  is fragmented but not open-ended. The very last section of the poem is an 
"Afterword: What the Poet Had Written." It begins with an ellipsis, indicating that the 
afterword comes somehow from an affect that has accumulated in reading the poem proper, 
so the afterword is not objective commentary; it is instead a responsive revision and 
reconstruction o f each and all o f the other sections. It is also indicative o f the theme: 
personality has a destination, but one cannot know any o f the characteristics o f that 
destination before arrival, that is, the journey is fragmented, but not infinite. Winter ends.
The end o f the journey in this case is, as a note tells us, "the poet thinking of the 
arctic expedition of 1909, lead by Commander Peary, who had preserved for himself and
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his negro ’servant,’ M atthew Henson, the honor o f the final dash to the pole." What they 
reach is the lonely interior pole:
...nothing they were nothing 
afloat on nothing frozen by the winds of 
nothing under the meaningless glare o f nothing’s 
eye there where the compass points down 
there where the needle turns in...
The interior north is a real place. The afterword directly raises the question o f what that
fact means, what is it, how am I, how can I know. How can 1 know?
They drew back not in
fear for fear had consumed itself 
but as the painter retreats from his canvas
and so they saved themselves now seeing 
how this was the only virtue the withdrawing
mind that steadies before reality and they 
turned slowly together through the whole
arc o f absurdity with outstretched hands 
bestowing cold benediction on the north
and then sank down Another confrontation 
murdered them as they peered in each other’s 
eyes...
In Carruth’s next book, After The Stranger, the painter-protagonist Aspen will literally
retreat from his canvas in order to steady his mind. And both visions are relentless and
scary. There is a moment o f being, as they bestow "cold benedictions on the north", (futile
though that might be). Upon the advent of the sense of community this bestowal incites,
the mutual gaze, each sees his own hollowness reflected in fee other. If true north is
an interior state, o f absolute zero, o f blank landscape, if, as N W ’s last lines say, " ...north
is/ nothing...," then it is a nothing that in desperation rebels against its own nothingness:
...north is a horror from which a horror grows
a purity and a fervor to which in opposition 
an equal purity and fervor supervene north
is fee latitude of the near remote lying 
beyond hope beyond despair lying in destination ...
In an essay, "Who I Am," (Sulfur 1, 1981) Carruth begins by quoting among others Andre
Breton," There is too much of the north in me to be a man who complies entirely." The
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purities and fervors o f metaphysical rebellion create constant change, constant change in, 
given the journeying topos, destination. It is "in the latitude o f the near remote." The 
ideal, the goal, gives the sense o f being distant, no matter how close. This is the nature of 
the self; self is the destination, the only point where man may stand in the chaotic 
complexities o f his relations. It is here, beyond hope or despair, wc arc.
i t  i j  i i
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After The Stranger: Imaginary Dialogues with Camus (1965)
To the existential task o f making his own rebellion Carruth brings his understanding of the 
concepts o f bestowal and his insistence on responding to the obligations of the world 
outside him self and his art. He also brings a sophisticated understanding of the existential 
movement in Western literature. His introduction to Sartre’s Nausea (New Directions, 1965) 
is a thumbnail sketch o f existentialism in America after WWII and o f existentialism in 
literature. On Carruth’s account, though it had precursors far back in Western thought and 
culture, existentialism is primarily a modern impulse, springing primarily from Nietzsche 
and Kierkegaard, with their "profound concern for the fate of the individual person," and, in 
literature, from Dostoevsky. Yet despite evidence o f existentialism in the twentieth century, 
in Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Ortega, Berdyaev, in Kafka, Lawrence, Hesse, Camus,
Faulkner, et al„ it resists, by its very nature, pinpoint definition; it is "not a product of 
antecedent intellectual determinations, but a free transmutation of living experience," or in 
the summary existential dictum, existence precedes essence (and moral authority precedes 
aesthetic strategy). That it is is more important than how it can be described, but, to 
accede to the demands o f the objective realm of our study, we can perhaps define Carruth’s 
position, for the moment.
Without rejecting reason, he insists on the limits o f rationalism. In this he is
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explicitly anti-Hegelian:
Hegelianism was the philosophy of history and the mass. By projecting a Final 
Reality toward which all history flows in a process of ever-refining synthesis, Hegel 
submerged the individual consciousness in a grand unity o f ideal mind.(intro to 
Sartre)
We can see the drive toward unity in some of Carruth’s poems, in "Ignis" (Journey), and in 
the existence of the Afterword in North W inter, which though it is fragmented is not open- 
ended. These unities are not seen as final, but are contingent; they arc not ideal but actual. 
They assume neither a terminal perspective nor an ideal organization of parts, in fact their 
existence is fortuitous. Here is Carruth’s Jamesian quality. In ATS Aspen believes that 
William James saw
a world which contained contingency, discontinuity, and in which the centers of 
experience were irreducibly plural and personal, as against a "block" universe that 
could be enclosed in a single rational system.
For Carruth, the victory of the logical over the illogical, the definite over the indefinite in a
rational unity is not only an illusion, it is morally wrong:
For the Existentialist, who insists that reality is only what he him self knows and 
experiences, this [rational unity] is meaningless. Not only that, it is cruel and 
coercive. The Existentialist knows that the self is not submerged, it is present, here 
and now, a suffering existent, and any system o f thought that overrides this 
suffering is tyrannical, (intro to Sartre)
Despair arises from the acknowledgement that the self may be formless, inconceivable, that
existence is inherently valueless. Yet, from that despair, not the least part of which is its
loneliness at not finding a place in the history of Platonic metaphysics, comes an existential
integrity that finds, in love, a basis for action in the face o f absurdity.
Carruth’s brand o f existentialism is not a humanism if, as Sartre writes, by
humanism one means "a theory which upholds man as the end-in-itself and as the supreme
value."9 For Carruth, as we have seen, this anthrocentric vision of reality is untenable.
But existentialism is a humanism insofar as it reminds
man that there is no legislator but himself, that he himself, thus abandoned, must 
decide for himself; also ... it is not by turning back on himself, but always by 
seeking, beyond himself, an aim which is one o f liberation or of some particular
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realization, that man can realize himself as truly human. 10 
This is not the romantic impulse that seeks the self in nature, instead it seeks a self in the 
delicate, suspended flux o f rebellion, in the moment, in action.
Carruth ascribes to Sartre "a classically brilliant French mind," which functions in 
the Cartesian tradition, that is, it assumes the cogito, "the self-that-is and the self that 
observes the self-that-is." This duality generates other dualities, "knowing-doing, being- 
becoming, nature-freedom, etc." In short, Sartre has not totally abandoned rationalist 
categories; he is a trained philosopher and he advances his theory logically. Camus is 
different and for Carruth the poet, more attractive. I w on’t address the question of whether 
Camus is properly an existentialist, but clearly Carruth perceives a difference between him 
and Sartre. Sartre’s elaboration o f the structure and the ethics of existentialism is 
philosophical in that "it abstracts from the historical factors which constitute the empirical 
concreteness."11 Carruth rejects this method because, as we noted above, it tends to 
"falsify reality." Camus emphasizes the personal correlatives o f philosophy; each man is 
exemplary o f moral values, as opposed to the idea o f an incarnation o f values. (Wc will 
discuss this idea more, in terms o f its meaning for representation, in chapter four.)
Camus, however one describes the content o f his thought, is, in method, not a 
theoretical philosopher but a moralist, his fabulous fictions in evidence. Carruth is attracted 
to Cam us’ concern for moral limits, his concern for the limits of philosophy in regard to 
suffering, his concerns about the limits o f erotic action and romance, and especially his 
concern about the limits o f art as a means of revolt. Carruth finds these limits for himself 
(though not by himsell) in a book which is perhaps the most extravagant of his career, in 
itself exploring the generic limits o f critical discourse and of fictional narrative. After The 
Stranger: Imaginary Dialogues with Camus is most revealing o f Carruth’s positions on the 
concepts of absurdity, lucidity, revolt, hope, and love, and it is essential to an understanding 
o f the development o f his poetry.
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ATS is at once a work o f fiction and o f criticism, the story o f the moral and 
metaphysical search o f Aspen, a painter, who bears at times a remarkable psychological and 
physical resemblance to Carruth. The action is relatively simple. Aspen is recovering from 
an emotional illness that resulted in a nervous breakdown. He paints alone in his one-room 
studio, making hundreds of drawings and paintings of a 9x5 "loaf-shaped," smooth, gray 
stone, by which he is entranced. He reads the newspapers, Partisan Review. He goes 
outside in his suburb or into the city only at night. "As for the internal aspects o f his life, 
they were indescribable." He is also entranced by Cam us’ The Stranger, with the meaning 
of the book and in particular with M eursault’s motive for killing the Arab, the act which 
precipitates his incarceration and trial. Is Meursault completely volitionless? Aspen is 
intrigued because he, like Meursault, is essentially a non-participant in his own life. Aspen 
keeps a diary which includes his notes on The Stranger. Finally he decides to seek an 
answer from Camus in person. He flies to France.
Part Two opens with a conversation between Aspen and Camus, who is being 
sketched by Aspen as they talk. In part Three, summer arrives. Camus goes away for six 
months, while Aspen, somehow stabilized by the initial conversations, spends his time 
meditating on and developing his responses to absurdity, lucidity, death, neurosis, and 
personality, the topics o f their conversations. In Part Four, in November, Camus and Aspen 
travel south in a car Aspen has bought, an act o f expectation and assertion that suggests his 
psychic healing. They arrive at a run-down, secluded villa on the Mediterranean. It is 
inhabited by an Algerian, D ’Arrast, and an attractive Frenchwoman, Dora. The discussion 
o f The Stranger continues, including now D ’Arrast and Dora, who becomes Aspen’s lover. 
D ’Arrast, it turns out, is a member o f the FLN, and he is in France to try to convince his 
long-time friend Camus to make a public statement "totally disavowing the French cause in 
Algeria." Camus eloquently defends his refusal to do so, and thereby raises other issues, 
most importantly about art as action and about the aesthetics o f revolt.
The final section begins just before Christmas. The group breaks up with the 
intention o f coming together again after the holiday. Dora and Aspen go to Italy, where he 
breaks a leg in a skiing accident. A romantic idyll ensues, during which Dora, a former 
prostitute, offers her own surprisingly acute perspectives on Cam us’ work and personality, 
noting, as Aspen had not guessed, that Cam us’ behavior indicated that he is in the process 
o f writing a book. They return to the villa on December twenty-ninth. D ’Arrast is there. 
Camus returns on New Year’s Eve, and after dinner that night there s a denouement. 
Existentially contingent, o f course. A few days pass; Camus continues writing. And in the 
final conversation, in regard to some self-deprecating remarks he has made earlier about the 
social role o f the artist and about the necessity o f effacing romantic notions of art, Camus 
reaffirms art’s place in revolt and the artist as "princes of lucidity." D ’Arrasl departs for 
the guerrilla war. Camus goes back to Paris. Dora and Aspen, who is no longer quaking, 
drive to Switzerland.
The prose style in the story is a bit odd. At the beginning it it arch, cute, too 
aware o f itself. Carruth had already written a novel, Appendix A (1963), and the beginning 
of this book shares the flaws of that one. Aspen’s diary, functioning in reference as a kind 
o f internal monologue, is set o ff in the text by heavy brackets, a device which is not only 
unnecessary but distracting. There are sentences such as "Clothing hung despondently on 
hooks, like flayed beeves; shoes, with their protective coloring, lay doggo on the floor," 
which, because of the facility of their metaphors and the emotional distance between the 
matter-of-fact tone of the narrative and the hysteria which might validate these perceptions, 
seem quite awkward. The prose becomes more literal and more forceful as the book 
progresses. Perhaps this is in deliberate mimesis of Aspen’s increasing lucidity. More 
likely the unpruned metaphoricity o f the writing is a sign that the book should have been 
written over again. Carruth was writing a great deal during this time, in addition to 
learning the necessities o f living in the woods.
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The primary significance o f ATS is its full-scale elaboration of the concepts to 
which Carruth will return for the next twenty years, those which define his understanding of 
existentialism. They can be stated simply without loo much distortion. First come the 
concepts of absurdity and lucidity. If there is no god, and death and obliteration are 
inevitable, what can any act mean? Action cannot change the fact o f obliteration, and, 
short o f that, its efficacy is laughable. In the face o f obliteration, by all normal standards 
o f hopeful action, existence is itself absurdly meaningless, and it becomes more absurd 
every time that death intrudes into life in the forms o f fear, fear o f death, that fear the 
source o f "all anxiety, all terror" (ATS,81). This fear is what creates neurosis, which is, 
like death, like the State, a form o f depersonalization. Camus believes that with lucidity, 
that is, by concentrating on death, death, the mother o f absurdity, we gain a sense of 
"values" in life. Through attention to the terminal nature o f our responsibilities, through 
that teleology, we can resist the depersonalizing effects o f meaninglessness; we can create 
ourselves as persons in rebellion, not against the fact o f death, but against the 
depersonalizing forces of death-in-life.
Aspen however believes at one point that Cam us’ Sisyphus is happy not because of 
his lucidity but because he is immortal. And if  he agrees with Camus that we cannot 
dissolve anxieties with an act o f faith, he also disagrees about the ability of lucidity to 
confront absurdity, Simply, Aspen thinks, lucidity is too static a notion to be realistic.
Scorn and rejection of death-in-life are not enough, and lucidity is intermittent. Something 
else is necessary for the creation o f personality. For Aspen, not coincidentally given his 
erotic relationship with Dora, that necessity exists in the limited possibilities o f erotic love.
There will be another discussion o f the dynamics o f existential eroticism in chapter 
four, but the seminary o f this espousal is here in ATS. On Cam us’ account (or o f course 
on Carruth’s Cam us’ account) it is "in opposition, lucid opposition, [thatj one becomes
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crystallized, so to speak, one is delimited and identified." But to Carrulh-Aspcn this sounds 
a bit too neat. He is deeply involved with Dora, and it is sex that has led him to 
happiness. He sees that absurdity comes from within as well as without; to love is to
overcome death-in-life, the anxiety that prevents the creation of personality -  but erotic
engagement also creates the most dangerous and destructive consequences; it is the hotbed 
o f human error.
For Aspen-Carruth successful revolt comes from lucidity plus strength. He needs an 
exterior source o f strength: "it must be a fellowship which is intimate and personal and 
responsive. In the nature o f things, this means a sexual relationship" (163). Camus, the 
character, believes that love leading to that kind of solidarity is fortuitous, rare, because sex 
is bodily, mechanical, grounded in physiological not ethical necessity. D ’Arrast tells Aspen 
later that Camus had been bound to reject Aspen’s radical hope for eroticism because he 
was a romantic instinctively, deeply, "and as an artist he has to exclude it. He knows if he 
permitted him self to follow his bent, he’d be overboard in a minute, and he’s deathly afraid 
o f it"(138). Again sex as a source of freedom will be one o f the topics to which we will 
pay attention in considering Carruth’s objections to Thoreau, but to summarize it for the 
moment: liberated sex is not a tyranny o f human physiology. Nor should desire rule life. 
(Erotic, like intellectual, discourse is not reality, but it contributes heavily). Presumably the 
decision to abstain is also an act o f freedom, provided it is a positive decision and a
personal decision, not necessarily an ethical necessity
In addition to being an important account of Carruth’s erotic brand of existentialism, 
ATS also reveals in many ways his attitudes about literary influence. Camus is a master 
writer. Aspen has gone to him to find personal resolutions. As Aspen makes his own 
exegesis of M eursault’s character, his sketches of Camus gaze down on him in various 
demeanor o f approbation and concern. Camus as a personality is always with Aspen, as in 
his writings he is with Carruth. In his afterword note to ATS Carruth says that the book is
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an effort "to combine homage with inquiry," that is, to personalize the analysis. This is 
how the book got its form, an imaginary dialogue, a form which is logically consistent with
Carruth’s feelings about influence and the community o f artists. Elsewhere he quotes
Longinus:
"similarly from the great natures o f  the men of old there are borne in upon the 
souls o f those who emulate them (as from sacred caves) what we may describe as 
effluences, so that even those who seem little likely to be possessed are thereby 
inspired and succumb to the spell o f the others’ greatness." This is [Carruth adds] 
the inspiration that comes not from "originality, which in any case is a delusion, but
as confirmation, the best and only reliable inspiration we can hope for. (Ef,3)
ATS is essentially a collaboration, as are all honest critical acts save theories so pure they
do not touch the work itself. ATS is a rewriting o f Camus, and the question of originality
is not an issue, though it is elsewhere for Carruth. In his "Foreword" to Stephen Berg’s
With Akmatova At the Black Gates: Variations, Carruth writes,
The use o f cultural reference in art is not, as some anti-intellectuals think, to show 
off the artist’s learning; nor is it, a some intellectuals think, primarily to reinforce 
meanings. It is to strengthen the companionship of artists living and dead so that 
their action may be more cogent throughout the polity. With exactly this in mind, 
Pound called his rewriting o f  Propertius an "homage." 12
Carruth’s emulation o f Camus takes an even more impressive personal form than in ATS.




In Carruth’s critical fiction, After The Stranger, the painter-protagonist, Aspen, asks Camus 
if it is true that The Myth O f Sisyphus and The Stranger are "more or less coeval, so to 
speak, the essayistic and fictional sides of the same coin." Camus replies, "They come 
from the same sources, yes." This relationship also exists between ATS and the next major 
work o f Carruth’s, the poetic sequence Contra Mortem, which is, according to Carruth, "in a 
way a versification o f After The Stranger, as far apart as they are in style, structure, etc."
In this poem, dedicated to Denise Levertov and Adrienne Rich "who read it first," Carruth’s 
huge lyric talent works absolutely in harmony with his newly won and rapidly increasing 
awareness of existential writer. It is his first fully mature work. There are of course 
echoes o f other poets here, but they are subsidiary; Carruth is soaring with his own voice.
Carruth wrote Contra Mortem (CM) in his converted cow shed at his home in 
Johnson, Vermont, at great speed, a 15-line paragraph a day for a month. It gives evidence 
o f this speed not with the Williamsesque typography he attempted in the third part of 
Journey To A Known Place, "Aer," but in the many word-combinations, two words into 
one, that he had made in North W inter, and in the omission of punctuation except for the 
period terminating each paragraph. Instead there are space notations within the paragraphs, 
the same paragraphics that he used in The Asylum. Here he has mastered the length, the 
rhyme, and it seems to go effortlessly; and the effect o f the writing goes beyond the former 
limit o f the technique.
The poem appeared in its first version in a relatively huge issue of Poetry (v.106, 
1&2, April-May 1965), which consisted of long poems in progress — by Carruth, Wendell 
Berry, Robert Creeley, Ronald Johnson, Galway Kinell, and Denise Levertov, et al. Carruth 
published the poem himself under the Crow’s Mark imprint in 1967 in an issue of 250 
copies. He has said he published himself in an effort to see if  he could do as good or
better a job  than other houses, large and small, had done. The poem was reprinted in For 
You (New Directions 1970).
Contra Mortem is nothing less than a discursion upon the ground, the components 
o f being. I refrain from using the analytically determined rubric "ontological" for reasons 
both existential and practical. The poem is not a study o f the ground of being, though its 
parts can be parted so; it is a being. After The Stranger embodied this consideration 
dramatically. CM is a discovery and a bodying forth o f the self within and extensible of 
its infinite relations with wife, with child, with village, with the natural world, and, perhaps 
most significantly, with the inner source of absurdity, human intelligence and imagination.
In probing towards its center, or its margins, as you will, the motive historically sanctioned 
by ... by itself, the mind in its own peregrinations finds nothing. He finds Nothing. This 
mystery is confronted again and again. It becomes a consummating refrain in the lyric 
structure o f the sequence:
There in the huge fire 
that rusts every thing away in the opening middle 
where the world falls in forever There There.
Call it a comprising 
call it the center and edge o f every relation 
the joum eyer’s pivot and the joum eyer’s horizon.
With a desolate 
cry falling felling falling into the star 
the candleflame the spark and through and out 
in the noplace where all the nothings never are.
In "The Nothing II," the third-from -last paragraph, before the affirmation that is in effect
the same as the one Camus makes before his exit in ATS, Carruth locates and evaluates the
end o f existence as it has been, is, will be reached by rational human intelligence.
Where the child’s eyes glaze with memory where the m an’s glaze
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with foreknowledge and how they darken and alter
to vacancy as when the shifting breeze
ramps like a closing shutter
on the deeplighted bay look in the wom an’s eyes
bravely in the moment o f rapture when the skies
loom between her lashes o r look there
in the m irror at those eyes bend closer
and closer still look in the black pupils
where other eyes appear
and in them others infinitely infinitely pools
o f incomprehension look the fear
is nothing look the courage nothing the song
has no consequence look look it is here
nothing nothing nothing nothing nothing
No breaks. This is an ensemble o f the poet’s concern for the coordinates of personality. It
assumes the burden and extends the refrain o f the sequence. It is helpful to remember here
what Aspen, the painter-protagonist o f After The Stranger, wrote in his diary:
the limits o f lucidity are extensible . . . First through the normal effort of 
concentration; second, and more important, through the faculties of anticipation and 
retrospection . . . This corroborates the faculties of memory and prevision | which j have no 
power to rationalize a mindless existence; but they do render it less terrifying (ATS 88).
Later Aspen writes,
If  the personality is held to be a structure o f memory, the past, at any rate, is 
important. In a completely real sense we live in it as well as on it. Yet without 
hope.
He says that for him the present has never been real, which is 
radically different from Camus. He continues,
It is possible to live in time without living in history. Not only possible but
necessary, just as it is necessary to live in meaninglessness without living in 
derangement. And because prevision is only memory inverted, the corollary is this: 
it is possible to live in expectation without living in hope.
Finally he concludes,
Memory and expectation, not to be confused with history and hope. Happiness has 
no present, lucidity no rest. Existence is without value or values. Yet it is not, 
because o f this, necessarily devoid of order.
In Contra Mortem Carruth has imposed poetic order on the concepts of memory and
prevision. The first two lines of "The Nothing II," above, are presaged by the three
previous paragraphs, "The Being As Memory," "The Being As Moment," and "The Being
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As Prevision." The first is a phantasmagoria o f images, beginning and ending with :a 
carpet raveling on a loom," images o f women, war, music. "The Being As Moment" 
begins by positing the present moment as "Between a sea and a sea where the combers 
meet/ in the cancellations o f their endless breaking/ between a dream and a dream where 
the night/ arrests in eternal waking." The present is enigma, defined not by essential 
characteristics but by its perceived limits. The paragraph ends with a question: "will the 
lovers on that continually dying/ wave of sensation ever really know/ what they know their 
drift and their expiring/ between a sea and a sea in the faint starglow?" The eerie 
crepuscular loneliness is a tone characteristic of Carruth’s discursion on his understanding of 
self-creation, lonely, rebellious and sad. Writing is itself an act o f creation, rebellious and 
assertive in its creation, elegiac insofar as it sets new limits on previously unlimited 
possibility, a lamentable act:
The pen
wrote freedom ’s elegy nothing less 
than ultimate aggrievment for the cost 
o f m ind’s disablement in loneliness 
and for the natural things so wrongly lost.
"The Being As Prevision" is a dramatization o f human searching, a tragedy where being
flits like a moth in a fantastic landscape which also has real characteristics. Any meaning,
any understanding, all cogency is brief; "through a gap the source/ bums bums for a
dazzling instant and then turns blank." The title in the original version is "The Being As
Vision," and this condition of brevity might well describe also moment and memory; as
Aspen noted, they are all three the same, equal in their contribution to being. They fonn
its limits and the limits o f poetic voice as well. Voice, and style, are part memory, part
moment, and part expectation. With the child’s memory and the m an’s foreknowledge
comes hope, which in its constant failures of teleology finds back nothing, the same nothing
in "the wom an’s eyes when the skies/ loom between her lashes", that is, the romantic
impulse that tries to find self in other, reflective in love, is also empty. Carruth agrees
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with D.H. Lawrence: "All vital truth contains the memory of that for which it is not true."
This is especially true for the erotically inclined self, which according to its own
demand, shortly finds that is is no longer suffering the light of the other or of "that time."
The eyes o f the self in the mirror, an image o f self-sufficiency, o f asceticism and its
attendant narcissicism, are also a mirror. But finally none of these acknowledgements of
oblivion are consequential. The five "Nothing"’s in the final line resume the allusion to
Lear's last words begun in "look there" in the seventh. Lear ends:
And my poor fool is hanged: no, no, no life?
Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life,
And thou no breath at all? Thou’lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never ...
Do you see this? Look on her. Look on her lips,
Look there, look there.
He dies. In this aural allusion Carruth has reversed the order of the phrases in Lear’s 
lines. This has not only a poetic, but a philosophic affect. Instead of the exoteric nature 
of Lear's mirage, Carruth moves from the exoteric, using the imperative to look chorically 
(meaning look and see), to the esoteric, the internal existence o f it: "it is here/ nothing 
nothing nothing nothing nothing." This reflects part o f the cohesive design o f the larger 
structure o f the poem. The end of time, of voice, the moment of death, if you will, is 
recapitualted as memory, to a primary position. (A clairvoyant and immediate acceptance of 
death defines Camus’s concept o f lucidity.) The movement o f the song is then from the 
remembered past to the remembered present. This is evident in "the Child" and "The 
Child’s Being." In the first the child is "Backward rocking" looking up in his immaturity 
and falling down, "extended a being from his arse to his three wits/ real to ideal and then 
gets up/ weeping..." A fabulous history of philosophy is here. In his Platonic search , his 
confusions o f rationalism, his ideal-looking urging, he fails, falls into the real. The 
description o f him is breech-first, like Carruth’s inversions o f Lear’s speech. Here, crudely 
put, arse = real, head = ideal. The failure o f Platonism, existentialism ’s seminary, is the
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reason the child gets up weeping. Weeping into romanticism and the failures o f that 
response to the failures o f Rationalism. "The Great Death" concludes:
The children went back 
to school where a few of them comprehended 
that what was called their questing was their lack.
This is another allusion, condensed, symbolic, and dramatic, this time to Plato’s
Symposium, where Socrates forces Agathon to admit that love, or Eros, lacks beauty,
because that is what it seeks in the beloved.
"The Child’s Being," paragraph 21, begins "Extended and always uncentered" and
says later the child is "a stranger to the pronominal itch..." That itch is of course "I." This
is a good thing. Is this another child? Yes, the first was the allegorized child, allegorized
by the poet himself. Here is the existential child who
puts on 
his being as the dark world 
in its necessity puts on the dawn 
by turning toward it The child 
trembling in halflight giving him self away 
becomes sun’s favor the choice of what is not willed 
a being freebom and intricate like the day.
It would take pages fully to unpack these lines, but a few comments may suffice. Carruth,
against all reason, is here asserting the necessity, necessity for him is a very important
word, of desire, the inherent impossibility o f escaping desire. To want the other and to
give one’s self away. To choose what is not willed. This is the paradox o f existence, to
which we must assent if we will survive. Look at the line " his being as the dark world."
What else can we have of the world except each dark, darkened other? The child to the
father? The father to the child? Carruth’s existentialism is not so programmatic that he
can refuse an homage to Wordsworth.
Surely the abyss of nothing, falling away on every side, invites insanity, that
reactive, often reflective chaos. But as Aspen noted, existence is not "necessarily devoid of
order." That order again is defined by its limits, not by its essence. A lter "The Nothing
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II" the next and penultimate paragraph, "The Wheel o f Being I," resounds with against the
limits o f words and o f personalities, the "being" o f the poem:
Changing figures The dionysian child
the woman in her assurances the old town
in its hallucinations spilled
like dominoes the mountain
and the void the moon and the sun whirled
from misthidden vale to vale and the day coiled
in the forest A word is like an ant
dragging a dead spider the meant
and the unmeant ...
People come first, then human evidence, the town in its aleotropic imposition, then the 
natural world, in which "the void" has reality equivalent to the mountain. Is this too an 
inversion, a artful recapitulation? I can’t say. But regardless o f order, all o f these exist 
both as they are and also in the relatively intractable medium o f language. They define the 
self, which exists on the page, as a voice.
So upon ragged changing seas 
the poem which is a ship 
buoyed by its hollowness on the abstruse 
coordinates o f meaning carries the loop 
o f its horizon forever with it Scan 
this circle vanishing across the deep 
It is contrived it is actual it is a man.
The poem is a ship, transporting self, or being, and the cargo necessary for self-sustenance.
The horizon-bound world o f the poem-ship-man is an image o f the radically perspeclival
and subjective nature of meaning. But as a poem it is an object in the real world both
sensible and unknowable, the only evidence o f personality. Contrivance and actuality arc of
course not exclusive states, nor is there a moral or phenomenological hierarchy: to be is not
to be essentially, to be more or less as in the Platonic dualism between real and ideal: to
be is to be m ade. The poem does not express or symbolize man; the poem is a man.
Searching. The navigational imagery also comes from Aspen: "Our minds and bodies arc
innately attuned to action, to launching. We launch ourselves upon the sea of the possible
person. The point is to do it in the manner of a swimmer, not in the manner o f a
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suicide."
The final paragraph, beautifully climactic in its rhythms, suggests the contingency,
the hopelessness o f lucid self-creations. We have nothing else.
Such figures if they succeed are beautiful
because for a moment we brighten in a blaze o f rhymes
and yet they always fail and must fail
and give way to other poems
in the endless approximations o f what we feel
Hopeless it is hopeless Only the wheel
endures It spins and spins winding
the was the is the willbe out of nothing
and thus we are Thus on the wheel we touch
each to each a part
o f the great determining reality How much 
we give to one another Perhaps our art 
succeeds after all our small song done in the faith 
o f lovers who endlessly change heart for heart 
as the gift o f  being Come let us sing against death.
To keep coming near to what we feel to be the moment o f full being, but never arriving.
The "was" o f memory, the "is" of moment, the "willbe" of prevision are themselves
contrived out o f nothing, as is Carruth’s greatest poem, The Sleeping Beauty, a poem made
"out of nothing," "by no one." There is a determining reality; it is in constant llux,
composed o f other realities, other personalities. Being is determined within the community
where the claims to existence o f each and every other being must be acknowledged. The
first version o f the poems reads,
thus we touch 
and are the coglike parts 
o f one another’s reality Each to each 
is the eternity o f the personal source 
therefore some are moralists and some have faith 
but some who live in the free exchange o f hearts 
as the gift o f being are lovers against death.
The language here is more technical and less charming, positively analytical and normative,
taxonomic, but more emphatic about the necessity o f choice. The refused to admit, with
whatever degree of generosity, is what separates murderers from lovers. Heart must be
changed for heart. There is no question about the moral imperative here. And hearts are a
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symbol o f identity in flux, flux for, that is, in service of, existence. And the directive is
change, not exchange. The difference is all about love, love which insists we sing together
against death, contra m ortem .
Carruth has written over and over about the kind of self-definition he advocates, "a
transcendent subjectivity, not the ego. The absolute self in poetry is what creates and
responds to rhyme and meter, the sensual, the expressive . . . Absolute selfhood is neither
vain nor humble, for these are qualities solely o f the reactive ego in the subjective world."
This absolute selfhood is evident in the extreme music of Contra M ortem , the selfhood of a
poet firmly in control o f all he knows, all practical wisdom and all poetic technique. Yet
this selfhood is non-egoistic. There are 450 lines in this poem; the words "1," or "my," or
any o f the forms by which the ego asserts itself in the objective world are completely
absent. This teachis the practical wisdom of the poem, which insists upon its own 
usefulness from the epigraph at the beginning, from Lao-tse:
Thirty spokes unite in one nave
and because o f the part where nothing is
we have use o f the wheel.
Contra Mortem is a wise and useful poem, to which concerned readers of Carruth’s 
poetry will go again and again, not only for its force and beauty, but also because it allows 
us to trust his whole work, even poems, parts o f poems, to which we cannot fully assent.
It marks the beginning o f the period o f his best work, the best period o f one of the most 
accomplished poets of our time.
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Chapter Three
"I live where Frost lived.
So? Its a free country. D on’t 
jum p to conclusions." (from The Clay Hill
Anthology)
From Snow and Rock, from Chaos (1973), Dark World (1974), Brothers, I Loved You All 
(1978), If You Call This Cry a Song (1983)
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Although these four books were published across a decade, they can be seen in one 
way as all o f a piece; they are all books heavily concerned with place, with Vermont. The 
poems in all were written during roughly the same period. From Snow includes poems from 
1965-72, Brothers, poems from 1969-77, and Cry is, as Carruth says in the prefaclory note, 
a miscellany o f poems written as early "as 1964 or 1965, the latest in 1979." This is 
roughly the time from the first publication o f Contra Mortem and the magazine appearance 
o f poems in Snow to the time of the composition o f poems that were written 
simultaneously with the final revisions of The Sleeping Beauty. Most o f the poems in Cry 
were "published in magazines but then were mislaid among accumulations of other paper or 
were intentionally omitted from the books they might have gone into because there wasn’t 
room ... some poems that I remember, though not well enough to reconstruct them, have 
failed to turn up." This in no way implies the poems in Cry are inferior. They are not.
Carruth has said that on these occasions, when the publisher wanted to publish a 
book shorter than the one he proposed, he himself usually got to chose which poems stayed 
in the manuscript, or, rather, which poems went together into another book.l Therefore the 
poems in each of these books were deliberately chosen by Carruth -  for reasons 
presumably other than the order of composition. The back cover of Snow, which Carruth 
certainly okayed (if not wrote himseli) describes the book as "a selection of his best short 
poems written between 1965 and 1972." Dark World was originally part of the same 
manuscript with Snow. Brothers contains only 28 o f the many 15-line paragraphs, separate 
from The Sleeping Beauty, which have never been published. Though each of these books 
has a particular thematic character, because o f their similarities it seems productive to 
discuss them at once, and to discuss individual poems in regard to their place in the 
development of larger patterns in Carruth’s poetics, which will be the topics o f the final
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three chapters.
To grant the books their deserved integrities o f response and of voice, though, we
should first consider them as discreet issues. From Snow and Rock, from Chaos (New
Directions, 1973) is as good an introduction to Carruth’s work as any single collection. In
these exquisitely fine lyrics about love, about family, about psychological incapacities and
courages, about the natural world, Carruth responds with his full range o f poetic perception.
Each poem gives evidence o f Carruth’s training in the variety o f lyric modes; the pace of
the poetry is expert, as many readers have noted. Normally blurbage solicited by publishers
is critically negligible (and negligent), but on the back cover of Snow is a response by
George Dennison, playwright and author of The Lives o f Children, Oilers and Sweepers,
and Luisa Domic; his assessment goes right to the essential qualities o f Carruth’s
accomplishment in this book. It is enthusiastic, of course, but also evocative and precise:
...What effects me most is the way these qualities combine, their drive toward 
wholeness -- its how the poet’s moments o f deep feeling arrive. I’ll say it crudely: 
they’re gobbets rather than feelings, flesh and thought together. But not at all in 
the technical sense. It’s as if a piece of music were to include the felt outcries of
the musicians. These moments are so alive, so immediate, that I take their context
to be their actual coming about, something unmediated and direct. The effect is 
tension, conflict, even harshness, getting ripe and opening into resolutions that are 
beautiful and exciting. I think there is a very human faith underlying this process, 
faith not only in art but in some sort of dialectic of error, pain and virtue, the
tendency o f the spirit to clarify itself.
Dennison talks about the meaning o f the poems in terms o f their music, and o f the full
sensual and intellectual effect in terms of the pace o f the voice, and he speaks of human
faith in terms of emotional and moral, not analytical, dialectics. He is talking about
process, not product; activity, not masterpiece. He notes the kind of fullness Carruth
managed first in Contra M ortem, "flesh and thought together," the poet and the thinker as
one, (one reason why I am treating Carruth as both.) Carruth shows that the caviling
generalities about which idiom can do what, that is, whether prose, or regularly metered
poetry or free verse can best describe, or argue, show ecstasy or carry mundane information,
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that these arguments are extinguished in the presence o f a poetry that, as James Wright 
wrote o f Brothers, "is startling in its mastery." Dennison clearly feels the force of 
personality in Snow, its "felt outcries," and the immediacy o f its improvisational qualities, 
which comes from jazz and is deeply informed by the existential insistence on process.
And yet the total effect — note his words, "ripe," "opening u p " -  has somehow an organic 
quality, for which his response is, "beautiful." Beauty fought for, disbelieved, rejected, and 
finally, as a gift to the other, a gift in the objective world, this beauty is relumed by the 
poem.
It is finally and after all beauty which Carruth achieves, despite his despair about
the cost. In "Anima, for Janet," (Cry), he talks about the unambiguous attractions of
beauty:
Firelight and starlight and woman, 
complete and beautiful, for only 
one place is known, ever, and this is 
there, meaning beauty, meaning 
all that is human in one fathoming, 
the passion of mind, the reflectiveness 
o f spirit. I do not know on this shore 
o f a shadowed field in the shadow of my 
old age, what else a man lives for.
The dedicatory nature o f this poem is the one which begins Snow, with "Dedication in
These Days" and "I Could Take." These short love poems are followed by "Reverting Still
Again," a poem about "The hatch," reminiscent o f The Asylum, and then "Fear and Anger
in the Mindless Universe," a poem strangely Frostian and thoroughly disagreeable. A
Vermonter, Evan, is walking to Cambridge junction (uncapitalized like many of the proper
nouns in this book), when he witnesses a car crashing and then watches furtively as "the
stranger" bleeds to death
in ten minutes
though the ice patch weren’t his fault 
and Evan began to feel better -
he even begun to laugh.
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That was last tuesday week in the forenoon
but now
he tells it without smiling
quicklike
looking out the com er of his eye.
Despite the strangeness o f rhythm created by the broken couplets the diction is Frostian,
New England in terseness as well as in its vernacular. As an exemplum of "Fear and
Anger In the Mindless Universe" the action, or the inaction, is disturbingly effective. Evan
lives in the same red-neck fear and anger as the miller in Frost’s "The Vanishing Red,"
which is, on Carruth’s account, one o f Frost’s best.3 The connection between Evan and
the miller is their inhumanity, their nihilism. The miller puts the Indian down into the
wheel housing, and
then he shut down the trap door with a ring in it
That jangled even above the general noise,
And came upstairs alone -  and gave that laugh.
This is the climax o f the poem, Carruth thinks, "the M iller’s laugh, and what that laugh 
means is the heart o f Frost’s poetic temperament: the blackest, bitterest despair in three 
hundred years o f the New England Tradition." He suggests that the despair is radically 
Puritan, the vision of man in self-made hell; "It is the greatest absurdity, as our survival 
somehow in spite o f it, our blind, ceaseless endurance, is the greatest heroism." If there is 
a ring o f the Faulknerian in this, it is because this also describes Jason’s laughter.
Carruth sees Frost as an existentialist, in this poem, in "The Witch o f Coos," "The 
Hill Wife," "Acquainted With the Night," "Neither Far Out Nor In Deep," "Out, Out," and 
other poems. Evan’s laugh though is less malevolent and more reprehensible. He is angry, 
afraid, and therefore irresponsible.
The next several poems deal with love again, and work, and with how they 
coordinate life. Love, work, place, lucidity create an potential unity in which the erotic 
solidarity o f the heretofore incomplete personalities is the consolidating force:
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Liebe, our light rekindled 
in this remoteness from the other land, 
in this dark o f the blue mountain where only 
the winds gather
is what we are for the time that we are 
what we know for the time that we know
How gravely and sweetly the poor touch in the dark.
("If It Were Not For You")
This kind o f unity has to be established not only in place but in a lime. In Contra Mortem 
Carruth made a unity from the elements o f human apperception o f time: memory, moment, 
prevision. Here, in "The Ravine" for example, time is apprehended as the measure of 
change, change in the natural world. "The Ravine" begins as a nature morte description of 
the ravine: weeds, mink, snake, dead woodcock; the moment. The poet remembers, 
in spring it
cascaded, in winter it Filled with snow 
until it lay hidden completely. In time, 
geologic time, it will melt away 
or deepen beyond recognition, a huge 
gorge. These are what I remember and foresee.
These are what I see here everyday,
Not things but relationships of things, 
quick changes and slow. These are my sorrow, 
for unlike my bright admonitory friends 
I see relationships, I do not see things.
These, such as they are, every day, every 
unique day, the first in time and the last, 
are my thoughts, the sequences of my mind.
I wonder what hey mean. Every day, 
day after day, I wonder what they mean.
Moment, memory, prevision are bestowed upon reality. They are revelatory o f reality in
the paced timing o f the poem. The tone, so characteristic o f Carruth, is querulous and
elegiac. To see things in relationship is to see them change. The thing-in-itself, the
objective moment, objectivism, the optimist of "realism," are, in art or in the artless
encountering of life, illusion. But the relationships of the word arc, not are symbolic of
(the mind is an organization o f tissues suspended in a saline solution), are the sequences of
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the poet’s mind. Without alluding to the concept of bestowal directly, Philip Booth in his
review o f Brothers has found the sources o f Carruth’s radical relativism:
But nothing is entirely "in i ts e lf  when met by the poet. In the poet’s 
consciousness o f his relationship [his italics] to the actual, w hat’s ordinary becomes 
extraordinary as it is raised by the power of a voice (however quiet) which verifies 
the music of tim e’s inconstant constancy. Because poetry assumes time (as painting 
and sculpture assume space) poetry is by nature elegiac: by timing itself (through 
every lactic o f rhythm, caesura, resonance, recurrence, pace, etc.) to make present 
the immediacy of a time out of time, a poem celebrates both its own temporal 
nature and (paradoxically) the timeless vitality o f its own being.4
This is an intimate and clairvoyant appraisal o f what Carruth has done in "The Ravine," in
many other poems in this book, and in the other three books we are considering here.
Carruth’s concept o f lucidity, that is, keeping obliteration ever in mind, coincides with the
way that a poem must necessarily unfold in time. It is the same way that a personality
accretes, toward extinction. Poetry assumes time and so it assumes the end of a time.
Death is in fact the m other o f this beauty.
In "Homecoming" the speaker’s family returns to "the part o f the world (we) had
left locked/ in safety," to find "two deaths, two abstractions," a pine tree and old Steve
Washer
a free-born man
who in the toil of self-creation probably wished
he wasn’t often enough, and so was like us all; 
his loss, as ours will be, is irreplaceable.
That is understood. The man is gone. And the 
type is almost gone, the tough, hard-minded Yankee.
The qualities o f independence, reticence, and practicality are those that Steve W asher passed
on to his son, Carruth’s neighbor, Marshall Washer, the subject of the poem entitled with
his name. Marshall is a "cowshit farmer," whom Carruth often worked with on W asher’s
farm, worked in tight-lipped Yankee silence:
Privacy is what this is, not reticence, not 
minding one’s own business, but a positive sense 
of the secret inner man, the sacred identity.
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A man is his totem, the animal o f his mind.
Carruth comes to this stunning idea, "the animal o f his mind," through his vital, often
inarticulate, work with Washer.
Is the creature who is "the animal of his mind," man, going to suffer the fate of the
other animals in Snow, Brothers, and Cry? They are dying, murdered. Carruth sees the
"Birds o f Vietnam,
you maimed, you
poisoned in your nests, starved
in the withered forests
O mindless heartless, 
you never invented hell.
The poem concludes,
O mindless heartless, I can’t 
help it, I have so loved 
this world.
There is a pervasive sense of m an’s ignoble bestiality here, but to say that "a man is the
animal o f his mind," is an odd way to put it. It is close to an idea o f Breton’s, or rather
to one that Breton gleaned from Novalis,
In reality we live in an animal whose parasites we are. The constitution of this 
animal determines ours and vice versa.4
In his insistence on admitting the equality o f natural phenomena, Carruth is even closer to
William James:
Who knows whether, in nature, we do not occupy just as small a place alongside 
beings whose existence we so not suspect as our dogs and cats that live with us in 
our homes.
For Carruth domestic animals are often numinous, not symbolically other than they are, but 
somehow more than they usually seem. "The Cows at Night" is one o f his most beautiful, 
complexly quiet lyrics. The speaker is driving in summer in Vermont, already off the main 
road as the poem begins. He comes to a field where he sees cows, "Always a shock/ to 
remember them there, those/ great breathings close in the dark." He counts them by
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flashlight, seeing their faces as somehow sad, beautiful, innocent, somehow as an image of
the remembered feminine, within and other.
But I did not want to go, 
not yet, nor what to do 
if  I should stay, for how
in that great darkness could I explain 
anything, anything at all.
1 stood by the fence. And then
very gently it began to rain.
The final epiphany here is crushingly effective. A man standing in ignorance, alone, by a
cow pasture in the rain. What can be said about the technique that imbues this quiet scene
with this power? There is no allusion, elision, evasion, no critical property here. The
equipoise o f diction, pace, and measure is so cohesive within the meaning o f the poem that
to talk about them separately seems more than normally fruitless, but perhaps a comparison
with another poem will be enlightening.
In the way it comes quietly to its genuine beauty at the end, "The Cows at Night"
is comparable to James W right’s much-anthologized "A Blessing." In W right’s poem the
speaker and a friend have stopped to pet some ponies beside the road:
I would like to hold the slenderer one in my arms,
For she has walked over to me 
And nuzzled my left hand.
She is black and white,
Her mane falls wild on her forehead,
And the light breeze moves me to caress her long ear
That is delicate as the skin over a girl’s wrist.
Suddenly I realize
That if  I stepped out o f my body I would break 
Into blossom.
These poems both display a decidedly open yearning for a merging with nature, a merging 
that is both invited and denied by nature. The two voices exist in their yearning, which is 
how they are in the world, but the way they mean is drastically different. W right’s poem 
comes The Branch Will Not Break, a period, when he, like Bly, Strand, Kinnell, Merwin,
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Rich, et al., was working within the imagistic surreal influence of poets like Jiminez, 
Guillen, Guillivec, Neruda, Vallejo, Salinas, Mandelstam, and Trakl, whom he and the 
others were translating.
Carruth wrote poems in this mode also, in Snow and in the book that was made out 
o f poems from the same manuscript but published in the next year, Dark W orld.
I would like to compare the substance and the effects o f these two poems, not in 
order invidiously to demote W right’s poem, but to suggest certain of Carruth’s 
accomplishments. W right’s speaker is "just off the highway," Carruth’s is "on the bottom 
road through the mist// of mountain dark," both ideationally marginal, in the geographic 
metaphor. Carruth sees the cows at some distance in the dark, then he remembers their 
presence. They turn their faces, animae o f history, to him. Wright says the Indian ponies 
"love each other. There is no loneliness like theirs." This might strike some, not me, as 
dangerously close to the fatuous, to pathos, or both. My point is that the loneliness bodied 
forth much more convincingly in Carruth’s poem is never named.
The epiphanic endings which seem similar are less so on examination, and again the 
difference is telling. In W right’s poem, the pony approaches, nuzzles his left hand (the 
attention to detail is what moves this poem so quietly and effectively to its end), and then 
he touches "her long ear/ that is delicate as the skin over a g irl’s wrist." Like Carruth’s 
cows, the ponies are a reminder of feminine youth, or rather "youth/ Feminized, sexual but 
eternal" (SB,78). The end of W right’s poem does arrive "suddenly" and mysteriously. The 
speaker "realizes” (an intellection) that if he stepped out of his body he would break into 
blossom. Why the conditional? And why the ecstasy first and then the inflorescence? 
W ouldn’t that stepping out itself be a blossoming? The touch o f the pony seems to satisfy 
the initial yearning, and the finale seems to be a statement o f satisfaction, completion, unity, 
but one which creates another kind o f yearning, which is indicated by the conditional, 
which awaits another set of possibilities. This cycle can go on as long as one likes, "a
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series in which desire obliterates itself and the self posits repetitions of the first moment of 
desire" (Kierkegaard). W hat can end this cycle o f desire except true ecstasy, death?
Carruth, on the other hand, is, in his poem, in the moment between going 
(forgetting) and staying (satisfaction). But W right has stepped "over the barbed wire into 
the pasture." Carruth, although o ff the road, remains separated from the cows by the fence. 
He remains as ignorant and unsatisfied as ever..."And then..." The tensile strength of the 
tercets sets up an expectancy here which Wright forfeits both with his irregular lines and by 
already having used "twilight," "softly," " kindness," "gladly," "happiness," "shyly," 
"loneliness," "light breeze," " caress," and "delicate."
And then 
very gently it began to rain.
The invitation of nature (and the concomitant invitation to romantic solipsism) is on one
hand refused, an heroic refusal because appropriative desire is and has always been tragic.
On the other hand it is accepted; the speaker has a simple reaction. He turns off the
flashlight. He assents to the void both within and without and, without guilt, to the
absurdity o f his desire. And then...and then he writes a thunderously quiet line which
evokes the whole Romantic tradition of correspondence. The line break before the final line
is the selvedge o f a basic paradox: opposites, the intellection about "what to do" and the
natural action in possible answer, the rain, are held in a rigorous tension. This is what
Denison sees as the "tension, conflict even harshness... opening into resolutions that are
beautiful and exciting."
Again, none of this is meant to demean W right’s poem. Carruth’s own high regard
for W right and his poetry is unquestionable. He has written that Wright "tried hard to
avoid the forcing and the self-conscious allusiveness of heavy-handed emblematicism.
Instead he was close to nature, especially to small things in nature, and he wanted them to
come into his poems naturally and to assume their symbolic functions with a certain
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delicacy or shyness" (SI, 118). Naturalness, then, the attempt at natural delicacy in the
making o f symbolic elements of a poem is something Wright and Carruth share.
This delicacy and respect for the integrity of things and of words, especially in the
realm of the symbol fabricated from the natural world, is of course a dilemma for the
imagination. Carruth found the concept of bestowal did not dissolve that dilemma, but it
was as good an intellectual paradigm as any for describing how he wanted to handle the
dilemma. This bestowing touch is evident in the poems of this period. There is an attempt
to show both the thing and the emotional valence of the thing, and therein also to show
somehow the dynamic o f the bestowal itself, emotional, and, yes, self-consciously artistic.
In "I Know, I Remember, But How Can I Help You," a doe’s presence under the northern
lights becomes a moment which, greeted by the wonderful yearning o f the man, is
complicated o f all o f the elements o f being: memory, moment, and prevision; and beauty,
fear, desire, remorse. And inevitable solitude:
I remember but without the sense other lighl-
storms
cold memories discursive and philosophical 
in my m ind’s burden 
and the deer remembers nothing.
We move on our feel crunching bitter snow while the
storm
crashes like god-wars down the east
we shake the sparks from our eyes 
we quiver inside our shocked fur 
we search for each other 
in the apple thicket -
a glimpse, an acknowledgement 
it is enough and never enough -  
we toss our heads and say goodnight
moving away on bitter bitter snow.
The supernumerary nature o f human intelligence does not preclude its impulse to find a
correspondence with the doe’s temporally one-dimensional imagination. Impossible. Yet
there is a shared world, shared imperfectly; it is "enough and never enough." Impossible
for either to come all the way into the spirit of the other. The pragmatic clement of
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Carruth’s mind compels him in the transaction between reality and imagination to realize the
limits o f the later, a limit which potentiates the entire exchange. The personalizing urge
insists that he negotiate the schism, up to the point where it becomes, for him, morally and
therefore aesthetically untenable. Poetry becomes an intermission, an act of creative
imagination which is an act o f personality, an act o f love, an intermission between the inner
and outer void. It exists both as a time and as a place where change and affinnation can
justifiably occur. This notion is as central as any to Carruth poetics:
It [poetry] returns from the frontiers o f experience bearing chaos and revolution, the 
rawness o f events, which it submits to the regulative conceptualizing of our
permanent, concrete, basic, human modes; that is, to language (WP,200) It
follows that poetry is social, though not in any sense o f the tenn used by 
sociologists. It follows then that poetry is political, leaving the political scientists 
far behind. Maybe it even follows that if the substance of a poem, or part of it, is 
expressly though broadly social or political, this fact will reinforce the subjective 
communalism of the poet’s intention in his transcendent act; but that is a question -  
the interrelationship o f substance and the vision o f form, or o f moral and aesthetic 
feeling — to which twenty-five years o f attention have given me no answer...
Finally it follows that the politics o f the poet, in his spirituality, will be a politics of 
love. For me this means non-violent anarchism, at least as a means; I know no 
end. For others it means something else. But we will share, at least in our 
spirituality, far more than we will dispute.(W P,288-89)




of imagination from this 
real world, made and given 
for lovingkindness
Note how the ear must meet and transform the normal syntax o f "real world made and 
given" by attending to the comma. The affect is itself thus already made (in the ear’s 
expectance o f regularity) and given (by the poet’s bestowal o f the comma.)
Carruth rejects deliberate and sadly abhors de facto assumptions o f artistic 
autonomy. He insists on the demands o f experience. And he has said this repeatedly.
See, for example, his comments on Blackmur’s dictum that poetic language should "add to
i
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the stock o f available reality," an idea which was taken up enthusiastically (and disastrously 
on Carruth’s account) by poets, for example John Berryman. Language, Carruth says, 
cannot create meaning. (Ef,197) In the view o f some of his critics, Carruth has successfully 
resisted this fallacy, a fallacy which Carruth without doubt, given his huge verbal facilities, 
was inclined, but again his resistance to verbal realities was deliberate: enire-les-gucrres 
modernism revised in light o f post-war existentialism. In reviewing Snow, Wendell Berry 
wrote,
When the worlds o f so many poets are made out o f words, as though poetry were 
accessible to no more than talent and ambition, it is a moving reaffirmation of the 
power o f poetry that Snow does not make a world o f its own. It does not attempt 
or desire to do so. Instead it accepts the obligations o f the world outside itself that 
it did not make.6
Again, Berry, like Carruth, puts the emphasis on necessities, obligations. As Booth remarks,
Carruth’s imagination, like Steven’s, struggles with reality, with "the necessary angel."
(This tension is nowhere more apparent than in "Concerning N ecessity’ (Snow) to which I
will devote a large part o f the next chapter.) The dilemma is the same one that concerns
Kierkegaard, especially in Either/Or. As David Stem puts it, there are for the complete
aesthete no material limits, he has broken them
by means o f the various modes o f active formative poiesis ... Bui he is thereby led 
to misunderstand himself, to suppose that he is wholly unfettered, free to poeticize 
in any way he desires, and thus he fails to appreciate the way in which he is 
dependent upon immediacy, a tie which is subtle and elastic, constituting not an 
immediate but a formal lim it that cannot be severed.7
It should be noted that the limits of language are material as well as formal. For Carruth
the solution is not therefore, as we have said, realism, "the official aesthetic o f a totalitarian
revolution."
His rejection of realism is quite apparent in Dark W orld, the book which Carruth 
picked out o f its original place in the manuscript with the poems in Snow. New 
Directions would not publish the entire collection because o f space limitations. The 
doppleganger was published by George Hitchcock, that polymath impresario o f surrealism,
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And Hitchcock’s interest reflects the strangeness o f the book. The poems have a static,
low-pressure eeriness and metallic dreamy chiaroscuro effects. It is clear that poems from
Snow have affinities with the poems in Dark W orld: "The End Again," with its vision of
frozen apocalypse, and the desiccate nature morte landscape of "Rimrock, Where It Is,"
where the stillness o f generations find expression in the plastic image of
a small woman, small as a girl, black with time, 
lies and lies, always raising her head, her charred
face
always raising her knees in a mock o f childbirth, 
always opening her mouth that is gagged with dust,
always screaming...
This is the image of the same eternal feminine force that will become the Sleeping Beauty.
In "Abandoned Ranch, Big Bend," (Snow) one of the most startling of Carruth’s 
poems for its other-worldly effects — other-worldly because the boreal sensibilities of the 
speaker, restless even when incorporate in its native New England landscape, is here in the 
desert as ripe as an ovary -  any and all contact detaches a gravidity. The normal limits of 
the sensibility have burned away, as if they were skin, and the self seems to be in a kind 
o f helpless solution with the acrid, ominous landscape:
Summoned
From half across the world, from snow and rock,
From chaos, they arrived a moment ago, they thought,
In perfect fortuity....
Again and again among the dry 
Wailing voices o f misplaced Yankee ghosts 
This ranch is abandoned to terror and the sublime.
The man turns to the woman and the child. He has
never
Said what he meant. They give him
The steady cool mercy o f their unreproachful eyes.
"Fortuity" is as loaded a word as "necessity" in Carruth’s technical vocabulary. Here the
assumption of its perfection is an error; fortuity is complicated with fatality, and both
impinge upon the human relationships, which are in constant revision. Here in Hie stark
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light of the desert the speaker feels the impossibility o f perfect expression o f self in 
language, o f saying what he had meant. That impossibility is reinforced in the final image, 
as it is in the final vanishing in "Coming Down to the Desert at Lordsburg, NM," the 
companion poem in Dark W orld. The slightly menacing aspect o f human mercy suggests 
the ambivalent nature o f mercy: often it is only another style o f domination. The effect of 
distance, so impressive in the desert, becomes the operative effect in the description not of 
the inner man, the ego, but o f human relations.
The sense of distance and detachment is characteristic o f many poems in Dark 
W orld. The epigraph ("What a good and bright world this is if wc do not lose our hearts 
to it, but what a dark world if we do") suggests the omnipresent temptation to abdicate 
from worldly responsibilities through fear, anger, insanity, love, logorrhea...all of the ways 
o f shunning necessity. But how can a poem brighten the world o f the heartless, or of the 
bereft poet himself? Is there a way? O r is it too hard?
It is impossible. Our inclination is rather to abdicate from the real world, 
sometimes in favor of a sur-reality. Dark World is full o f poems which show the attraction 
o f this capitulation in varying degrees o f surreality and loneliness. In "Two Silences" we 
are told that the heartlessness o f the world is the reason for song: "in a universe/ regulated 
by magnanimity poetry/ would disappear." "The Chase In Spring" shows us the volatility 
of identity, a sense of identity that is instantaneous and fleeting. "Something Was There" is 
a companion poem to "Concerning Necessity" (Snow). It affirms the existence of 
"something" not in "sweet Spinozan/ meadows or in/ Kantian monumental/ forests" but 
rather in his "moments o f unmeritable/ luck with Rose Marie..." Luck again; as Camus 
says, solidarity is erotic love is fortuitous, not necessary.
"The Existing Pool" can be taken, with some enlightening results, as a Carruthian 
version o f Frost’s "For Once, Then, Something," which Carruth finds skillful, but loo 
contrived and evasive.8 Carruth’s poem begins at a real pool, "below the Shinglemill
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Bridge..." The conventional symbols o f the situation, the pebbles on the bottom, the clarity
of water, the reflections of face and sky, are resisted here as much as they arc asserted in
Frost’s poem. Again, this is a reflection of Carruth’s vision of the human mind separated,
across the fence, as it were, from nature. He sees the particulars o f nature with great
acuity, but the layers of images have
neither originality
nor grace, and the others too,
these inventions o f yours,
guardian trees, mosaics, windows, dancing -
all absent. Reality and unreality
are your ways of looking into the pool
for the pool has neither.
The pool "has" nothing at all.
The "you" here could be the speaker, talking to himself, or the reader, or, since Frost
asserts a mystifying "something" at the end o f his poem, the "you" might as well be Frost.
■»
"Spring 1967," whose title is reminiscent of Paul Goodm an’s sonnets on political 
occasions, like many of Goodm an’s poems also shows the emotional process of de- 
escalation, from anger into illusion ("your mind/ wrenches across the world, tearing the 
dirty/ shimmer o f blossom from every bough") to sell-pity, to despair ("your innocence is 
like cold spit in your mouth, eject it or swallow it -  you cannot/ use it.") A dark world 
indeed. A real world "where we are said to live,/ who have done with living," says "Senior 
Citizen," who speaks, as in the voices in The Sleeping Beauty, "words given to me)/ by 
women. They are women who die far away/ o f stinking illnesses and malnutrition --/ these 
words, gasps, and wails o f love."
Dark World also contains some of Carruth’s most obviously experimental poetry, 
the broken and staggered quatrains in "Discourse," "Thaw," a sonnet "for Allen Ginsberg" 
not of fourteen or fifteen lines, but, as I can roughly count, 20 lines of rambling rhapsody, 
a stylistic homage. There is a series o f eight "Poetical Abstracts:" "Chronological," a
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bricolage, elegiac , as Booth suggests about Brothers, in its sense o f the loss of time. 
"Metaphysical," "Classical," "Scenic," "Meteorological (for JL, fellow allergy-head." JL is,
I assume, James Laughlin, for the section looks like one o f Laughlin’s "typewritten" poems, 
"in which each succeeding line could vary from the typewritten length of the first line by 
no more than one space either way, or in rare emergencies two spaces" (Ef,139). In 
"Rhopaloceral" the careful reader may discern the affinity with Jim Harrison, whose 
"Letters to Yesenin" was published in the preceding year. "Political" is a gruesome 
weaving o f warfare, fat-boiling, napalming. "Introspectional" concludes the collection with 
its final lines: "the dog/ raises his head// and howls."
Trrrrr
In his review of Brothers, I Loved You All Philip Booth notes that the structure of 
the book suggests a lacuna in the implicit experiential narrative of the poems, "some event 
between 1969 and 1977 which Hayden Carruth does not yet want to publish or has not yet 
written." Booth did not know Carruth personally at that time and could not have known 
that from 1972-80 Carruth was writing The Sleeping Beauty, putting much personal 
experience into that poem. Booth’s comment springs from a perceived disjunction among 
the poems in the first part o f the book, the Frostian poems in the middle, and the final 
"Paragraphs," and a disjunction between that structure and the subtitle,"Poems 1969-1977." 
Booth o f course also could not have known that five years later Carruth would publish If 
You Call This Cry A Song, a collection o f poems from this same period, many in the same 
modes. Yet, Booth’s sense o f disjunction, especially the stylistic shifting, not only suggests, 
as I have, that these books are complementary, it points to the highly various stylistic 
strands in Carruth’s poetry after 1975.
Whatever the events of the years immediately preceding, 1978 and 1979 were
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important years both personally and professionally for Carruth. Stanley Moss, editor of 
Sheep Meadow Press, brought out Brothers, and it won the Saturday Review (annual)
Lenore Marshall Poetry Prize awarded by Alastair Reid, Galway Kinnell, and (voting in the 
minority) Mark Strand. Reid admired the book’s "Richness and variety ... burly energy ... 
courage and gusto ... [Carruth’s] work teems with the struggle to live and to make sense, 
and his poems carve out a kind o f grace for us." 10 This prize, along with the nomination 
o f Snow for a National Book Award, was instrumental in attracting a wider audience. But 
even more important, both professionally and for what it meant in terms of his continuing 
recovery from his emotional incapacities, in 1979 Carruth came out of the woods to join 
Philip Booth, George P. Elliott (who were joined in the next year by Tess Gallagher and 
Ray Carver) on the faculty o f the Creative Writing program at Syracuse University, taking 
the place o f long-time faculty member W.D. Snodgrass. Although Carruth had by this time 
begun trying to do things like read in public, a horrifying experience for him ,II the move 
to Syracuse and the necessities of professing poetry virtually forced him to maintain at least 
reasonable control over his anxieties. The full reasons for his leaving the place where he 
had lived for twenty years and taking the job at Syracuse are no doubt as complex in his 
case as in all decisions o f this nature. Carruth himself says that he left Vermont
because I had to. I was too old to put in the hours -  70, 80, 90 a week -  that I
had to put in to earn a living from hack editing, reviewing, etc. 12
For Carruth the move marked the beginning of a period of recognition and relative financial 
case, if  not o f complete personal calm. His contact with his students and with colleagues, 
other writers on the staff, especially with Ray Carver, with whom he was close until 
Carver’s death in 1988, all of these demands helped bring Carruth into the agora, and with 
him came an increasing sense on the part o f those who knew him that his writing was far 
more important than it had been given credit for being.
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But Brothers is set in Vermont, not in Syracuse. It is, as the past tense o f the title 
indicates, full o f  retrospection, homages to poets and friends, remembrances of old poems, 
o f a past time, full o f Carruth’s declarations o f love and respect for his jazz heroes. Yet, 
the end o f the book, "Paragraphs," is a prevision of what will come next, The Sleeping 
Beauty. W ithin a collection arranged by time, we have poems of memory, moment, and 
prevision. As Alastair Reid noted, the book is full o f  passionate and expert poetry.
Brothers begins with "The Loon on Forrester’s Pond." The cry of the loon, that solitary 
bird that needs privacy in order to thrive and reproduce, is the inhabiting spirit of the book, 
the totemic song o f the poet’s life: "it came from inside the long wilderness/ o f my life." 
The cry becomes a metaphysical refrain:
The loon
broke the stillness over the water
again and again,
broke the wilderness
with his song, truly
a vestige, the laugh that transcends
first all mirth
and then all sorrow
and finally all knowledge, dying
into the gentlest quavering timeless
woe. It seemed
the real and only sanity to me.
The iconoclastic tenor of the loon’s song puts even the images of the natural world into 
flux, "breaking the wilderness." What about this song makes it a "vestige"? What part of 
it is memory? Does man remember this as his own song? And if  it is a laugh, how does 
it differ from Frost’s M iller’s laugh or from Evan’s laugh in "Fear and Anger in the 
Mindless Universe"? It is an existential laugh, but not darkly so. It comes from a bird, 
and it is woe-begone, informed by the predicament of suffering, of inevitable destruction 
and the subsequent responsibility o f self-making. This is the "real and only sanity to m e." 
The radically subjective declaration identifies the speaker with the basic solitude of the loon, 
as he is likewise identified with the bombed fish in the next poem, again in the past tense,
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"When Howitzers Began." The third poem, "August First" also begins with a meditation on
the past, the past day, and then a time more distant:
Late night on the porch, thinking 
o f old poems. Another day’s 
work, another evening’s 
done.
The simplicity o f statement is empowered by the pace o f the line, by caesura, and line-
cndings. Booth’s remarks about the relationship o f technique to vision are particularly
relevant to this poem.
Because poetry assumes time (as painting and sculpture assume space) poetry is by 
nature elegiac: by timing itself (through every relevant lactic of rhythm, caesura, 
resonance, recurrence, pace, etc.) to make present the immediacy of a time out of 
time, a poem celebrates both its own temporal nature and (paradoxically) the 
timeless vitality o f its own being.
We can see how this happens in "August First" in, for example, the syntactical ambivalence 
suggested by the comma after "evening’s." It can be read either as a possessive or as a 
contraction, and both give a sense o f completion, weariness, finality. The world-weariness 
o f the man possessed by time, by tim e’s contractions, is the theme. Booth notes that "to 
anticipate death is to live and to write in time, the measure o f change." In the poem the 
speaker remembers
a poem I wrote 
years ago when my wife and 
I had been married twenty- 
two days, an exuberant 
poem o f love, death, the white 
snow, personal purity. Now 
I look without seeing at 
a geranium on the sill; 
and, still full o f day and evening, 
o f what to do for money,
I wonder what became of 
purity. The world is a 
complex fatigue.
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The continual disappearance of words, o f hope, in time creates the elegiac tone here. The 
poem to which Carruth refers is "Essay on Marriage" (NET), the theme o f which is exactly 
as Carruth describes it from memory: it is a death-haunted meditation on the relationship 
between poetry, love, joy, and death. It is exuberant, that is, luxuriant in its expressions of 
commitment to his wife and to poetry, to Love and Art. The jejune reflection in "August 
First" becomes exuberant itself within the limits o f its own resignation. The moth that is 
"battering" the porch screen, "its strength spent,/ its wings tattered," and the geranium, with 
its "clusters of richness/ held against the night in quiet/ exultation," become natural symbols 
for the change in mood between the youthful poet’s exuberance and the middle-aged poet’s 
complex fatigue (Now I am fifty-three going on fifty-four,/ a rotten time of life" "Essay on 
Stone"). The m oth’s struggle, the geranium ’s exultation become the meaning and the music 
of the poem.
The emotion o f these poems is grounded in the actual elements o f Carruth’s daily
existence. At the end o f "August First" in this poem written in Foote Brook Gulf,
The moth rests again, clinging.
The brook talks. The night listens.
Nearness and distance, in lime and space, of personalities and of things, are the 
coordinates along which Carruth explores in many of the poems in Brothers. On Carruth’s 
account, the illusion that our own consciousness is distant from that o f the animals has 
created a horrible error, that is, as he tells us in "Essay," their
extermination. But that same illusion, as it works in life and in art, creates the apparently 
desireable possibility o f transcendent moments, as he says in the poem following "Essay," 
"The Joy and Agony of Improvisation,"
How the song is striving 
and how beautifully failing — the measure 
o f beauty, beyond plenitude, 
never enough but always enough.
97
These poems are followed by occasional poems, of memories, elegies: to the 
friendship with Denise Levertov and Mitch Goodman, for Paul Goodman on occasion of 
remembering that he is dead, and laments to the poet’s own sense of the meaninglessness 
and chaos o f the universe as it is shown again to him from a strange perspective in the 
questionings of his son. Looking at "The Mountain," the poet remembers the Italian 
campaign in WWII in connection with the current war between the races in the United 
States.
In "Essay on Stone," the poet ("will," one almost hopes "finally" say plainly, but
no, he) talks of what his (and Aspen’s) profound and recurrent attraction to stone consists.
Again, the force is somewhat enigmatic:
At all events the fascination 
is undeniable. I
always said there could be no absolutes,
but this is stone, stone, stone -  
so here, so perfectly 
here. It is
the abyss inverted, the abyss made visible.
And the following poem, "After the Winter o f Many Thaws," concludes:
Beauty
is the lightless light that is
the stone
in the eye o f the world forever.
Is it finally stone which is both fact and symbol o f itself, nothing incarnate, the impossible, 
that defies Carruth’s imagination? It certainly fascinates him as a phenomenon for 
investigation; references to stone abound in his work. Perhaps the most revealing 
statements are in "Almanach du Printemps Vivarois" (Cry):
Am I obsessed by stone? Life has worn thin here 
where the garrigue slopes down to the 
vignes and luzem e. A meager surface
covers the stone — stone so long my own 
life and my song...
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At the end o f "Almanach, " which is an extraordinarily beautiful erotic tableau, the speaker, 
who is also a poet (the pretense that they are different is false; it is becoming tedious for 
this critic to maintain in the lack o f a compelling reason any disclaimers about personae) 
the poet writes,
O r is silence 
the indispensable analogue 
of brilliance? And stone is silent. Ancient stone, 
glowing stone. Song in its confusions 
is all extraneous, it dies away. Shreds
of time. In April when the seed sprouts, 
in the Ardeche huge with silence where life is 
thin, an old man and a girl are held 
in stillness, in radiance, in flames o f stone 
for the moment of eternity.
Stone here seems to have a more profound, more enduring existence, a higher existential
significance (this is somewhat contradictory) than song. Rock and stone are relatively
resistant to time, not in their superface which is always being eroded, but in their simple
existence. Perhaps this is "it." But perhaps it is also a mistake to bear down too hard in
trying to say the symbolic meaning o f stone. Perhaps Carruth’s intent is to try to allow
stone to keep its attractive silence, thereby remaining the unknowable thing that it seems.
For it fascinates, enchants, as it did Yeats:
Hearts with one purpose alone 
Through summer and winter seem 
Enchanted to a stone 
To trouble the living stream.
The stone’s in the midst o f all. (Easter 1916)
Carruth writes about mystery, and perhaps that mystery is a justification, if one is needed,
for this obsessive enigma of stone:
No matter how far one may press an investigation of expressive means, no matter 
how near one may edge to "final knowledge," a cognitive ending or point of rest 
will never be reached. An effective line o f poetry, for instance, will never disclose 
all the elements o f its own prosody. Even the most elaborately programmed 
computer could never find them, which is to say that every line of poetry, in all its 
prosodic combinations, is unique. Thus, mystery lies at the center of knowledge -  
at the end or at the center, depending on how you look at it. Those who pursue
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knowledge the furthest will see, not the mystery, for it is precisely hidden, but the 
inevitability o f mystery, m ost clearly, though whether or not his vision is an aid to 
understanding I do not know. But the acknowledgement o f mystery is at least 
salutary. (SI,123)
The lyric movement o f the book builds toward "Once and Again" and "Late 
Sonnet," poems which are amply discussed elsewhere in this study. Then comes 
"Vermont," Carruth’s blank verse homage to Frost’s "New Hampshire," followed by the 
equally Frostian "John Dryden," a portrait o f a local bricoleur, the mildly bawdy tale of 
"Johnny Spain’s W hite Heifer;" a poem about a farmer neighbor, "Lady," and then the 
encomium for his neighbor, "Marshall Washer." Booth, while noting "these poems are so 
good o f their kind that, truly, they almost out-Frost Frost," finds them to be situated 
strangely in the book, creating a structural irrelevance amounting to a serious (law, because 
"Carruth is too fine a poet to be imitating another poet’s voice," (although Carruth has 
always done so extensively) and because "practically nothing" in the book prepares or 
provides context for these poems. Booth’s objections arise genuinely, but from a 
perspective that does not entirely take into account Carruth’s voice. One limitation of 
Booth’s perspective is his notion of stylistic integrity. Carruth is a prolific and diverse 
poet. We have seen that thus far. If Frost seems an influence here, and he certainly is, 
one could point out a score o f others --even in these "Frostian" poems, W ordsworth’s 
influence, for example, is clearly apparent. Carruth has indeed written o f Frost as a huge 
influence, "a figure with whom younger poets, even the most rebellious, must come to 
terms" (Voice,3). F rost’s "combination of Emersonian spiritual aspiration with back-country 
Yankee pragmatism" is apparent in Carruth, both in his shorter poems and in the Frostian 
poems in Brothers.
In an essay on Frost (Ef,58) Carruth notes that as Frost’s career progressed his 
poems often turned "talky, insistent, literal," and he perceives a falling off in quality due to 
formulaic impositions on the poems. Well, these poems of Carruth’s are also talky. When
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he gives his rare readings he often reads one or two of these first. These from Brothers 
and their counterparts in Cry are sociable, informative, amusing, but also passionate and 
moving. This is part o f his discursion on Vermont:
W hat was it like, 
this land o f passage? Green. Remarkably green, 
and not in summer only but all year round.
White pine was what the plant biologists call 
our climax -  nature’s multimillenial orgasm -  
especially on the mountains: trees as tall 
as western pines, and brilliantly, brightly green.
No wonder Champlain, looking up at Mansfield 
from his longboat over the windblown lake, 
murmured "ver’mont" and wrote it on his map.
We are reminded o f w hat’s right with literalness. A few facts. From Lake Champlain, the
west coast o f Vermont, if  one looks in the direction o f France, on a clear day one can see
M ount Mansfield, in the middle of the state. The other "fact"; Cham plain’s cartography
was a personal and paralogical act. His map became ours. Did Frost get this much out of
mere description?
a  n  n  ###
The second way in which Carruth’s work replies to Booth’s questions is in the 
structural prolepsis which includes these Frostian poems. The introductory poems though 
are not all in Brothers. Many of them, written at the same time as those in Brothers, some 
a bit later, are in If You Call This Cry a Song (Poems 1965-1979). "Regarding Chainsaws" 
and "Marvin McCabe" are much like the monologues in the previous book. Cry too 
contains many poems about Vermont and about Carruth’s neighbors and friends. It is 
dedicated to his neighbors Midge and Martin Parkhurst.
Stylistically it is quite clear how these poems are related to those in Snow and 
Brothers. "On Being Asked To Write a Poem Against the War in Vietnam" belongs with
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the animadversions on violence in Snow; "Bouquet in Dog Time," "My Meadow," "The 
Countryman’s Reply," "Spring Break-Up," "The Mouse," "Popple," "Mild Winter," and "Our 
Northern Kind" could all have gone into Brothers without violating the stylistic integrity of 
the book. Carruth is no different from many poets in having written much more than he 
has been able to publish, or to publish in a sensible and timely fashion. The commercial 
constraints o f the publishing industry, "constraints" sired out o f private greed and public 
ignorance, are thus responsible for things such as the structural "faults" Booth (in his 
impulse to see some kind o f organic unity) finds in Brothers (and, also given his bio- 
narrative assumptions, one assumes he would find in the other three books o f this period.) 
The completeness or incompleteness o f books does not necessarily mean that there is a gap, 
a hole, whatever, in the overall integrity of a poet’s work (though o f course many writers 
work precisely to create and investigate such rifts)
Other poems in Cry also have direct connections with those in other collections.
"In A Year o f Increasing Adversities" is highly reminiscent o f "The Spanish Civil War," 
from Snow. "Song; So Often, So Long Have I Thought" is in the manner o f "Song" and 
"This Song," also from Snow. This "Song" in Cry begins, "So often, so long have I 
thought of death/ that the fear has softened. It has worn away." It is a poem about the 
limits o f lucidity and, in that context, the potential freedoms of love and work, Aspen’s 
theme.
Cry also contains three poems, "A Little Old Funky Homeric Blues for Herm,"
"Who Cares Long As Its B-Flat," and "The Cowshed Blues," which directly exhibit 
Carruth’s concern with using jazz as a structural paradigm (this is jargon, Carruth would say 
jazz is poetry) for poetry. The compositional aspects of jazz arc operative in many of his 
poems both explicitly, as in "The Joy and Agony of Improvisation" (Snow), and implicitly. 
Carruth believes that jazz technique is or can be directly related to the central line of poetry 
written in English ("Jazz improvisation is paradigmatic o f the evolution of all the arts in the
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twentieth century" (SI,100)). All three o f these poems are printed, unreviscd, in Sitting In. 
"The Cowshed Blues" especially is a lesson on Carruth’s notion of the paradigmatic aspect 
of jazz and blues. His structural notations (Intro, Vamp, 16-bar theme, piano break, 12-bar 
theme, stop-time chorus, trombone, etc.) gloss in technical terms changes in pace and 
movement o f the poem. It is a pedagogical gambit; all poets who want to include material 
from other disciplines in their work, e.g., Pound and Olson, must be pedagogical to some 
extent. Carruth is directly so here, and the notations make sense.
Among the most interesting and impressive of the poems in Cry are those that were
published previously in separate limited editions. "Loneliness: An Outburst of
Hexasyllables" was published first by the Janus Press. It is a significant poem for several 
reasons, the first being simply its beauty. It is elegant and straightforward. The tense 
seven-syllable line holds the attack finnly through the eleven sections. The theme is also a 
favorite of Carruth’s. "Loneliness" is a moment arrested, an"outbursl,’ in his perpetual 
discourse with the intractable solitude and beauty of winter. The poem is full of intense, 
highly lyrical moments, pristine almost in their exact saying of what it means to be a 
human and to pay the price o f presence o f mind in a world that affords no support for the 
human compulsion to find value. In the "thick newfallen snow" the speaker walks to a 
hidden field, a place lit only by the moonlight, "pale," "ethereal," bright but "not daylight; it
is/ the visible aspect o f stillness: the two are/ one." This direct, emotive, affective
association between light and feeling is something that Carruth docs often and does very 
well. We will see it more poems shortly. One might call the effect metaphorical, except 
that that equivalence is not being asserted, there is no tenor separate from the vehicle, they 
are one. One might call the effect "painterly," but the images are often, coming within a 
fully developed context as they do, far more indicative o f personal voice, subjective feeling, 
than most paintings (I grant all individual protests to the contrary, since this is a subjective 
generalization). In tenns of painting, however, one is inclined to think of deChirico, whose
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atmospherics are akin to those in many of Carruth’s poems, in "Abandoned Ranch," and 
especially in "Eternal City," the first poem in Dark W orld. Carruth often makes quite 
original visual effects not by way o f "abstract" style (vis a vis, e.g., those who really go for 
the visual effect via that route, Ashbery, Blackburn, OHara, Padgett (sometimes), and 
Stevens before them, a few of the better poets o f the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E "school" in the 
generation after Carruth), instead Carruth’s effects come by way o f "tone, phrasing, free 
play o f feeling" ("Late Sonnet") . The result, the emotional valence o f sensual, visual 
impression, is almost stunning here. Moonlight is "the visible aspect of stillness."
The speaker’s loneliness is a result o f intelligence, that same accident that has 
produced his capacity for woe: "Cursed, cursed from childhood with/ incapacity with/ the 
vision o f the void." He longs for a world full o f beauty and devoid o f mind, knowing also 
the impossibility o f that longing. But this world offers itself -- offers a snowy aesthetic at 
least, by which the speaker would be known, within whose paradigms the poet finds his 
way:
The snow sculpts this object, 
a snow-tree, and does it 
neither by carving nor 
by molding, for there is 
a third way nature knows 
and a few men besides 
(who will not give themselves 
to the controversies 
o f theorists). Rather 
this sculpture is made by 
the whole o f motioning, 
all in a concert, which 
condenses out o f air — 
out of universal 
substance -  the exact form 
this tree must take. Never 
a flake too many or 
too few: it is exact.
All growth is a kind of 
condensation, like these 
intense words gathering 
here. Its exactness is 
all that we understand 
o f perfection. Yet it
104
cannot last. That dream was 
a folly, for the sun’s 
first m inutest degree 
o f heat at dawn, the w ind’s 
least pressure, will change it 
irretrievably. This 
snowy space is good for 
these few hours only, in 
a quiet w inter’s night.
A dendronatomy o f poetry. Is this "organicism," that old bugaboo of romanticism? 
Yes or no. The rubric is demolished by the poem, which is not structurally arborescent in 
any important way, but the ramifications o f the conventional structure "branch out." Look 
at the phrasing, " this sculpture is made by/ the whole of motioning." What might another 
poet have written, "by all movement," or any number o f less charming and less acute 
phrasings, who knows? But the nearly awkward exactitude is Carruth’s metier. Finally, the 
231 line o f "Loneliness" conclude,
The cold weight o f my 
body pulls downward and 
I feel as if my 
years were heavy, and I 
feel a drop o f moisture 
sliding down my nose, cold 
and weighted, until it 
meets the glass. I know that 
I am a fool and all 
men are fools. I know it 
and I know I know it.
What good is it to know?
The final question is one whose answer, or the potential for a positive answer, has not been
expressed in the poem; it is the poem. The self-consciousness here is not wholly
intellectual. It is the case o f a mind, sometimes sane sometimes insane, always in (lux, in
a dying body; foolish to grieve over that but impossible not to.
As an accompaniment to "Loneliness" there is an essay, "How a Poem Was
Written" (Ef,105), in which Carruth explains exactly, or inexactly, how this one was written.
All the actions are given a specificity that is fictional in the poem; though all of
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them may have occurred at one time or another in my life, and though some of 
them have in fact occurred many times, the unity they have in the poem is 
invented.
Carruth goes on to explain that he chose hexasyllables almost arbitrarily because he wanted
"freedom, but freedom within a limiting frame." This kind of aesthetic decision is
consistent with his more theoretical views on freedom, which we will look at at length in
the next chapter. Carruth thinks this poem is simple, straightforward, and he also surmises
that "readers, who, for whatever reason, do not read it in the spirit in which it was written
will find it too simple or revealing." And then, in an addendum to the reprinting o f the
original essay, it is in Effluences but I do not know if it was in the original, Carruth states,
Now I ’ve reread what I ’ve written, and I should like to say, briefly, that I don’t 
believe in this way o f talking about a poem. It gives the wrong impression. The 
truth is that this poem, like most of my poems, was written in a state o f mind very 
close to trance ...in extreme emotion — agitation, depression, bitterness.
There was a first trance, "then a second lesser one in which amplifications are made ... 1
called the poem an "Outburst" and that’s what it is." W hat it "is,” he says, not "was." So
much for a retrospective, objective appraisal o f improvisation.
One almost wishes, aside from the intrinsic attraction o f "Loneliness," that Carruth
had chosen "Almanach du Printemps Vivarois" for an explication of process. Published in a
limited edition by Nadja, the poem contains events which seem, so complete is the effect,
to be unified in fact. The scene is the Ardeche , in south central France, arid, rocky,
sparse, the "republica de miseria," Occitania, land of trobar clus and the troubadours. It is
not unlike an Old-World northwestern Vermont. The place is important beforehand to
Carruth not only because o f Pound’s transmission o f the troubadours, but also because of
the love-themes o f those poets, love-themes intrinsically connected with war. It is the
landscape of paragraphs 81-85 o f The Sleeping Beauty, the "Basse-Ardechc -  Labeaune,
Burzet, Roche-Colombe, Balazac/  Towns lichened in ancientness,/ Their crumbled chateaux,
walls that a troubadour took/ With a song, blood-dark still where the Languedoc/ Shed
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fierce heretical blood. He wandered? Beauty is pain plus time" (81). "In the Midi,"
Carruth says in 85,
was where it began, dear sleeping princess,
This stony land with its stony great chateaux,
Your dream ’s origin and focus,
The sweet song that somehow rose 
As from the stone itself, rime clair et douce.
To sing old joi, valor, m esura, -  oh, loveliness 
Beyond all preconceiving. This,
This land o f oc is where your kiss 
Awaits you ...
land o f blood, o f class, o f  hunger.
For here a song could nearly
Make nature from the w orld’s pain, sex from anger,
A woman from death.
But knowingly, drearily 
Now we bear — so far, so near -  the troubadour 
Sing, Oc, Dieu d ’amor -  wistfully, wearily -  
Quora me donas joi, quora m ’en ven dolor.
But in "Almanach" there is joy, not pain. An old man, rejuvenated by the previous night’s
lovemaking, is writing his poem al fresco while a woman, younger, his companion, paints
the landscape. It is one of Carruth’s most beautiful poems, and the ending is spectacular:
But my song 
is old, my stone song; I patch it up from shreds 
o f Latin grandeur and trobar rhyme, 
old, conventional, wrong — who knows it better? -  
though all conventions are old as soon 
as they occur. They are always occurring.
The song is all in my head. Shreds of 
culture. Confusions of time. It is noon now, 
my shirt goes to the pillow, I look 
at my own white skin, almost parched it seems, creased 
with age lines. And it gleams! Suddenly 
the republic o f misery is blazing,
the old stone is glowing, and as if 
at a stroke o f some cosmic tone everything 
falls silent, the finches, the tractor, 
the cuckoo, the wax crayon squeaking, even
the small wind in the grass, yet nothing 
has stopped. Am I deaf now too? Or is silence 
the indispensable analogue 
o f brilliance? And stone is silent. Ancient stone, 
glowing stone. Song in its contusions 
is all extraneous, it dies away. Shreds
of time. In April when the seed sprouts, 
in the Ardeche huge with silence where life is
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thin, an old man and a girl are held 
in stillness, in radiance, in flames o f stone, 
for the moment o f eternity.
This great ending is an epiphany o f Carruth’s themes: song and stone, convention and
illusion, time and art, and of course love. The nature o f the silence here evokes the
stillness in "Loneliness," and also the monumental stasis o f the final image evokes the form
and the function that the wom an’s sculpture (of the woman) will bear in The Sleeping
Beauty. Form (the evidence of human intelligence) and function (the practical responsibility
o f serious art) are "the indispensable analogue o f ' not only brillance o f image, but Carruth’s
own intensities of perception.
One of the themes of this poem, that of despair about the capability of an to
capture a fluid reality (though for once in "Almanach" Carruth without irony defies the
futility with an all-out display o f technical power) is a theme that was dear to another of
his masters, Mallarme, and Carruth has included his translation o f "L’Apres-midi d ’un
Faune" in Cry. The original edition (Ironwood Press, Box 40907, Tucson, AZ 85717)
includes a "Prelude" by Carruth, a tender facade in which the friend o f a "Stephane"
encounters "the most beautiful woman (I) have ever known" at Stephane’s home. Even
though they have a passionate affair, he is sad because of his inability to merge completely
with her. Sometimes he see both Stephane’s face and his own face in hers, and, once, she
murmurs "Stephane" in her sleep. All of this is related after "Stephane’s" death; it a hair-
raising introduction to an already emotionally and verbally charged work. One can see
why Carruth is attracted to M allarm e’s poem. It is romantic, sexy, elegiac, and the
language is dense; the music o f the lines, which seem carved out o f granite, so perfect is
each syllable, is, like stone, entrancing. Carruth makes an attempt to reproduce the
movement of the half-dream of a half-human reed player (and is it Carruth translating the
dream of him self as a clarinetist?) The translation is full o f Carruthian touches, sometimes
for the effect o f the eroticism ("itch" for "vcux"), sometimes to emphasize the
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m etaphysically ("Aimai-je un reve" as "Was loving a dream"). 13
There is no use in any normative evaluation I can make o f the translation. It is not 
a "version" or a free translation, but there is a real attempt not just to give a sense of the 
original but to make it go as a poem in English. Without offering alternatives, which those 
who are interested can readily adduce, I pick a translated passage almost at random, from 
the third strophe:
Something arcane chose to confide 
Below the azure in this great twin reed we play on,
Which dreams in a long solo, taking to itself
The cheek’s shamed blush, how we were amusing 
To the beauty around us through false confusions 
We conceived between her and our credulous song;
And how also in song’s sublimity a purging 
Might strike from our worn fantasy o f a pure 
Back or flank, pursued by my half-closed eyes,
One sonorous and vain and monotonous line.
I know of no better English translation, not only of this passage, but of a rendering o f great
for great, and Mallarme is difficult. If other critics know of translations that convey both
the original and accomplish another, additional, beauty in the translation, given all the levels
of difficultly here, let them bring them forth. Carruth has done away with the original
coupled hard rhymes, as they sound in English, and linked the ends of the lines with
vowel rhymes and alliterating last words. And nearly every element of Carruth’s own
poetry is here: mystery, music, improvisation in service o f individual voice. The longing
confusions o f love and beauty and art are expressly in this syntax. Read it again. There is
a dense but lucid drive, drive, amounting in its virtuosity to a verbal attack, for poetic, not
objective, understanding.
In the "Postlude" Carruth writes, "I find in this poem and others by Mallarme many
things that answer deeply and closely to elements o f my own poetic nature. The work is a
homage, a reverence, for a great master." A "homage," a formal and public
acknowledgement o f allegiance, or, as Carruth describes it elsewhere, "praise of the dead for
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the glorification o f the living." 14 Carruth to Mallarme. Duncan to Pound. Pound to Dante, 
Cavalcante, Propertius, and so on.
The primary subjects of Carruth’s homage are closer in time than Mallarme, or 
Nerval, or Lamartine, whom he also translates in Cry. In "Paragraphs," the final poem in 
Brothers, and our final topic in this chapter, Carruth tells us exactly who his brothers and 
sisters are, who he has chosen or who has chosen him and why. The poem is a sequence 
o f 28 o f the fifteen-line paragraphs which he had used before in The Asylum and Contra 
M ortem . The lines here are broken, irregular in typography, yet intensely musical. James 
W right’s blurb calls the poem "startling in its mastery, surely one o f the great poems 
written in English in recent years." From our later vantage point the mastery is less 
startling, but in the poem ’s combinations of voices and history and in its high lyricism we 
can see what Wright meant. It takes jazz improvisation as its model. It begins in Lamoille 
County, Vermont, "on the Campground Road," a significantly ordinary and remote place for 
a "paragraphic." In his review, Booth speculates that the title comes from " ’paragraphia," a 
mental disorder o f which the primary symptom is writing words or letters other than those 
intended." Well, perhaps. Error certainly has a large place in the theme of the poem, but 
Carruth has said that he intended the more mundane meaning, i.e., paragraph as the line or 
stroke in the margin indicating a break in the text. Marginality is the functional concept.
What is humanly useful has been driven into the margins. The destruction of the 
landscape coincides in the poem with the deaths of Henry Rago (Carrulh’s immediate 
successor as the editor o f Poetry), M.L. King, Malcolm X, and George Jackson. The hilltop 
farms o f New England have been replaced by trailer parks and ski-lodgcs. Pigeons and 
otters exterminated, "the braves castrated, the stretched squaws/ bayoneted up their vaginas." 
Why? A vision o f My Lai runs into the fact o f Verdun and back to an a.d. 843 treaty 
dividing France from Germany. Paragraph 11 then, a litany o f the great blues and jazz 
men and women concludes, "Brothers, 1 loved you all." Booth is bothered by the past
n o
tense; he asks:
Is Carruth suggesting that all he once loved is dead, or that his own love has 
entirely ceased? If such possibilities apply to the whole book as they apply to 
section 11 o f "Paragraphs,’ does Carruth intend "Paragraphs" to be his final morning 
for all that time makes irretrievable?
If not all, much o f what Carruth had loved is gone. That’s clear. M ost of the people he
mentions in the poem are dead. I think it is that simple. Nor is this a final mourning.
That will come only with the poet’s own obliteration. Meanwhile the changing: from
elegies to celebrations, from violence (12) to intense beauty (13), from the "shabby and
fictitious liberty/ extolled by the school of J.J. Rousseau and the other/ schools o f bourgeois
liberalism" to the anarchism of Bakunin. These changes keep the time. Thus personal life
and history fit together. In 24 and 25 the napalming of civilians, an atrocity which is
echoed later in the Sleeping Beauty’s dream of napalm ’s creator, Honeywell, is both poetic
prelude and human error; it accounts for the inability of the speaker in 25 to find his own
personality. It has been destroyed by hate.
The poem ends with the making o f "The Bottom Blues" in New York City,
February 12, 1944:
(while I kneedeep 
elsewhere in historical war 
was wrecking Beauty’s sleep 
and her long dream)
This is a proleptic parenthesis. The poet was in the Army Air Corps in Italy. Somehow 
he feels, not only that he would like to rather have helped make "The Bottom Blues," but 
that he somehow is responsible for the cataclysm which drove Beauty, that is, Sleeping 
Beauty, that is, his wife Rose Marie Dorn, from her home in Silesia to America, to him.
In this nexus o f passion for music, for beauty, of love, guilt, and violence, Carruth begins 
The Sleeping Beauty.
The end o f the book, the final paragraph, is an assertion o f the self-transcendent 
effect of making, of making in this case music, the blues (and the poem). 15
I l l
And it was done 
and they listened and heard themselves
better than they were for they had come
28
high above themselves. Above everything, flux, ooze’ 
loss, need, shame, improbability/ the awfulness 
o f gut-wrong, sex-wrack, horse and booze, 
the whole goddamn mess,
And Gabler said "W e’ll press it" and it was 
"Bottom Blues"
BOTTOM BLUES five men knowing it well blacks & jews
yet music, music high 
in the celebration o f fear, strange joy 
o f pain: blown out, beaten out
a moment ecstatic
in the history
o f creative heart and mind/ not singular, not the rarity
we think, but real and a glory
our human history shining, shekinah. . . Ah,
holy spirit, ninefold
I druther’ve bin a-settin there, supernumerary 
cockroach i ’th ’comer, a-listenin, a-listenin,„„,
than be the Prazedint ov the Wuurld.
As one gets through, as one is supposed to, llte pauses and the rapid shifts in diction, the
music of this, let alone the passion, come through clearly. Even the puckish ending.
"Paragraphs" is stylistically and thematically the prelude to The Sleeping Beauty.
But having moved so far straight through Carruth’s career, it is necessary here, before
continuing directly on, to consider what is at work conceptually in all o f the poems of this
last period, and in doing so to survey across his career and build a sense of some of the
larger implications o f his work. Those larger themes, the "Existentialism" and the "New
England" o f my title, are revealed in Carruth’s response to regional literary thinkers. In
Paragraph 5 Carruth asks querulously,
Once at Walden 
it was the "morning star" calling us to the order 
o f this world.
Tell me Henry David are you still called?
Carruth’s response to Thoreau’s vision is telling in regard to his relationships with regional 
traditions, to tradition in general, and to his pragmatic, existential philosophy, and it is to 
Walden that I go now with Carruth to find what is possible there.
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Chapter Four
Carruth’s Existential Revisions o f Walden
He has an angry wrenlike vigilance, 
a greyhound’s gentle tautness 
he seems to wince at pleasure 
and suffocate for privacy
— Robert Lowell, "For the Union Dead"
I I J  I I Ifrfrrr
Every individual, however original he may be, is still a child o f God, o f his age, of 
his nation, of his family and friends. Only thus is he truly himself. If in all of 
this relativity he tries to be the absolute, then he becomes 
ridiculous.-S. Kierkegaard, Either
I I  i f  / I
Trrrrr
Is a voice crying in the wilderness 
the same as an existential 
denial and validation 
in the mindless universe?
-  Hayden Carruth, "Picking Up the Beer 
Cans"
In his essay "The New England Tradition," Hayden Carruth approvingly describes 
among Thoreau’s personal qualities " his stubbornness, his voluntary poverty, his distrust of 
organized society . . .  in short, his dyed-in-the-wool Yankee character."1 Carruth suggests 
that the primary importance of Walden is its "autobiogenetic" quality, Thoreau "in a sense 
constructing or re-constructing himself, or at least his image o f himself, from the fragments 
of day-to-day experience . . .  far more sophisticated, for example, than the Romantic notion 
o f the autobiographical poem, as W ordsworth’s Prelude or Byron’s Childe Harold." This
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type of personal construction is immensely important to Carruth, whose psychic
disintegration in the early 50s and a subsequent lapse o f identity due to electro-shock
therapy, necessitated a self-renovation. Carruth accomplished this re-conslruction not only
through writing, but through the maintenance o f useful relations with the members of his
small community in Northern Vermont and with his family, the people with whom he
shared a daily life in common. In fact Carruth had gone to his small house in Fool Brook
G ulf in Johnson, Lamoille County, Vermont in much the same spirit as Thorcau ostensibly
went to Walden: to live deliberately, to seek a life of meditation and repose, "plain-living
and high-thinking." Part of Carruth’s decision to go to the woods with his family was
surely dictated in part by the omni-present fact o f his biography, his people phobia, the
specific manifestations o f which are discussed in The Bloomingdale Papers (see
esp. pp. 19-20). This kind o f teno r prevented his career as a jaz?. musician and for years
severely inhibited his ability to promote his poetry.
Carruth’s withdrawal has a personal dimension which informs his writing in general
and especially his criticisms of Thoreau. In 1976, five years after the essay above was
published, Carruth published "The M an in the Box at Walden."2 In this essay, while
explaining his reference to Thoreau as "an idiot" in his poem "Concerning Necessity," (a
poem that I will examine at the end o f this chapter) Carruth explains why he finds it
extraordinary that a people should adopt for their favorite Great Work a book 
written in disdain for the people themselves. That’s what Walden is: a work 
conceived in rancor and composed in scorn. It is an elitist manifesto, a cranky, 
crabby diatribe. Its victims are its readers, and none escapes. Its author was 
sanctimonious, self-righteous, and ungenerous to the point o f cruelty. (EF,64)
While agreeing with Thoreau’s basic ideas of independence and o f living close to nature,
and his "insistence on the need for meditation and repose," Carruth strongly objects to the
rhetorical violence o f Walden as well as to what it asserts in regard to the possibilities of
erotic love, to the necessities of labor, to the Thorcauvian ideal relationship between man
and nature, and he objects ultimately to the kind of careless individualism that Walden has
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encouraged in American life. In his celebrated appreciation o f Thoreau, The Senses of 
W alden, Stanley Cavell has asked what it means to be a reader of Thoreau. In "The Man 
in the Box at Walden" Carruth wonders what it says about the American people that they 
have taken Walden as their social contract. What I wish to find out here is what Carruth’s 
reading o f Thoreau tells us about Carruth. His criticism o f Thoreau is consistent with his 
thinking and writing in general. First, it reveals what Carruth believes about the nature of 
the relationship between art and the social polity, specifically, between literary style and 
environmental issues, or, more precisely, how poetry is a moral epistemology. Carruth secs 
that the degree of reliance upon metaphor reflects the degree of willingness to expropriate 
and destroy the identity o f external objects. And furthermore, the willingness to make this 
appropriation is characteristically, congenitally American. Secondly, Carruth solves the 
conflict between work as a necessity and work as a source o f oppression. For Thoreau and 
his followers work is, in general, a reifying force contributing to a lack o f freedom, but for 
Carruth there is a resolution o f this in his vision of work as an act o f love. Thirdly, 
though not actually separate from the first two, Carruth’s response to Thoreau elaborates his 
particular vision of how anarchism can co-exist with Yankee independence and democracy. 
Instead o f Thoreau’s self-defeating, transcendental individualism and the guilt that its rigidity 
engenders Carruth proposes a kind o f existential independence based on love and work. A 
focus on these aspects of Carruth’s thought will allow us to examine both his poetry and 
his criticism.
«« a 1###
On the surface Carruth and Thoreau have much in common. Both are loners, 
Yankees. Carruth went to live in the woods by choice, "seeking/ What [hej had once 
known in Southern New England/ Now destroyed" ("Marshall W asher",Brothers,64). He 
went to the woods to be alone, independent, free from the urban ugliness and its 
encroachments everywhere. More recently he has moved in person to this urban landscape
and he evokes the details o f it, in Asphalt Georgies for example, with the horror and 
understanding that only a countryman could feel and summon. Carruth appreciates 
Thorcau’s amateur naturalism, "his affection for particular trees and rocks, meadows and 
groves" — his sense of writing as husbandry. Their work shares as well the inclination of 
the voice, the speaker, to inhabit and be inhabited by a place, the place, a tendency to 
evoke by various means the genius loci o f their own worlds — an almost supernatural belief 
that there is a spirit o f place. This belief allows them "to honor what omens and 
intimations How from nature," though Carruth never crosses the line into "dark and 
discontinuous fantasy," the impasse and deadly consequence o f romanticism.3 In both 
writers there is a co-penetration between paysage and personality, and an almost totemic 
response to certain animals -- owls and loons. The personae of C arruth’s poems and the 
man at W alden move among the hills and fields with a comprehensive feeling that invests 
the land with a poetic dignity. For both, New England " is a region o f the heart . . .  the 
forest is cosmopolis" (MLD,1). Yet they are not "local colorists. . ./ at any rate, not 
keepers/ of quaintness sake." The kind of realism that they attempt means, as Carruth 
writes, " place, and place means/ where we are. We name it, with all its garbage/ and 
slaughter, and its comeliness too, and then/ it is our center -  where we are. We try,/ in 
our own unobtrusive way, to make it/ a center of everywhere, a center for/ everywhere (and 
thanks to Ted Enslin of M aine/ for saying that)" ("Vermont," Brothers,47).
Furthermore the characteristic elegiac tone of many o f Carruth’s poems about New 
England is presaged by Thoreau’s complaints about the intrusion o f other men into the 
woods. In their expressions o f loss, o f indignity at the senseless violation o f our only 
world, there is a certain continuity of vision that, although twentieth-century Vermont is a 
far cry from nineteenth-century Concord, connects their work. They share a profound 
alienation from industrial society, from the hostile, dehumanizing environment that the 
rational human intelligence was creating in the form er’s and has accomplished in the lattcr’s
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time. For example, Thoreau’s authentic disgust at the "wasted life" o f the Irishman, John
Fields, and his starving family leads him to a statement with which Carruth, despite
Thoreau’s concurrent and nearly debilitating condescension, might partially agree:
the only true America is that country where you are at liberty to pursue such a 
mode o f life as may enable you to do without coffee, tea, and meat, and where the 
state does not endeavor to compel you to sustain the slavery and war and other 4
superfluous expenses which directly or indirectly result from the use of such things.
This passage displays what Carruth calls "Thoreau’s native Yankee anarchism," and also his
patriotic idealism. In Northern Vermont in the late twentieth century Carruth sees the
economically and politically oppressed descendants o f the Fields:
Two fat women, maybe nineteen
Or twenty, issue sidewise
From Tom linson’s Deli, eating without smiles
Something from the sacks clutched to their snowmobile
Jackets. Their breath is steam. They climb
Into an object o f rust, which has five
Kids in the back with a black and white shepherd dog,
And one sack passes rearward.
Carruth’s companion, the spectral, dead Vermonter, Amos, remarks,
Notice them childem? T hey’ll eat the mice
Out o f the mousetraps when that there candy
Gives out, of course unless
Their old man poaches them a half o f venison
And sneaks it up some morning about 4 A.M. (SB, 115-16)
But Carruth and Thoreau respond in very different ways to this kind of oppression.
Thoreau seeks to isolate him self while Carruth insists upon understanding how poverty is
connected with environmental destruction and psychic disintegration, how "a broken land
makes broken people. The poor know this" ("Song o f the Two Crows," Cry, 69).
Carruth sees what the Puritans and their immediate descendants did to New England,
the destructive consequences that occurred when "the elitist ethic of the Puritan fathers
became an imperialist attitude toward the land and the Indians, while their doctrines of
individual election and the perseverance o f grace lent themselves to a laissez-faire attitude in
commerce."5 The otter, white-tailed deer, moose, caribou, wolves, mountain lions, and
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beavers were exterminated quickly. The white pines were felled, the soil blew away. "It 
was at best carelessness and at worst deliberate exploitation, the inverse of Puritan 
responsibility; and the worst was far commoner than the best." And when the Puritans 
moved west they took this exploitation with them. Carruth’s disgust here is as much at the 
compulsion of the human intelligence to expropriate as it is at the actual ruination of the 
land. It is a disgust at self-destruction. It is an outrage tempered by a sense of relative 
worth, a sense which refuses the sentimentality of value. Ultimately, Carruth has written 
elsewhere, natural objects and man-made objects, the rock and the sky-scraper, are 
equivalent in reality. The notion o f relative value is "an illusion, an invention; at its best it 
is a sick joke, and at its worst an inexpressible sorrow."6 This claim certainly should bear 
on considerations of Carruth as a nature poet, and it also suggests part o f his disdain for 
Thoreau, for what he calls Thoreau’s "exproprialive, solipsistic view of nature" and, on the 
other extreme, for Sartre’s systematic disdain for nature.7 Certainly also it informs his 
disgust at W alden’s reception as the touchstone for middle-class Am erica’s response to 
nature.
In "The Man in the Box" Carruth writes that "the matter of Walden generated a
manner which negated the entire enterprise." Other recent critics have assumed the same
stylistic approach in pointing out the limitations of W alden. Michael Gilmore has charged
Thoreau with generating a similar consequential error:
Though Thoreau begins with the conviction that literature can change the world, the 
aesthetic strategies he adopts to accomplish political objectives involve him in a 
series o f withdrawals from history; in each case the ahistorical maneuver disables 
the political and is compromised by the very historical moment it seeks to 
repudiate.8
This unwitting self-compromise functions not only in politics but in ethics and 
morality. "Moral feeling," according to Carruth, "is the prior condition o f aesthetic feeling," 
(Ef, 153) and therefore the determinant of aesthetic strategy, of style. Style is the man, anti 
through the mediation of man, style is experience (WP,68). The consequences of Thoreau’s
*
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kind o f social and moral withdrawal are not only then a denial of society, but they create a 
denial o f the self, o f the man, and of man. By merely asserting himself as an individual 
Thoreau has thwarted himself. The consequence is a stylistic violence generated by 
frustration and guilt. For Carruth part o f the evidence o f this sell-defeating meanness lies in 
Thoreau’s stylistic exploitation of nature.
#
"Bright cupreous fishes which looked like a string of jewels"
Along with Thoreau’s characteristic "unconnected assertions . . . non-sequiturs . . . bad 
manners and violence o f feeling," Carruth also suggests that we take a look at Thoreau’s 
stylistic response to nature. It is not difficult to sec that it is essentially metaphorical, and 
to the extent that it is so, it is expropriative. Descriptions are made in terms of extraneous 
objects without regard to the distortive consequences. Though perhaps inevitable, perhaps at 
the heart o f language, metaphor is for Carmth nonetheless an inherently dangerous rhetorical 
mode, the literary correlative o f "the general exploitation o f the world for human ends." 
M etaphor reflects the human will to dominate.9 On the other hand, Thoreau seems 
generally to endorse the kind o f domination o f which metaphor is both cause and effect. 
Despite his own keen accounts of how man is ruining nature, Thoreau continues to assert 
that he is the ultimate thing in nature, that "nature is hard to overcome, but she must be 
overcome." Part o f this overcoming is the denial o f the reality o f objects, ignoring their 
identity and converting them into fodder for moral allegory. This impulse is pervasive in 
Thoreau, in A Week on the Concord and Merrimac Rivers, as much as in W alden.
Thoreau finds nature "a restorative, a tonic, by which we must be refreshed and by which 
we are cheered" (339). The "crowing of cocks, baying of dogs, and the hum of insects at
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noon" (A W eek), a dead horse (Walden) become "evidence o f health." The food chain is a
beloved drama because "tender organizations can be serenely squashed out o f existence like
pulp" (339). Holding "a rare mess o f golden and silver and bright cupreous fishes which
looked like a siring o f jewels" (are these brook trout?) Thoreau claims to have proof of his
own mortality. He frequently distorts nature so that he may be elevated by his own
response to it. But as we can see from the last passage, he ignores its reality, in this case
the smelly proof of obliteration at the end o f his own stringer.
Not only is Thoreau compulsively metaphorical, his metaphors are largely
anthrocentric. A passage from A Week will suffice:
The shining pebbles, not yet anxious to belter their condition, the chips and weeds 
and occasional logs and stems of trees that floated past, fulfilling Lhcir late, were 
objects of singular interest to me, and at last I resolved to launch m yself on [the 
river’s] bosom, and float whither it would bear me (32).
Certainly, Thoreau’s figures here are conventional. Carruth knows this, but he would also
have us realize the moral consequences of the unthinking use of literary conventions. Can
pebbles be transcendent? If so, what can this kind of transcendence mean to humans?
Are the wood chips interesting to Thoreau because in his perception o f them they connect
him both with nature and with human activity? If they are fulfilling their fate as they
move on the water, where did their fate begin? Doesn’t Thoreau mean that he is willing to
"launch" his ego into the world without regard, to impose his own image and meaning on
nature without considering his responsibility of his readers? Arc we so far removed from
primary experiences o f nature that we can find it true of this passage and hundreds like it,
as Stanley Cavell suggests, that Thoreau’s "readings of nature do not feel like moralizations
o f it, but as though he is letting himself be read by it"? 10
These observations can be made by anyone who will take Carruth’s brief account
o f  The Man in the Box" seriously, and one could on this count endlessly prosecute
Thoreau, his critics, and many other writers. But that is not necessary to understand
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Carruth’s basic objection. It is perhaps easier for us today to see the effects of this 
particular kind of ignorance o f the fragility o f the natural world. Perhaps it is easier to 
admit now the necessity o f refuting Protestant utilitarianism, to see that the casque flower 
has outdone and always will outdo our contrived elegance. Carruth thinks it is important to 
remember that Thoreau was working without "a knowledge of psychoanalysis, a background 
in the existential authors," and a concept o f writing as action. 11 He quotes Leslie Fiedler; 
Thoreau was creating himself "archetypically, against the M assachusetts wilderness."
Perhaps this is an inherent reason for the aggression which is embodied in his style. And 
in quoting Allen Tate Carruth acknowledges that Thoreau was writing within an atmosphere 
where the doctrines of election and grace "gave to the experience-of the individual a heroic 
proportion, a tragic mode." Carruth finds particularly dangerous the consequences o f that 
same assumption in modem writers o f his region — Low ell’s tendency to assert personal 
experience, a personal tragedy based on guilt, as national mythology, or in O lson’s term, a 
"precis o f national experience." Carruth published his objections to Walden because so 
many readers take the book whole, an bible o f social and ecological behavior. Thoreau is 
their priest. Americans are able to ignore that his vision is in large part fantasy, an 
expression o f "the whole romantic, Hegelian, utopian current of his time." If Thoreau saw 
a danger in, in the "Hegelian concepts o f mass consciousness and determinism," he 
nonetheless failed to realize the dangers in his own responses to it.
##
In his essay, "The Fantastic o f Philosophy," 12 Cavell asserts a claim of originality in his 
discovery o f elements o f the fantastic in W alden. He provides evidence of fantasy from the 
third paragraph, in which Thoreau finds that his neighbors are having to work for living 
"incredible and astonishing." Cavell goes on to compare this "vision" with the vision of
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Rousseau in his Social Contract, o f  men "as bom free and everywhere in chains," and he
also links Thoreau with Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein by way of
asking (but not attempting to answer) "what it might betoken about a culture’s literature that
its founding works are works o f the fantastic." Carruth finds not just Walden but much of
Thoreau’s work fantasy indeed. And long before Cavell Carruth directly tried to answer the
question o f Thoreau’s work in literature and in the social polity. In "The Man in the Box
at Walden" Carruth writes,
The fact is that Thoreau acted out, for a short period o f time and in a limited, easy 
way, a primary and perennial fantasy o f the American male. To escape, to be on 
one’s own, without the anxiety o f sex or the clutter o f responsibility: it is the 
dream of the failed man.
A dream, a fantasy. But who does not dream? Even Carruth, with what James Wright
called "his clear mind, Lucretian in its exact intelligence," 13 admits in his poem
"Loneliness, An Outburst of Hendecasyllables" (Cry),
Everyone now has thought 
how it may be when soon 
universal death comes 
down the mountainside, creeps 
up from the sea, appears 
out of the air like snow 
and how one lucky or 
unlucky person might 
escape the multitude 
and survive alone. This 
is the archetypal dream 
or daydream o f our years.
The fact o f potential universal nuclear demolition increases the propensity to escape through
daydreaming. That same propensity with its refusal to deal with reality increases the
probability that demolition will occur. This is one reason Carruth in his criticism and
especially in his poetry means to be antidotal to the effects o f Thoreau, to National
Geographic, to television, "to the twin American idols: Walt Disney and John Wayne." 14
In his attempt to point out the toxic effects o f Thoreau’s argument Carruth notes
that the topic of the lirst chapter of W alden, "Economy," is contained in a couple of pages;
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the rest o f the section is "given to a protracted scourging o f the evils of mankind." It is 
an attack based on the assertion that he, Thoreau, has made the ultimate moral decision, 
"built his own cabin on borrowed land and lived for a couple of years in leisure, eschewing 
every obligation except to himself." This brings Carruth to the passage where, in 
considering the ideal dwelling, Thoreau sees a large tool box by the railroad. It suggests to 
him
that every man who was hard pushed might get such a one for a dollar, and, having 
bored a few auger holes in it, to admit air at least, get into it when it rained and at 
night, and hook down the lid, and so have freedom in his love, and in his soul be 
free. (126)
This is Cavell’s "soul of practicality." He seems to have overlooked a number of features 
in the ideal dwelling. Nor is Thoreau being figurative here. He says, "I am far from 
jesting." But how can one have freedom of love in a box? What Thoreau really means -  
and here it is easy to anticipate the nature o f Carruth’s objections — is freedom from love. 
This fantasy is a perversion o f the concepts o f freedom and of love and additionally of the 
votive actions that make them possible -w ork . For Carruth this statement of "philosophy" 
means that "Thoreau solves the problems of sex by masturbation and the problems of all 
humanity by isolation." This is the kind of transcendentalism, the kind of individualism 
which, through its refusal to accept responsibility, Carruth connects with the adolescent, 
immature violence and irresponsibility that has characterized American life from the 
settlement of the frontier to current expeditions in foreign policy, from genocide of the 
natives to sexual domination to the sacking o f the planet by various means. Even while 
distiusting the optimism that assumes complete health possible, Carruth means his own work 
to be antidotal to this tendency. By examining and elaborating parts o f Carruth’s work that 
are consistent with his critique of Thoreau, we can see what Carruth means by existential 
independence and what it means for him to attempt to be a person "free from ego, free 
from self-regard, and hence free from the threatening, determining forces of objectivity"
(WP.226).
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j i  if a
The voyeur has replaced the seer. -  Andre Breton
Is life the place where we find happiness 
or not at all . . . Ask the voyeur
what blue movie is worth a seat at the keyhole. —Rbt. Lowell, "Robespierre and 
M ozart as Stage"
I have allowed myself
This com er and am God. -  Alan Dugan, "For Masturbation"
Carruth has observed that, in his own experience, all o f the people who are enthusiastic
about Walden are men, that he hasn’t found a woman who cares much for it, and that
many readers, "though five women for every man," have told me that they understand my
view and agree with it. What part does gender response have to do with Carruth’s antidote
to Thoreauvian fantasy? If Thoreau doesn’t want a lover, why does Carruth want us to
condemn his masturbation? W ouldn’t Carruth agree with Jim Harrison:
The minister whacks off as does the insurance man, 
habitual golfer, sweet lady in her bower, 
as do novelists, monks, nuns in nunneries, 
maidens in dormitories, stallion against fence post, 
goat against puzzled pig who does not cease feeding 
and so do senators, generals, wives during tv 
gameshows, movie stars and football players, students 
to utter distraction, teachers butchers, world leaders, 
everyone except poets who fear the dreaded 
growth of hair on the palms, blindness.
They know that even in an empty hotel room 
in South Dakota, someone is watching.
Perhaps Thoreau is this poet. W atching in isolation from the creative act leads to the 
feeling that someone must be watching you? Perhaps. But I am getting at something 
serious here. It is not unfair to say that nowhere does Thoreau lake notice of the vast
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intricacies of erotic relationships, or much notice o f women at all. To the contrary -- he 
tries to belittle them to the point o f denying them altogether. Note his descriptions of "the 
traveller who stops at the best houses . . , and if  he resigned him self to their tender 
mercies he would be totally emasculated." Note his disdain of "ottomans, sunshades, and a 
hundred other oriental things which we are taking west with us, invented for ladies of the 
harem and the effeminate native o f the Celestial Empire." Note his disdain for the 
charitable enterprises of the women of Concord. And note his misogynistic description of 
John Field’s wife, "with round, greasy face and bare breast, still thinking to improve her 
condition one day; with the never-absent mop in one hand, and yet no effects of it visible 
anywhere." Ungenerous, yes, and beyond the point o f cruelty.
Thoreau’s ideal universe is a universe o f one; his ideal companion is "the universal 
fact" (367). Carruth, no doubt loves and needs women, as much as he needs and loves 
natural beauty. He also accepts the "moral, psychological, and metaphysical agonies arising 
from these loves" (SI,29). Perhaps he loves these agonies as well. And, considerations of 
Thoreau’s rhetorical excess aside for the moment, doesn’t his thinking at least originate in 
the striving for optimum favorable conditions for his own work, the kind o f conditions that 
Carruth himself created, albeit with his family, in Vermont? As Nietzsche noted, great 
philosophers, including Heraclitus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and 
Schopenhauer abhorred marriage, "marriage being a hindrance and a calamity on the path to 
the optimum." Carruth’s friend, Ray Carver, in his essay Fires also complained about the 
baleful influence o f his wife and children on his writing. But Nietzsche reminds us that the 
ascetic idealism o f the philosophers is not a simple, superficial desert; it is an inner stale 
accomplished in the midst o f an active social life. Thoreau, in the extreme simplicity of his 
idealism comes "to the point at which he is not far from harboring the impious w islrpcreat 
mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiarn (let the world perish, but let there be 
philosophy, the philosopher, me).‘5
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Thoreau is saving himself for his own purposes, the writing o f his autobiography. 
The large problem is that his psychic retention becomes the substance o f his effort. An 
autobiography that purports to be ethical should not be autotelic. We return to Carruth’s 
conclusion that Thoreau "solves the problems of sex by masturbation, and the problems of 
all mankind by isolation." In the chapter on The Sleeping Beauty I have discussed what 
Carruth sees as the problems of sex. In brief, it is that the impulse to love generously and 
thereby to have freedom has led to failure, to murder and domination; "passion/ in romance 
must be love in action/ Lust for the ideal." Love is too often only a style of domination.
In practice love produces the best and the worst, the simplest and the most difficult of 
human consequences. I do not suggest that Thoreau avoided erotic relationships because he 
understood this paradox. He arranged his whole life so as to avoid any conflict that would 
have produced this kind o f knowing. And this very avoidance is a large pan of the
substance o f Am erica’s favorite Founding Work. By avoiding erotic engagement, Thoreau
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also, on Carruth’s account, misses one large opportunity at establishing not only a true
personality, but the possibility of generating an ethics, a code of morals.
In After the Stranger we find Carruth’s account of the positive possibilities of
eroticism (I cover this in the chapter on SB) and a few comments on the topic of
masturbation, both o f which we can also bring to bear on his response to Thoreau. Aspen,
the painter-protagonist o f the book, realizes in his votive exegesis of Cam us’s The Stranger,
the relationship of sex to freedom. Camus’s character Meursault suffers from sexual
privation when he is imprisoned for murder. His jailer tells him that part of his
imprisonment is precisely one of the ways in which he is being punished; he is being
thereby deprived o f his liberty. Aspen notes,
How simple, classical. And how opposed to the accepted modernism that sex and, 
for that matter, all nature, far from being a liberty, are an enslavement, an 
inescapable determinism which creates us against our wills, first as the shapeless 
fruit of our parent’s needs; then as the misshapen materia in qua of our own.
(ATS, 19-20)
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The source o f many of Carruth’s objections is that W alden is not modem, that it is 
romantic — romantic for instance in its insistence on the primacy of immediacy over 
tradition, romantic in its use o f the seasons as a structuring device — romantic and utopian 
and should be seen as such. Thoreau is, however, modem in his view o f eroticism as 
limitation, limitation as a lack o f freedom. Carruth’s existentialism, as well as his 
understanding o f the values of poetic forms, holds that this is not the case. He agrees with 
Kierkegaard: "the more you limit yourself, the more fertile you become in invention."
This is especially true in creating a personality. This limitation also means the 
abandonment o f hope, "for hope precludes self-limitation" (Either, 228). M eursault is 
more free than his jailer, who is operating on received morality, but eventually , the next 
day, M eursault masturbates. "Not a very satisfactory way out," Aspen comments, "for 
anyone experienced in sex, as M eursault is, or for anyone devoted to freedom, as Meursault 
also is." There is a duplexity here. Is accepting limitation from without the same thing as 
accepting necessity? Is the mere recognition o f necessity, for instance the acknowledgement 
that one is being coerced, an act o f freedom? Aspen asks, "Can one be free even if one 
follows the recognition [of coercion] with an act o f will, ordaining necessity?" Sartre has 
at times seemed to argue that all limitations o f freedom are internal. Critics o f Sartre’s 
existentialism, Marcuse for example, have pointed out that in fact there are often external 
constraints which make this position ludicrous, and that "existentialist freedom is safe from 
the tribulations to which man is subjected in empirical reality.Ml6 This is precisely the 
objection that Carruth makes about Thoreau’s work, its radical removal from real life.
There are sources in Carruth’s poems for his connection o f sex and freedom.
Freedom means having a woman when you want one. When institutionalized (as Carruth 
was), or driven by fear into isolation (as Carruth also was), sex is not possible. In the 
asylum "the calendar/ on the wall masturbated shamelessly, relentlessly" (SB,67). In the 
isolation of his rural home, presumably after the break-up o f his marriage, it is rare that the
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persona is "making love in the cabin, not to himself/ This time, a visitor has come to him, 
has come/ With him" (SB,76). Many people might agree that two are better than one, but 
if Carruth’s position on masturbation were a mere assertion o f that it would be of little 
consequence. Carruth objects to Thoreau’s vision as an ideal. Masturbation, on Carruth’s 
account, is the sexual analog, cause and effect o f social irresponsibility. It is acsthelicism 
masked as asceticism. Thoreau is the aesthetic man. He simply wants to watch. This is 
an untenable ground for a social contract.
The ascetic and the aesthetic urge pervade W alden. Asceticism is his aesthetic 
strategy. Everywhere his disgust at his own body and its functions is a metaphor for his 
disgust at society: "the bad neighborhood to be avoided is our own scurvy selves" 9130): 
"There is no odor so bad as that which arises from goodness tainted. It is human, it is 
divine carrion" (160); from Higher Laws. "The gross feeder is a man in the larva state; and 
there are whole nations without fancy or imagination, whose vast abdomens betray them" 
(264); "The wonder is how they, how you and I, can live this slimy beastly life, eating and 
drinking" (267); sensual urges are like "the worms which, even in life and death, occupy 
our bodies" (267); "Chastity is the flowering of man" (268); Thoreau’s bedfellow is "the ice 
in the pond" (306). In Life Without Principle this metaphorical mode becomes even more 
direct:
Those things which now most engage the attentions of men, as politics and the 
daily routine, are, it is true, vital functions o f human society, but should be 
unconsciously performed, like the corresponding functions o f the physical body.
They are infra-human. (372-73)
Thoreau’s asceticism is self-disgust; his ideal response is flight. This is why he confuses
liberty with freedom, and why, as we shall see in his response to work, he confuses nature
with history. Freedom is freedom from , from sex, from corporeality, from social
responsibility. Cavell has suggested Thoreau’s resemblance to Rousseau. Carruth concurs,
and he makes the distinction between the Thoreauvian, Rousseauvian definition of freedom
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and his own, which partakes consciously of the writings o f Bakunin, Most, Goldman, and 
Kropotkin. Carruth sees the historical truth o f negative freedom, that "men must be forced 
to be free," that belief in freedom has manifested itself most often as passion,
And passion
In romance must be love in action,
Lust for the ideal . . .  oh, murderous
All you great,
All you good and terrible
Straining forever in beauty and m an’s fate,
You heroes valorous in error,
Why could you not have let love be? And why 
Was loving never enough?
Sing, Robespierre,
O f how your loves look, trundling past to die. (SB,54)
Hannah Arendt has remarked, "Robespierre carried the conflicts o f the soul, Rousseau’s ame
dechiree, into politics, where they became murderous because they were insoluble." 17 On
Carruth’s account, this kind of freedom is romantic error; the consequence of Rosseauism is
tyranny, e.g., in Cuba:
He reads:
"That is one of the great tragedies 
O f revolutions: you have to suppress man 
In order to save him."
But o Fidel
"Suppress" means the camps.
It means "up against the wall," and good Cardenal 
Who loves you and your revolution, the equalities,
The courage, the beautiful new nation,
Cardenal saw the camps, saw the oppression,
Cardenal saw the State . . . (SB,53)
This suppression is Thoreauvian tyranny over self, asceticism. In another poem Carruth
quotes Bakunin to make a distinction between freedom and independence:
"I am a fanatic lover o f liberty, considering it
the unique condition in which intelligence, dignity,
and human happiness may develop and grow;
not the purely formal liberty
conceded, measured out, and regulated by the State,
an eternal lie which in reality represents
nothing more than the privilege
of some founded on the slavery
of the rest; not the individualistic, egoistic,
shabby and fictitious liberty
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extolled by the school of J.-J. Rousseau and the other
schools o f bourgeois liberalism,
which gives us the would-be rights o f all men
as embodied in a State that limits the rights o f each —
an idea which leads inevitably to the reduction
of the rights o f each to zero." (Brothers,90)
Though there is evidence that Bakunin and Thoreau had much in common in regard
to their psycho-sexual identities 18, Carruth sees that Thoreau’s egoism, his self-hatred,
tends, when translated into social praxis, toward tyranny, toward liberty for a few at the
price o f the enslavement o f many. Thoreau’s hatred o f organized power is "the hatred of
the ill-constituted, disinherited, and underprivileged, who destroy, who must destroy, because
what exists, indeed all existence, all being outrages and provokes them ."19 This is
Nietzsche on anarchists, but it resonates with Carruth’s objections to Thoreau. Thoreau’s
individualism is "only the other side o f corporatism, the two blind, sick egos of the
objective world" (Ef,2). Again, this is a disastrous basis for a social contract, for it is
the tyrannic will of one who suffers deeply, who struggles, is tormented, and would 
like to turn what is most personal, singular, narrow, the real idiosyncrasy of his 
suffering, into a binding law and compulsion -  one who, as it were, revenges 
himself on all things by forcing his own image, the image o f his torture on them, 
branding them with it.20
This forcing o f the image o f the self is, as we have seen above, precisely the nature of
Thoreau’s metaphoricity. Santayana called this kind o f anarchism one in which each man
lights "to make his conscription universal."21 In short, Walden is the medium o f passage
from romanticism, in this case a romantic pessimism, to fascism by way of individualism.
Yet, Carruth has no doubt that the individual must be primary, that the State in all
o f its manifestations must be resisted. The State is the most obvious form of destructive
pressure on individual consciousness. In the wake of the death o f god, the state came into
the void as a superperson, mindless, tyrannical,like all corporate personalities. "Against the
superperson, the person is literally nothing: a no thing . The slate has the goal to infonn
the individual that he does not exist, has no claim to exist except as an abstraction, a token,
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a statistical unit o f  labor, consumption, revenue, or the like" (ATS,94). The task, Carruth 
has learned from Camus, is "the preservation of both terms in the absurd relationship, the 
meaningless universe in the individual consciousness" (ATS,95). Is such a preservation 
possible?
Thoreau seeks to resist by asserting his ego. Carruth connects this kind o f egoism,
"mankind comprised o f only a miscellaneous assortment o f egos, single nodes of
consciousness endowed, each one, with demoniac self-regard." ("The Act o f Love," WP),
with Stim er and Nietzsche, with nihilism. The result of nihilism is a constant conflict: the
ego tries to remove itself from the objective world, but this is impossible because 1) it is
thus coerced by the objective world into determined responses and 2) it cannot escape into
pure transcendence because it can never let go o f itself.22 The existential answer is for the
self, the ego, to create a subjective order from the phenomenal elements o f objective reality.
This is what creates personality, and while it is happening -  the process is what is
important — there is a state of self-transcendence, a true subjectivity, "a spiritual stale of
pure existence" ("The Act o f Love"). This is work, and work is an act of' love. Work is
the source o f independence. There is every indication that Carruth sees the project as
purely personal, though the results are social. He asks,
Now tell me if we don’t need a revolution! Black 
is the color of my only flag
and o f m an’s hope.
Will revolution bring the farms back?
The answer is no, and to hope for that would be a backward-looking, sentimental 
utopianism.
Its true, the real revolutionary is one who can see 
all dark ahead and behind, his fate 
a need without hope; the will to resist.
The State is universal, the Universe is a state.
Now ask me if i am really an anarchist. (BILYA,94-5)
###
133
W hat Was Emerson Really Saving?
Carruth suggests that Thoreau was less free in his box in the woods than, "say,
Thomas Jefferson wrangling in the Congress or building Monticello," and that he would
have been freer if he had understood Jefferson or "even if  he had understood what his
neighbor, Ralph Waldo Emerson was really saying." What had Jefferson to say to Thoreau?
Carruth’s "Black is the color of my only flag...," above, evokes a message from Jefferson
via one of Carruth’s contemporaries who had a great influence on Carruth. Paul Goodman,
"Flags 1967":
How well they flew together side by side 
the Stars and Stripes my red white and blue 
and my black flag the soverignity of no 
m an or law! They were the flags o f pride 
and nature and advanced with equal stride 
across the age when Jefferson long ago 
saluted both and said, "Let Shay’s men go.
If you discourage mutiny and riot 
what check is there on government?
Today
the gaudy flag is very grand on earth 
and they have sewed on it a golden border, 
but I will not salute it. At our rally 
I see a small black flag o f little worth 
and touch it wistfully. Chaos is Order.23
In 1786, when Dan Shays led farmers in a desperate attempt to stop bankruptcy courts from 
sitting and then to Springfield in an attempt to capture the federal arsenal, his force was 
captured. All were pardoned or given short sentences. Jefferson, from Paris, said "A little 
rebellion now and then is a good thing . . . The tree o f liberty must be refreshed now and 
then with the blood o f patriots and tyrants." What Thoreau might have learned from this 
is, simply, tolerance. And, along with that, he might have tempered his position on 
working. Jefferson believed that agriculture encouraged the qualities o f practicality and self- 
reliance essential to a democracy. Jefferson encouraged diversity, not uniformity,
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enlightened and constructive rebellion, not revolution. Pride and nature (could Thoreau 
know the difference) "advancing with equal stride."
What does Carruth think Emerson was really saying? Certainly, Emerson saw that 
the poet, the ideal man, acts and creates from his character, and in doing so he acts for us 
all, not against us all. In his Shelleyan optimism, he believed that the poet could legislate 
a code o f ethics. And he had the Miltonic urge to be "doctrinal to the nation." He saw 
the creative artist as liberator, as vates, and in his own paeans to nature he saw all life as 
symbolic. In some ways none o f this is foreign to Thoreau. However, in "The New 
England Tradition," Carruth notes that although Emerson withdrew in a sense from Boston 
to Concord, his great value was in the active soul. Despite the cloying effect o f his 
"gorgeous inrushes o f exaltation" (D.H. Lawrence on Emerson), Emerson was trying to 
restore to Puritanism "an awareness of the spiritual unity of meaning and being." If his 
optimism overlooked the nature o f real suffering , eventually, Carruth believes, it issued out 
in an admirable kind o f Stoicism
In "The Poet" Emerson writes,
every natural phenomenon super-exists in pre-incantations which sail like odors in 
the air, and when any man goes by with an ear sufficiently fine, he overhears them 
and endeavors to write down the notes without diluting or depraving them, (my 
italics) The condition o f true naming on the poet’s part is his resigning himself to 
the divine aura which breathes through forms.
Although Emerson is much nearer to neo-Platonism here than Carruth could ever be, we can
see a source of Carruth’s affinity for Emerson. W alter Benjamin has defined "aura" as "the
unique phenomenon of appearing distant, however close a thing may be."24 For Carruth
and Emerson this appearance o f distance has a metaphysical and a representational valence.
If we arc to see into the souls o f things, those things must be appropriated lor our scrutiny.
But we must hold in mind, consciously, that they are always other, and equivalent. We
should not, in Em erson’s words, dilute or deprave them, which is the inclination of
metaphoric representation to which Thoreau falls victim over and over. Indeed, the
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maintenance o f that sense o f separateness, o f distance, is one o f the true sources o f wonder,
o f joy, the indispensable prerequisite for our own sense of phenomenological equality. This
is apparent in Carruth’s poem "Aura":
Now twilight comes; 
not dark but a moment’s 
clarity so that brute
wonder drains 
from my eyes, relieved 
by the evening star,
there, calm, over
the horizon, a lucidity,




and inside my skull I rise 
tall and free again 
then
the mountain, free too 
in its subduing,
intercedes, a new presence now
a sense given beyond
color, around and surrounding -
is it shadow, is it
a blue myth coming to be?
Ah, wonder gone, how 
lovely this welcoming! I see
I see the new dimension, form 
wavering into essence 
and shimmering -- oh,
so slightly! -- back to
new fonn, while
the mountain looks at me.
The loo brilliant light o f the autumn day produced "brute wonder," but the appearance of
the evening star restores the distance and measure, the identity and perspective that had
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been extinguished by that wonder. One consequence is that the man is released from his 
role of spectator and becomes in the liminal state o f light a participant, and to the extent 
that he participates he is free. As the mountain changes from form to essence it is freed 
from being merely an object of contemplation and it becomes free also as it becomes 
active, subduing the appropriating sense of the observer -  essence defies and subdues visual 
appropriation. In its flux the mountain subdues the outrush o f ego, resists in the 
independence o f flux the static quality that the vision demands for apprehension. In doing 
this the mountain restores the sense o f limitation and helps establish the definitive limits of 
the human self. The possibility o f self-definition with the help o f the natural world, which 
is granted an equivalent phenomenological reality, is one o f Carruth’s most characteristic 
perceptions. Here, unless sensory apperception is somehow subdued by the actual, the form 
and the essence o f the mountain, there is no necessity. Without necessity one lacks "the 
power to obey, to submit to the necessary in oneself, to what may be called one’s limit."25 
M etaphor always refuses to some extent to submit to the actual. So does Thoreau. And so 
Thoreau lacks the ability to define him self actually. His self is a fantastic thing, defined 
only in regard to the possible, the infinite, denying all actuality.
Attention to Em erson’s belief in the laws of spiritual compensation might also have 
tempered Thoreau’s vehemence. On Em erson’s account, aggression begets aggression, hale 
begets hate. Emerson believed "when he could love his enemies, he would have none, that 
is, he would not think o f them as enemies." 26 And, finally, we can say that the least that 
Thoreau might have learned from Emerson is his love, his sense of communion, the love 
that Emerson felt radiating from the truly great poets -  Shakespeare, Homer, Dante, and 
Chaucer. For Emerson "love is compatible with universal wisdom” ("The Poet"). If we 
can love we will find the cosmic reflected in one another, as well as in the water. Some 
understanding o f this might have helped keep Thoreau from becoming "ungenerous to the
point o f cruelty."
Yet, many critics have pointed out facets of Em erson’s thought which, even Carrulh
admits, Thoreau was clearly listening. Carruth notes Emerson’s "simple optimism in wage-
earning life," his use of commerce as a metaphor, in short, his optimistic belief in
commerce that led Allen Tate to call Emerson "the prophet of industrialism," and Santayana
to condemn Em erson’s inability to "comprehend the tragic view o f experience." If
Em erson’s knowing does not operate on suffering, suffering remains intractable. It remains
a fact. The actuality o f suffering (though certainly not ignorance of it!), is something
Carruth insists upon. Carruth thinks that if Emerson was a prophet of industrialism, it was
the fault of his interpreters. "We cannot blame Emerson for that, anymore than we can
blame Calvin for the ethics of Protestant businessmen." But Carruth largely ignores the part
o f Emerson that Thoreau understood.
In "Nature" Emerson states that in using phenomena symbolically the poet
unfixes the land and the sea . . . and disposes them anew," that "the sensual man 
conforms thoughts to things, the poet conforms things to his thoughts. The one 
esteems nature as rooted and fast; the other as fluid and impresses his being 
thereon.
It is precisely in his denial o f sensuality that Thoreau is uniformed in the attempt to 
dominate through denial both nature and the organic manifestations o f society -  
government, trade, work, marriage, etc.
Emerson talks of "the kingdom of man over nature." Though again Carrulh is 110 
"Objectivist," it is the deformative results o f this confonnity that he believes few of 
Thoreau’s fans are aware of. Michael Gilmore points out that in "Commodity" Emerson 
"betrays his admiration for commerce in his conception of the soul." The body and its 
functions become a commodity metaphor.27 Thoreau shares this characteristic; his disdain 
for bodiliness is embodied ideationally in his metaphors o f trade. Yet, the vehemence of 
his objections to trade make us wonder along with Carruth at the origin o f the metaphors.
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Which was primary, his disgust for his body or his disgust for trade?
Again, Carruth generally agrees with Thoreau on the insidious effects of technology 
and commerce. Serious writing has despised them. "As the subjugation of all our civil 
life by technology has accelerated, until now we are completely enslaved, so has our haired 
become deeper, broader, greater in every way, a controlling thematic element in much of 
our writing" (Ef,149). The problem is therefore how to react without continuing to be 
victimized in being merely reactive. Disgust must not dictate a mean and disgusting 
response. The work is difficult. And as Carruth points out, working is what Thoreau like 
least.
(I f f  | |
T r T r W
"WORK!" -M aynard G. Krebs
Even more galling to Carruth than Thoreau’s stylistic response to nature with all of
its troubling implications, more than his onanistic and neurotic demand for privacy, is his
attitude toward working, especially his ridicule o f his neighbors who have to work because
they have families. Carruth wonders why this attitude on work is part of Am erica’s love of
W alden. Why do Americans want to be flayed for obeying the Calvinist directive? It may
help to state here that Carruth does not naively assume a simple relationship between love
and work, e.g., that work — manual, intellectual, or other — is a repressive sublimation or a
negation of desire. There is, however, the implication that there could be a sublimation of
desire for an ideal, a positive view of work. Carruth realizes, with Marcuse, that erotic
power builds social order. Thoreau’s
projects o f realization: the abolition o f toil, the amelioration of the environment, the 
conquest o f disease and decay, the creation o f luxury . . . constitute work which 
associates individuals to greater unities; no longer confined within the mutilating 
domination o f the performance principle, they modify the impulse without
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deflecting its aim. There is sublimation and, consequently, culture; but this 
sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relations, 
which are in themselves work relations.28
Carruth knows this, that work is the prerequisite of creation, of existence. As Sartre writes
about Kierkegaard: "existence is the work of our inner life . . . resistances overcome and
perpetually reborn, efforts perpetually renewed, despairs surmounted, provisional failures and
precarious victories -  and this work is directly opposed to intellectual knowing"29, i.e., to
Hegel and to Thoreau. Thoreau’s rejection o f culture, of society, his escapism, his wish to
"do away with art, do away with history, abolish every civilization more complex than that
o f the anthill beneath your feet" is the concomitant o f his refusal to acknowledge the
libidinal aspect o f his body, his need for love and work. His disgust for fanning misses
the main spiritual value o f work -  that it is done not for an ideal, not for the state, not
directly for the economic community at large, not even for the universal fact, but for some
other human beings, for their welfare and maintenance. Work is an erotic act.
Carrulh’s "Essay on Love" is a meditative poem that is essential in his larger
evocation of the beauty of the New England countryside. It is intense in its perception of
the land, so that we understand that this kind o f looking, watching with a vigilant refusal to
distort, is itself hard, erotic labor. Carruth writes this poem in his middle age, literally
weary o f manual labor.
I used to drive this wedge in the maple blocks 
with pleasure, now I wouldn’t care 
if I never saw another.
Yet the air so clear, utterly clear,and the blue 
September sky arching the forest’s bright crown 
so very deep: Come lean the sledge 
on its maple block
and walk away, slow, stepping by the little brook 
where shad leaves turn coral and the turtlehead 
blooms late this year its petals 
still perfect and while.
Sec, ladies’ tresses, right here where they always 
were; kneel then to their fragrance, near
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to the cool o f the earth. And goldenrod, 
plumes o f yellow
where yellow bees mumble, and asters, blue 
and purple and white, New England asters 
that are our stars, and the small 
speckled asters massed
at the edge o f the clearing, that are called 
farewell to summer; and there beneath them 
the peeping, deep, blue shy eyes 
of the gentian,
so rare a color.
There is a tenderness o f visual touch here, along with the Keatsian brilliance o f imagery
and the expert lyrical movement o f the poem (peeping, deep, blue shy eyes!). The poem
goes on to enumerate the particular pains o f failing mind, failing body. The ultimate
realization is o f the redeeming otherness in daily chores:
Years, years, seasons and changes. Time,
which is nothing but the measure of change -  
nothing. No meaning.
Years, years I ’ve driven this wedge with my big 
hammer into these maple blocks for Rose Marie, 
to keep her warm and give her stovewood 
for her kitchen
all winter, firesticks wrenched, split, pried 
apart, each with the thought of her. 1 see 
so clearly, precisely, with the keen 
eye o f dispassion,
the trees, flowers, birds, all colors and forms, 
but what good is such seeing in this chaos 
we used to call our order? She 
is invisible now,
a purity, the greater loveliness for the greater 
seeing. Back to the block then, back once more, 
pick up the sledge, eyes down, and bend, 
bend to the labor
that is the only meaning. Farewell to summer.
Yes, let changes keep the time. I ’ll count 
no further, except the firesticks 
counted for her.
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The endurance o f fatality is made possible by a practical, immediate goal. The reaching 
toward this goal also controls the impulse o f the chaotic imagination toward fantasy.
Today, or tomorrow, is of necessity more important than the infinitely distant future, the 
nowhere o f the utopian sensibility. In the face of chaos clairvoyance is a curse, a pain, but 
the narrowing o f scope from the universal fact to the particular fact is a source of sanity. 
This is not merely a sentimental love of the land and of the woman; labor for love, 
including the labor of lucid attention and clear writing, is the only meaning, the only way 
to impose provisional unity on an immensely intractable reality. This is true o f any erotic 
act, especially the act o f writing (and o f reading, with love, the product of the writer). "Let 
changes keep the time." This applies both to the poem on the page -  that the meter is 
improvised in regard to a basic, arbitrary order — an aesthetic credo, but also it means that 
the illusion of time is a feature of the world of perceived change. Maya. Where does the 
poem go when it is not being written? Where is our world without us?
Thoreau tenns attention to mundane details "moral suicide" ("Life Without 
Principle",368). Carruth sees that this kind o f attention to detail is the only way to survive. 
Thoreau’s vision is of himself, numinous, in a world of facts, avoiding the filth of human 
contact, the difficulty o f finding part o f himself reflected in the joys and tribulations of 
others. He can never admit his own part in the mindlessness he abhors. The loss of 
spiritual purpose Thoreau detects in society is a manifestation of brutishness in the heart of 
man, and, insofar as he is a man, in Thoreau. Thoreau denies this void in himself, denies 
the brutal consequences of it, but he displays that very brutishness in his excessive 
vehemence. Carruth wishes to call our attention to this same crazy behavior in American 
life.
Work, doing, is a positive necessity, and a way of achieving selfhood and 
community which is far more practical than, say, living in a box and reading the Hindu
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scriplures. Writing is work, and Carruth shares with Kierkegaard a sense of writing as 
action.
In "The Act of Love: Poetry and Personality," an essay that Charles Altieri has called "the
best discursive essay by a contemporary American poet," Carruth describes literary creation,
at least the moments when the artist is intensely engaged, "spontaneously engendering
imagery and verbal compounds from the imagined structures of remembered experience," as
a spiritual moment of pure existence, a moment of personality, of love. This moment can
come from any activity, from working with machines or from working the land. Carruth
makes a clear distinction here between spiritualism and mysticism, between intensification of
identity and ecstasy, loss of identity (ek-stasis, out of place):
The poet at work is in firmer command of what he knows, all that he knows, than 
at any other time. Indeed work is the key word here. The spirit of man may be 
capable o f developmental or mutational stages beyond my comprehension -  I 
certainly do not comprehend visions or the antics of parapsychology -b u t the stage 
I do comprehend, which I therefore call spiritual and not mystical, is that stage that 
is reached through work. (WP,223)
Carruth sees some of this spiritual work in W alden. The creation of a personality ,
autobiogenesis, is an existential act insofar as there is no assumption o f an essential self
which takes precedence over the created self. There is no expression o f an a priori self,
but rather an improvisation. Thoreau unfortunately diverts himself from himself through his
careless and fantastic egoism.
Autobiogenesis is an act of rebellion. The individual creates an image of himself
not by using knowledge, but with the Kierkegaardian conditionals o f belief, decision, and
choice. As such a creation it is a subversive social act, egoistic in the best sense of
Nietzsche’s self-assertion, "setting up a real ego, accessible to [the individual] and fathomed
by him, in opposition to the general pale fiction and thereby annihilating it."31 Carruth
quotes Schopenhauer to put this creative egoism into perspective:
Genius, then, consists in the capacity for knowing, independently of the principle of 
sufficient reason, not individual things, which have their existence in their relations, 
but the ideas o f such things, and o f being oneself the correlative of the idea, and
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thus no longer an individual, but the pure subject o f knowledge.(Ef,2)
The capacity for being the subject of knowledge rather than the compulsion to be the source
of knowledge. How different this is from Thoreau, who defines himself only in reaction, in
creating W alden, an overheated tome of "sufficient reason."
But back to work. Carruth had to support his family in the dismal economic
environment o f northern Vermont by cutting wood, ghost-writing, raising chickens, and
writing what he calls "hack reviews." He naturally resents being laughed at by Thoreau. Is
there a "higher" dimension to Thoreau’s castigation of his readers? Thoreau works at
Walden, it seems, only to try to validate his use o f farming and working the woods as
metaphors. "Our lives pass at such remoteness from its symbols, and its metaphors and
tropes are far-fetched." In "The Bean Field" he says he farms the land "for the sake of
tropes and expressions, to serve a parable maker, one day." Thoreau wants to earn his
tools, but does he? Here is a troped-up passage from A W eek:
We all had our daydreams as well as more prophetic nocturnal visions, but as for 
fanning, I am convinced that my genius dates from an older era than the 
agricultural, I would at least strike my spade into the earth with such careless 
freedom but accuracy as the woodpecker his bill into a tree. There is my nature, 
methinks, a singular yearning toward all wildness. . . what have I to do with plows?
I cut another furrow than you see.
There is much characteristic o f Thoreau’s "vision" for Carm th’s objections here. Night
visions are delivered by the unconscious and therefore untainted by reality. They are more
prophetic o f something, the future perhaps. Thoreau’s "genius" here is not his
accomplishment, but his inhabiting spirit. It comes from the fantastic realm of pre-history,
before agriculture, from . . . how far back, over 10,000 years? The metaphors here are
unintentionally ludicrous. The woodpecker pecks for something that is already there, hardly
like preparing the earth for seeding. How does accuracy enter into spading as preparation?
Thoreau’s wish for careless freedom, his assignment of it to a woodpecker are telling.
Wildness, carelessness, and freedom are synonymous for Thoreau, as they are for many
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Americans today. What has Thoreau to do with plows? He uses the idea of a plow to
express his own Platonic desire to "cut another furrow than we can see." Good for him.
But the rhetorical question is barely functional. He has nothing to do with plows, and he
compounds his lack o f sympathy for working folks with his view of the people who use
plows, farmers. Carruth finds in his farming neighbors "the remnant o f human worth/ to
admire in this world and, I think, to envy." Compare this to Thoreau’s statement at the end
o f the passage on Flint’s pond: "Farmers are respectable and interesting to me in
proportion as they are poor -  poor farmers . . .  I respect not his labors, his farm where
everything has its price." The price, of course, is work. Thoreau’s contempt for farmers
reaches its depth as he criticizes their living arrangements, "chambers for men, horses, oxen,
swine, cleansed and uncleansed, all contiguous to one another. Stocked with men! A great
grease spot redolent o f manures and buttermilk." Thoreau’s expression of ultimate contempt
takes the form of a physical revulsion at the proximity of domestic animals. Where should
the farmer live? Does he really expect that farmers should be engaged in aesthetic
cultivation? The attack on Flint is senseless.
Carruth has developed a natural respect for the people who farm for their lives.
They were his neighbors in Johnson, and he could not have survived there without them.
One of the most moving o f Carruth’s poems is "Marshall Washer." Washer is a "cowshit
farmer," an actual neighbor of Carruth’s, a passionately private man who knows everything
useful about his land. W asher’s endurance in the face of the destruction o f the surrounding
countryside and the apparent obsolescence o f his vocation, his practical skills, his shy
neighborliness, emerge as truly heroic qualities. This is a piece o f Carruth’s song in praise
of the farmer :
I see a man in bib overalls
and rubber boots kneeling in cowshit to smear
ointment on a sore teal, a m an with a hayfork,
a dungfork, an axe, a 20-pound maul
for driving posts, a canthook, a grease gun.
I see a man notching a cedar post
145
with a double-headed axe, rolling the post 
under his foot in the grass; quick strokes and there 
is a ringed groove one inch across, as clean 
as if cut with the router blade down at the mill.
Thoreau would call W asher’s life moral suicide, but Carruth’s understanding is that
W asher’s relationship to his place, to his way o f life, and therefore to him self is highly
moral. His morality is pervasive, reflected even in his archaic diction which reveals thaL
He is rooted
in history as in the land, the only man I know 
who lives in the house where he was bom. I see 
a man alone walking his fields and woods, 
knowing every useful thing about them, moving 
in a texture o f memory that sustains his lifetime 
and his father’s lifetime. I see a man 
felling asleep at night with thoughts and dreams 
I could not infer -  and would not if  I could -  
in his chair in front of his television.
Note the speaker’s typical Yankee reticence to intrude, the respect for limits. Frost’s fences
are, o f course, psychological. History is in some sense always a limitation, and the
acceptance o f history is the only way to live morally. This acceptance o f history, natural to
Carruth and reinforced by his friendship with Washer is a characteristic o f all of Carruth’s
writing, especially The Sleeping Beauty. Thoreau’s denial o f history is, as Gilmore points
out, self-defeating; he confused nature with history. Thoreau believed that farm work
demeaned the farmer, that by engaging in commodity exchange the fanner, in Sartre’s
words, "reduces himself to inorganic materiality in order to act materially upon matter and
to change his material life,"32 that some kind o f undesirable transubstantiation occurs as a
result o f work. Thoreau doesn’t understand that W asher with his dungfork controls his
material and social reality, instead o f being controlled by it. He has lost sight of the
subjective element in his activity. Gilmore notes that
An important corollary to this loss o f person is a confusion of history with nature.
By mystifying or obscuring m an’s involvement in the production of his social 
reality, reification leads him to apprehend that reality as a "second nature." He 
perceives the social order as an immutable and universal order over which he exerts 
no control. The result is greatly to diminish the possibility o f human freedom.33
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Here is the consequence o f Thoreau’s failures in logic. Had Thoreau read and understood
Jefferson, he would have realized his potential ability to create his social reality. Had he
realized the positive aspects o f working he would not have confused history with nature.
His inability to understand that history abuts with the present and is therefore malleable
leads to understanding it as nature, nature which must be overcome. This is an essentially
bourgeois perspective. The American middle class thinks that there are two classes :
"great individuals," viewed as the autocratic makers of history, and, on the other hand, the
"natural laws o f the historical environment."34 Given this view, any attempt to mediate the
present has the following result (Lukacs quotes Hegel)
Consciousness has become an enigma to itself as a result of the very experience 
which was to reveal its truth to itself; it does not regard the effects of its deeds as 
its own deeds: what happens to it is not the same experience for it as it is in 
itself . . . Abstract necessity, therefore, passes for the merely negative, 
uncomprehended power o f the universal by which individuality is destroyed.35
For Thoreau this abstract, necessity is the power against which he makes his stand.
Unfortunately, the experimental circumstance o f his self-engagement is so removed and
distorted from everyday existence that his conclusions emerge as mere assertions of
individualism, not as help for anyone confronted with the anguishing choices of real
independence. One can deny history. Or one can acknowledge history and rebel against it,
which can be truly creative and courageous. One can diminish suffering only if one
acknowledges it, otherwise rebellion is nothing. Nor can rebellion occur without love, as
Camus says, rebellion must result in community: "If all are not saved, what good is foe
salvation of one only?"36 Thoreau, and all adherents to his kind o f transcendentalism,
prefer an abstract conception of man, of themselves, rather than flesh and blood. This is
proven in Thoreau’s metaphors o f self-disgust. He denies existence. He would rather hate
than love.
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And his withdrawal is terminal. Carruth mentions Kierkegaard’s life as an example
o f a similarly isolated attempt to generate a moral and philosophical basis for individualism.
If we consider Kierkegaard, we see, Carruth suggests, that working in a social isolation
similar to Thoreau’s, he realized that "to strive against the whole world is a comfort, to
strive with oneself is dreadful."37
Thoreau can assert the sublimity o f poverty because o f his lack of compassion. He
has no compassion and he hates exchange — exchange of anything. So he cannot love. He
cannot submit to love because he is afraid o f limitations. He writes, "Not until we have
lost the world do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite
extent o f our relations." A particularly lucid moment, which sounds as if he has precluded
hope and is willing to proceed with the immediate, not the universal fact. It sounds true.
It is not at all unlike Kierkegaard, who writes in "The Rotation Method, "it is impossible to
live artistically before one has made up one’s mind to abandon hope; for hope precludes
self limitations" (E,288). But Thoreau was content with living the aesthetic, artistic life.
He was withdrawn for his own aesthetic purposes. He participates only by watching and he
is satisfied with finding himself. To do so he has to look neither out far nor in deep. He
has no sense of the finite self which might accentuate his desire for an eternal, infinite self.
Kierkegaard knew that the self accomplishment o f the "knight of infinite resignation" was
possible because "he is not afraid o f letting love creep into his most secret, his most hidden
thoughts."38 Not only does Thoreau fear his own affectionate impulses, he derides them in
others. He hides from history in his fantasy o f nature.
Carruth’s reference to Kierkegaard leads to further insights into the consequences of
Thoreau’s fantasies. S.K. again:
When feeling becomes fantastic, the self is simply volatized more and more, at last 
becoming a sort of abstract sentimentality which is so inhuman that it does not 
apply to any person, but inhumanly participates feelingly, so to speak, in the fate of 
one or another abstraction, e.g., that of mankind in abstractio . . .  so it is with him 
whose feeling has become fantastic; he becomes in a way infinitized, but not in 
such a way that he becomes more and more himself, for he loses himself more and
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more. 39
This abstract sentimentality is part o f what Carruth calls nineteenth-century utopianism. It 
abandons the present for the future. Thoreau’s participation in mankind is done feelingly, 
with hate. One also senses that Thoreau’s violent rhetoric, e.g., his statements about 
poverty, his declarations on women, his assertion that "there is nothing, not even crime, 
more opposed to poetry, to philosophy, aye, to life itself than this incessant business" (this 
doesn’t deserve rebuttal), these are the result o f the desperation he feels at his leaking self.
Yet, he feels no limit to his selfhood, his ego. Without family, without work,
without social obligations, he has no necessity. He lacks the power to obey, to submit to
the necessary. In fact at Walden Thoreau is not only hidden from society, in the illusions
that result from his fantasy he is hidden from himself. Kierkegaard makes the distinction
between mysticism and illusion that bears on both Carruth’s differentiation between
individualism and independence, between the spiritual and the mystical, and generally on
withdrawal as a political and aesthetic strategy, or tactic: "In illusion the individual is
hidden from himself; in mystification, he is hidden from others, but both cases arc a result
o f romantic training" (E,248). If Thoreau suffers from illusion, Carruth is surely engaged in
mystification. But he knows what he was and is doing. His life in Vennont was dictated
by his need to withdraw, to make him self obscure. This is largely apparent in his poetry,
explicitly in "Moon" (FSRFC):
I watch you, alone and lonely,
both o f us lonely, full o f this late
fire. Then I descend once more
to the cove, to deepening snow and the house
that stands by the loud brook in freshet
under the hemlock bank, finding
my loves there, companionate and always
careful of me. And you
are hidden by the banked black boughs
as I am hidden by love.
Hours later
when the night has gone to frost
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again, a reversion to winter,
I walk out onto the crusted snow 
and there you are, high 
in the winter sky again, so clear, 
like a free flake in the stream 
o f stars. I have found you in the depths 
o f cold and darkness, you always there 
and yet so often hidden, as I too 
am where I am always, hidden.
There is more than a hint o f the romantic here, but a lucid lunacy: to identify oneself as
the lover o f the moon. Perhaps the speaker also feels like a "free flake," but there is no
illusion. To hide in love is quite different from hiding in hate in the woods. The speaker
realizes that he may not know himself, except as an object o f flux, and also of potential
beauty, like the moon. This sense of potentiality, of yearning towards the beautiful both as
a quality o f the self and as a granted endowment o f loving perception, is .the prerequisite of
finding beauty. Other people, families, in their companionability and careful love suggest
the beauty o f the self. Thoreau suggests "the bad neighborhood to be avoided is our own
scurvy selves." He cannot allow him self the opportunity to see that he might be otherwise.
He is hiding, not creating, and Carruth wishes that Americans knew the difference.
I I  I I  [ I 
t T T t T T
Guilt and the "twist o f the Puritan knife"
Expropriative style. Lack o f compassion. Irresponsible utopianism. Abstract 
sentimentality. Conflation o f necessity and actuality and the consequent conflation of nature 
with history. Disgust for the body overwhelming social and ontological conceptions. 
Ignorance o f the difference between illusion and mysticism. These are serious charges, and 
serious flaws, indeed. And even worse, Carruth thinks that Thoreau asserts this vision with 
a kind o f arrogance that makes it unbearable. Thoreau’s excoriation of his neighbors is 
"nothing but arrogance,, and of an extreme order that [heJ can explain only by believing it
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defensive al bottom and motivated by guilt"(Ef,65). Does this guilt originate in some 
unconscious need for punishment, because o f Thoreau’s minimal social transgressions?
Does Thoreau at some level realize that he has given up necessity, the only tool with which 
he could gain the power to effect reality, and does he display such severity towards his 
neighbors because they are still powerful? What is this guilt?
In "A M eaning o f Robert Lowell" (WP,138), Carruth defines a kind of guilt, a 
regional, Yankee guilt, that elaborates not only his response to Thoreau, but his response to 
Puritan ethics in general. Carruth admires Low ell’s poetic achievement. He admires 
Lowell’s "hardrock Yankee pertinacity." Low ell’s poem "Night Sweat" (For the Union 
Dead) is a poem to which Carruth is naturally attracted; it is about writing, love, 
responsibility, and guilt. Carruth quotes two lines from the middle of the poem: "always 
in me is the child who died,/ always inside me is his will to die." His interpretation of 
these lines in the context o f Lowell’s poetry and of American culture is, he admits, highly 
conjectural. Not only is it the finest piece o f criticism I have ever read on Lowell, it is 
essentially useful in evaluating Carruth’s response to his regional culture.
Carruth sees these lines as "the expression o f the radical guilt which seems to lie at 
the base o f Lowell’s poetic nature." The sources o f this guilt are cultural -- the Yankee 
shame "over the Indians and the Salem women” -  and biological -  the Oedipal guilt over 
the death o f the father — and also, "finally from the horrendous events of contemporary 
history." Carruth says that this guilt is caused by a puritan conception o f sin, that sin 
brings death. This is the dark, intestinal, Puritan, American superstition. Personal death 
comes as a result o f sin. Yet, everywhere Lowell asserts his personal innocence. The only 
meaning then is that
death is our sin, for which we pay in advance through our guilt. Our death is a 
crime . . . Our bodies are going to commit it, do what we will. They are going to 
carry out this murder inexorably, while we stand by, helplessly and aghast.
This is the ultimate Yankee metonymy, you might say. Puritan death as 
punishment for sin contracts, under the paradox of benign transcendentalism, to 
death as sin. Naturally it is a theological monstrosity. It is impossible. Yet in the
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human and poetic sphere, it is a validity o f staggering force. And it lies at the 
heart o f the American sensibility, a far more cogent explanation o f our altitudes 
than, for example, Leslie Fiedler’s mythologized sexualism.
Lowell carries this "sin-death" inside him; the consequent guilt is an autogenetic engine.
Thoreau did also. Thoreau’s disgust for his body is informed by this submerged metonymic
corporeal sin. The body is treacherous, to be denied by asceticism. Society is treacherous,
tending toward annihilation o f the helpless individual, and should also be denied. This is
as impossible as immortality. But, still, all o f it, society-death-sin-death-in-life, it is all
Thoreau’s fault. He is guilty, defensively, arrogantly guilty.40 This is the source o f the
vehemence in Walden and in Civil Disobedience. In paragraph 14 o f the latter Thoreau
seems to realize that he is associated with the state, in the same relationship to the state as
the state is to the nation. His withdrawal has not dissolved the union between the
individual and the state, and hence he is disgraced. This is a sin, a source of guilt, a
source o f his useless and naive political rhetoric. His statements about political philosophies
are typically bitter and simplistic: "The government o f the world I live in was not framed,
like that o f Britain, in after-dinner conversations over the wine."
This same guilt functions in Thoreau’s appraisal of commerce. His zealous rejection
of exchange in some ways anticipates the rejection of the meanest values of capitalism by
many serious writers. Like many people today, Thoreau perceived, as Carruth notes, "the
doom of civilization in the flaws o f a specifically human nature." Does he know that he
himself is responsible? He does nothing but yowl at and accuse his fellows. In placing the
blame for this sin solely on others Thoreau falls victim to the psychic process described by
Hegel
he does not regard the effects of its deeds as its own deeds . . . what happens to it 
is not the same experience for it as it is in itself. Abstract necessity therefore 
passes for the merely negative, uncomprehended power o f the universal by which 
individuality is destroyed.
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In denying his own responsibility, Thoreau is subscribing to the Christian tradition that 
traces original sin to an ancestor: evil has already taken place. This view insists upon "the 
impotence o f will that surrounds every actual fault."41 Americans crave the 
unaccountability and the moral paralysis that his vision of sin encourages. It is directly 
opposed to one of the prime existential tenets: man is only what he makes of himself. 
Carruth knows this; he also knows well the attraction of personal paralysis. In "The End 
Again,” (From Snow and Rock), the speaker stands in the literal and moral moonlight 
"metaphorical of/ Abstract perfect justice," at 40 below zero, contemplating oblivion 
helplessly "stiff/ Almost solid, staring with frozen eyes."
This particular kind o f guilt and sin are also factors in Thoreau’s refusal to admit 
erotic relationships. Not only would a lover put practical restraints on him, so he thinks, he 
feels the very existence of others as the dead-end of his own possibility — and possibility is 
the realm that Thoreau wants to infinitize. The other gives him his own value and so, he 
thinks, creates alienation, enslaves him, makes him less a man than a thing. Sartre puts this 
neatly:
By the very emergence o f [the other’s] existence, I have an appearance, a nature; 
the existence of the Other is my original sin.42
Given Thoreau’s thinking, the very fact of a social order makes him guilty.
The end result o f all this guilt is the vehemence Carruth decries along with the
unfortunate tendency o f Americans to accept that vehemence as correctly applied to
themselves:
because we return compulsively to our endeavors, our studies, our poems and 
paintings, we must permit ourselves to be scorned, reviled, and castigated . This is 
deeply, congenitally American. It is the twist of the Puritan knife, guilt returning 
upon desire and weakness. Thoreau was eager to do the job for us, and today we 
have plenty o f lesser Thoreaus, equally eager. The magazines and lecture halls, 
though not the woods, are full of them.
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What could be meaner, on Carruth’s account, than a lesser Thoreau? The tone here is
typical of Carruth’s judgments on corporate culture, on the intellectual friability and the
hostility toward intellectual rigor o f the contemporary sensibility and on the artists who
would cater to it. Although Carruth has used the words flayed, excoriated, cruelty,
arrogance, castigated, etc., in describing Thoreau’s approach, he never explicitly goes to the
conclusion, though he implies it in the image of Thoreau twisting the knife. Thoreau was
sadistic and the American public, Thoreau’s enthusiastic readership, is masochistic. I mean
this literally. We have already said that in his aestheticism Thoreau would rather watch
than act. In his asceticism he would deny his body. Clearly also he means by watching to
humiliate the objects o f his attention. He sees social relations, like sexual relations, as a
power struggle. This is what intercourse looks like to a kid. Thoreau is sadistic in
both Freudian and Sartrean terms. If the experience o f the other is as the source of
reification, there are two responses:
1) the attempt on the part o f the ego to deny the liberty and mastery of the Other 
and to make him into an objective thing, totally dependent on the ego; or, 2) to 
assimilate his liberty, to accept it as the foundation of the Ego’s own liberty and 
thereby to regain the free ego. The first attitude leads to Sadism, the second to 
Masochism.43
(This is Marcuse on Sartre.) But sadism, by destroying the other, destroys the chance of
self-definition via the other; it destroys necessity. Masochism is merely reactive; by
accepting the "liberty" offered by Thoreau Americans have given up the chance for true
independence, the difficult chance o f composing themselves in regard to reality. And again
there is the question of responsibility. Neither the sadist or the masochist is fully
responsible for the act o f torture. W ho’s to blame for the extermination o f the passenger
pigeon, the Crow, The Ncz. Perces, and the Sioux? Or do we conclude that Americans
like certain ancient peoples find suffering and cruelty virtues, find well-being a 
danger, the craving a danger, peace a danger, pity a danger, being pitied ignominy, 
work ignominy, madness divine?44
Carruth cannot.
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The perfect position for Thoreau’s sadistic need to humiliate his neighbors is the
one he has assumed, that o f the solitary ascetic priest. Though Carruth grants Nietzsche
preeminence as an existentialist because o f his concern primarily for the fete o f the
individual, he also often evokes Nietzsche as the precursor o f the kind of modernism that
he him self abhors.45 But Nietzsche forcibly describes the sadistic effects of guilt and
asceticism, o f "guilt returning upon desire and weakness," where inflicting pain brings
pleasure. Nietzsche understands it well because he is, at times, the ascetic priest:
let us have fresh air! fresh air! and keep clear o f the madhouses and hospitals of 
culture. And therefore let us have good company, our company! Or solitude if it 
must be! But away from the sickening fumes o f inner corruption and the hidden 
rot of disease! so that we may, at least for a while yet, guard ourselves, my fiends, 
against the two worst contagions that may be reserved for us — against the great 
nausea at man! against great pity for man!
Thoreau has not succumbed to great pity. But he does see himself as a priest, a spiritual
sentinel. The effect o f his ministrations has been to deaden our pain by producing feelings
o f anger. He makes us feel guilty about working, so that we see work as a curse instead
of a necessity. He appeals to our meanest traits. We can hate our situation and for that
moment forget our responsibility . . . b u t  this only worsens the situation. Carrulh does not
say that Thoreau didn’t in general mean well, only that we should understand his Haws, that
we should no longer use Walden and other works to exploit our sense of guilt, our "sin,"
our humanity. We needn’t punish ourselves for our desires. Suffering exists, but guilt is




...and this is the sad fact, one o f the saddest — that weary tedium which the heart 
and the spirit feel when they no longer need that to whose need they (the heart and 
the spirit) are necessary. -  Faulkner, Absalom,Absalom.
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Carruth understands that other people, rather than being merely antagonists of the 
ego (though any given individual can, o f course, be that), are objects of love and 
beneficiaries of work; their existence creates the possibility of self-realization, creates some 
limits , some definition. For Thoreau, the other "transforms the world o f the ego into a 
world of conflict, competition, alienation, reification."46 But for Carruth it is only the 
existence of the other which can create the possibility o f the self. Again, it is Kierkegaard, 
so seminal for many existential concepts, who has clearly said this:
For the purpose o f becoming (and it is the task o f the self freely to become itself)
possibility and necessity are equally essential.
If, as in Thoreau’s case, one tries through withdrawal to create limitless possibility, 
everything exists in the realm o f the possible. At the utmost limits o f infinite possibility, 
nothing is actual, for actuality is a unity o f possibility and necessity. The self is unreal and 
in despair, either from excessive hope or excessive dread. Thoreau’s wishful utopianism 
results in the former, a fantastic life which hopes for better but does not act in order to 
achieve the goal. Manipulating actual facts is a more difficult imaginative task than 
fantasizing. Thoreau’s response to the actual is flight, denial, even in the political realm. 
Despite his statement that he feels "his connection with and obligation to society are still 
very slight and transient," he goes on to express his wish that "government will go down on 
its knees to him"(372). Why? Because he ignores it! This is as idiotic as his incredible 
assertions that in poverty is the sweetest life, that "the tow n’s poor seem to me most often 
to live the most independent lives o f any"(347). These are the insensitivities o f a man who, 
by his own admission, "never got his fingers burned by actual possession" (166). What he 
never possessed was compassion. It is in his poem "Concerning Necessity "(From. Snow and 
Rock) that Carruth refers to Thoreau as an idiot:
Its quite true we live 
in a kind o f rural twilight
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most o f the time giving 
our love to the hard dirt 
the water and the weeds 
and the difficult woods
ho we say drive the wedge
heave the axe run the hand shovel
dig the potato patch
dig ashes dig gravel
tickle the dyspeptic chainsaw
make him snarl once more
while the henhouse needs cleaning
the fruitless com  to be cut
and the house is falling to pieces
the car coming apart
the boy sitting and complaining
about something everything anything
this was the world foreknown 
though I had thought somehow 
probably in the delusion 
o f that idiot thoreau 
that necessity could be saved 
by the facts we actually have
like our extreme white birch 
clasped in the hem lock’s arms 
or our bay-breasted nuthatch 
or our mountains and our stars 
and really these things do serve 
a little though not enough
what saves the undoubted collapse 
o f the driven day and the year 
is my coming all at once 
when she is done in or footsore 
or down asleep in the field 
or telling a song to a child
coming and seeing her move 
in some particular way 
that makes me to fall in love 
all over with human beauty 
the beauty I can’t believe 
right here where I live
This poem is in the long current o f debate over pastoralism, a tradition that includes
M arlowe’s "The Passionate Shepherd to His Love," Raleigh’s rebuttal, "The Nym ph’s Reply
to the Shepherd," and thereafter many others.47 Carruth’s use of the topic is quite 
genuinely original. "Rural twilight" is a temporal and a spatial metaphor; life in the 
hinterlands in and of the twentieth century live little time exclusively for meditation and 
repose. In his poem "August First" (BILYA) Carruth writes, "The world is a/ complex 
fatigue," and here again the speaker spends most o f his time giving his time and his energy 
and therefore his love to his small holding of land, in order to make his life out of "the 
hard dirt/ the water and the weeds/ and the difficult woods." By adding the conjunction 
here, the "and’s", Carmth has mimetically created the fatigue of the speaker. As Longinus, 
the writer whom Carruth admires "maybe most o f all"(Ef,2), notes, polysyndeton is effective 
because
emotion frets at being impeded by conjunctions and other additions, because it loses
free abandon of its movement and the sense o f being, as it were, catapulted oul.48
The loss o f abandon creates a discipline, creates the possibility of beauty. The emotions are 
not catapulted out into the realm of possibility, but harmonized in the straits of necessity. 
The opposite figure, asyndeton, omission o f conjunctions, connotes the urgency of chores in 
the third stanza. Yet these chores are the real occasion for this song, "ho we say drive the 
wedge/ heave the axe . . ." Intimacy with one’s tools causes even the loud, stinking, tree- 
eating saw to become familiar, almost an extension of the viscera. The fact of hard labor 
was foreknown. This is and has always been the fact of life in the woods, but the speaker 
had shared with Thoreau the delusion that nature alone could be a tonie, could actually 
mitigate necessity. To say that "necessity could be saved/ by the facts we actually have" 
means at least two ways: natural facts -  trees, birds, mountains, stars, and the fact of our 
contemplation o f them -  mitigate the pain o f necessity; it also means that these facts are 
where necessity is saved, in which we find our necessity and also therefore the potential of 
self-creation. The trees are as ever in Carruth’s poetry a large part o f this complementary 
natural cohort. The hemlocks are lovers; they have arms. This is a vision of them that
persists from Carruth’s early poems in The Bloominndalc Papers. The anthropomorphism 
comes from living with the trees, and personification calls into question how it is that we 
can have facts, our mountain, our stars, how can human intelligence have anything except 
on its own terms, in terms o f itself? Perhaps this is impossible, but we should resist the 
tendency to wholly expropriate; we should be practical and metaphysical stewards of the 
world. Nature is not to be overcome, but is, instead, a sometimes difficult, sometimes 
compliant partner. Nature is necessary, but not sufficient, not enough. In the sixth stanza 
necessity is apposite to "the undoubted collapse/ of the driven day and the year," that is, the 
realm of necessity encompasses both work and time, and the end of time, death. Time 
constrains and defines life by giving it a term. M an must rebel against the collapse o f time 
(collapse short of death caused by anger, arrogance, guilt) by imposing his own order. This 
is where existentialism and romanticism concur: Camus, in a Blakean mode, has written, 
"Genius is a rebellion that has created its own limits." But these limits arc not created 
solely by or for the self. Here the "she" of the poem becomes a necessity because of her 
own demonstrations o f love. The speaker is made "to fall in love/ all over with human 
beauty," meaning to fall once again, but also that he is encompassed in his own 
compassionate reaction and is therefore beautiful. The rather awkward syntax here ("makes 
me to fall in love") indicates at once the "choked up" moment of epiphany. It also 
indicates with "makes" 1) that there is a certain passivity on the part of the speaker, 2) that 
this moment is when personality is made, or 3) created for the purpose of that moment, i.e., 
"Makes me for the purpose o f falling in love, and, 4) the deliberate and unusual adjacency 
o f the pronoun "me" (the objective case of "I") to the infinitive "to fall" indicates that this 
moment is the interstice of the finite person with the infinite possibility of action ( action 
infinite in the sense that it is without declension, not limited to person, number, or tense -  
a freedom of action). The climax of the poem creates a confluence of the actual (me) with 
the possible (to fall), issuing forth in the necessity which is the claim of the title. This
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necessity is the incredible beauty, his chaotic being and hers, endowed with a unity. It is
immediate and contingent, only here in the spot o f time in which he stands. Insofar as the
speaker can respond to beauty he is, must be dedicated to this time, this place, to the
present, to "what we are for the time that we are/ what we know for the time that we
know." ("If It Were Not For You" in the same collection).
It should not go unsaid — this is a beautiful poem, Carruth at one of his many
moments o f extreme technical virtuosity. The rhyming is subtle and varied (abcbdd,
abcbde, abcbaa, ababcb, ababca, ababcc, ababaa). Beginning in the fourth stanza "have"
rhymes with the end of the poem ’s first line, "live." This is sounded again in stanza 5,
"serve," becomes an interior rhyme in stanza 6, and then is the dominant rhyme in the
ultimate stanza: "move," "love”, "believe," "live" — these words are the thematic coordinates
of the poem. The rhyming o f the poem moves toward a greater regularity and unity, and
to the progressive harmony is added a circular element: the final line ending with the same
word as the first: "live."
This beauty is in service o f one o f Carruth’s characteristic themes, the relationship
of art and the artist to the world at large. Camus, who is important to Carrulh in many
ways, has put it forcibly: "Art rejects the world on account o f what it lacks and in ihc
name of what it sometimes is." The world often lacks love, so the questing o f man must
be for love. This means that living is essentially erotic, an erotic struggle that finds its
ultimate form in art, "in a poetry that by the very tension of its striving confutes the
recurrent social philosophies o f expedience and claptrap" (Ef,35). The existentialist lives in
the name of this struggle and of the occasional beauty in man that is discovered through
lucid attention to the present and through work. Camus makes a connection between this
existential aesthetic and the aesthetics o f transcendentalism:
There is a living transcendence, o f which beauty carries the promise, which can 




At the beginning o f "The M an in the Box at Walden," Carruth explains that in
referring to Thoreau as "that idiot" he applied the term "just as [he] might apply it in casual
exacerbation to the local school superintendent or the Secretary o f Stale. It was a pul-
down, an expression o f annoyance." This may have been true at the moment of writing,
but the annoyance was informed by a lifetime o f rigorous and integrated thought. Carruth
sees that erotic action is essentially human and to deny it, despite the anguish it creates, is
to be less than human. He refuses to believe that a person can exist in a box, without love
and work, in all their forms. Corporate exploitation, economic and political, is to be
annihilated not by assertions o f individuality but by true independence. The freedom from
self, from love, from work, Thoreau’s freedom and that of his disciples is self-defeating.
With it we are finishing ourselves off; we refuse to realize that "freedom that merely turns
its back is no freedom at all" (Ef,68). In short, Thoreau’s notion of freedom, shared by
many Americans, is precisely the
impasse of objective egoism, as distinct from transcendent subjectivity, [which] must 
be eluded if  we are to go forward without disaster in a condition of reality. (SI, 11)
Thoreau stayed at Walden for a little over a year. Carruth’s personal withdrawal
has been profound, even in the midst of intense personal and professional obligations, and it
has produced a unique vision o f a man in the world (in the wer-ald, A.S., the man-era).
Perhaps Carruth does share with Thoreau a tendency toward asceticism. To turn Romance
against Romance, as Carruth does in The Sleeping Beauty, is asceticism of a sort. Perhaps
what we have in Carruth contra Thoreau is one elitist against another. But there arc huge
differences in the substance of their idiosyncratic visions. As W.J. Bale notes in The
Burden of the Past and the English Poet, "idiot meant originally what is peculiar to a
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private person (probable cognates range from the Freudian ‘id ’ to our word ‘identity’)."51 
Carruth wishes that we could understand the flaws o f W alden as a social contract and come 
to see Thoreau as an idiot, an intensely private and anti-social thinker. Instead we should 
be idiots o f the original variety. In this effort, in this time, Carruth has with his own work 
given us a lucid, rigorous, and compassionate example.
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Chapter Five
Erotic Conventions: The Voices o f Desire in The Sleeping Beauty
and Either
The textural rhymthic and tonally modulative qualities of jazz can apply as 
well to my love o f natural beauty and my love o f women, and to the moral, 
psychological, and metaphysical agonies arising from these loves. (SI,29)
U f f  i f
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[Diometa:] ...So naturally you thought o f Love as utterly beautiful, for the 
beloved is, in fact, beautiful, perfect, delicate, and prosperous -  very 
different from the lover, as I have described him.
[Socrates:] Very well, dear lady, I replied, no doubt you’re right. But in 
that case, what good can love be to humanity? (Symposium)
11 t i  l ]
T T T rT r
...but since my whole soul is filled with you, life takes on another 
significance for me. It becomes a myth about you. (E,402).
1 6 5
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The Sleeping Beauty is Carruth’s m ost thematically delibrate and encompassing 
book. It was written during various periods from 1972 to 1980 at Carruth’s home in 
Johnson, Vermont; in Temple, Maine, where Carruth’s friends writer George Dennison, poel 
Denise Levertov, and her husband, novelist Mitchell Goodman, lived; in Lagorcc in the 
Ardeche region of France; in Syracuse ; and in Hamilton, Montana. Even though Carruth 
wrote the poem "in states o f transcendent concentration and with great speed," or it "breaks 
down into parts written this way" (SI,28), and despite disjunctions caused by shifts in voice 
and setting, it is stylistically integrated. The poem is composed o f 124 of the fifteen-line 
verse paragraphs Carruth developed First in 1955 for "The Asylum," which was included in 
his first book, The Crow and the Heart was revised and reprinted in For You. Carruth used 
the form again for Contra Mortem (1967) and again later, in a more irregularly 
improvisational way, in "Paragraphs," the final poem in Brothers, I Loved You AH (1978), 
which was published immediately before The Sleeping Beauty.
Technically, the poem evokes its predecessors in the tradition o f the lyric sequence. 
The fifteen-line sonnet recalls M eredith’s sixteen-liners in M odem Love. The predominate 
and detennining rhyme scheme is ababaaccdedefef. The metrical scheme is iambic witli 
lines of 5,5,4,3,5,5,4,4,5,2-3,5,4,5,5,5 feel respectively. The couplets in the second quatrain 
connect the similarly rhymed first and third quatrains. This interlocking rhyme scheme is 
reminiscent of Spenser’s couplet links between the quatrains o f his sonnets (ababbcbccdcdec) 
and o f the stanzas of The Faerie Oueene (ababbcbcc), but in fact the tetrameter couplet in
ihe middle of the paragraph was suggested to Carruth by Paul G oodm an’s sonnet "In 
Lydia," which Carruth saw when he was editor o f Poetry 1949-50, (sec p.210-11 of 
G oodm an’s Collected Poems’). In its internal linkage and in the variations of rhyme and 
closure (some of the paragraphs are end-stopped, some run into the following paragraph), it 
is a form particularly well-suited to a long sequence. Although my primary puipose in this 
chapter is not to attend the relation of the poem to its lyric predecessors (nor to wobble out 
onto the always perilous ground of asserting direct formal influence), certainly one of the 
pleasures of reading this poem is the recognition o f Carruth’s detailed evocation of the 
poem ’s generic cohort: the dream genesis of the Romaunt of the Rose and M allarm c’s 
L ’apres-midi d ’un faune ("Aimai-je un reve?"), which Carruth has translated.1 Carruth has 
written admiringly o f the "fluidity and simultaneity" of Spenser’s verse, which is "exactly 
what our poets today are striving to achieve in their purposely fragmented writing" (Ef,25), 
and this poem also recollects elements o f the Amoretti (e.g., 77) and the erotic allegories in 
Book Three o f The Faerie Oueene. The poem gains additional valence when read vis-a-vis 
contemporary poems, e.g., Aiken’s Preludes, which has tonal similarities with Carruth’s 
work in general, and D uncan’s Ground Work, which addresses the Heraclitian vision of war 
as a principle o f regeneration.2 There are also many verbal echoes of Wyatt, Milton, 
Shakespeare, Yeats, Pound, and Stevens, which some readers may appreciate. However, the 
primary importance o f the poem is its existential discursion on the great paradox of the 
Romantic impulse: that the will and drive to be good, heroic, noble, to achieve the ideal, 
the impulse to love generously and thereby to have freedom have led to failure, to murder 
and domination: how "passion/ In romance must be love in action,/ Lust for the ideal 
. . . O, murderous" (54)3.
On Carruth’s account, the heroic striving o f the Romantic personality for an 
individual selfhood has meant personal disintegration and social chaos. Episodes o f this
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destruction in personality, in history, and in contemporary society are dreamed by the 
Sleeping Beauty. Her dreams are the episodes o f the poem. She dreams history and she 
dreams the poet who writes the poem. The writing o f the poem, an erotic act involving a 
self and many others, creates a third being, the poem, in which the ecstasy and gladness of 
the romantic sensibility and the subsequent and inevitable consequences, depression and 
disintegration, or in W ordsworthian terms despondency and madness, are transcended. The 
poem itself has a personality equivalent in existence to the dreaming woman and the 
hero-prince-poet with his legionary visages, the hero who "lives/ wherever and whenever he 
perceives/ Himself in [her] dreaming, though in fact he is awake/ And so knows the horror 
o f being/ Only a dream" (4). It is the poem "who must make/ Presence from words, vision 
from seeing,/ This no one that uniquely in sorrow rejoices/ And can have no pronoun."
The final elem ent in the making of the poem is "as in all dreaming . . . the echo of 
coincidental voices." There are two ideas I would like to define and develop in this 
chapter. First, that the assignation o f personality to the poem is an attempt to establish 
beyond individuality, beyond corporatism, beyond time, a ground of being in which the will 
to establish a self through erotic possession of another and the inevitable destruction of that 
desire are transcended. Secondly, I will explore how the voice of the poem, the assignation 
o f creation to various speakers in history and ultimately to the dreaming of the Sleeping 
Beauty, is an attempt to let the others speak and thereby to avert the destructive will of the 
ego as it has been manifested in the traditional single authorial voice. Instead of this 
egoistic self-assertion Carruth proposes a self that exists in an indirect way in the poem, a 
self which exists in its subjective relations, not as the source but as the object of possible 
knowledge. The existence o f the self is contingently other, existing only when the other 
dreams that it is. Carruth concurs with Kierkegaard’s definition of a self as "a relation that 
relates itself to its own self and in relating itself to its own self [for Carruth,] in an act of
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existential self-creation which includes but transcends history] relates itself to another" 
(SD,146). In Chapter Two I have discussed the general nature of Carruth’s existentialism 
and his relation to existentialist thinkers. In this chapter, after again establishing a ground 
of Romantic thought against which Carruth and the existentialists react, 1 will explore the 
act o f writing as an act o f self-creation and compare the nature of the voice in SB to ways 
of "other speaking" in, primarily, Kierkegaard’s Either.
Selflessness is apparent from the beginning o f The Sleeping Beauty, in the genesis 
of the poetic consciousness. The poet-speaker is dreamed by the Sleeping Beauty, who is a 
being created out of tradition and the actual world. She is, in fact, Rose Marie Dorn 
(Carruth), the poet’s wife, who fled Silesia when the Red Army invaded in 1944. "Dorn" in 
German means "thorn." She is the Rose in the Thom, the Domroschen (3). In a 
contribution to the New American Review in 1970 Carruth gives a forcrendcring of this 
mythopoeia:
Tradition: a misused word. The thing itself, what the word stands for, does 
not exist. It is a myth, and like all myths it cannot die. It may go to 
sleep, like the princess of the thorny rose, and during its slumber 
extraordinary changes may occur; but as long as human sensibility continues, 
someone will always come to kiss it awake again. (WP,162)
The poet half-creates and half-receives then the story of a woman, a woman both real and
mythic, who is like in her dreaming the tradition in which the poet himself exists both as
dream and as an actual man. The Sleeping Beauty is dormant Tradition, which in its
dreaming uses its individual elements (poets) in a re-creative autobiogencsis that affirms, at
the same time, the identity of the poet. The myth is eternal but it coincidentally validates
the being-in-the-momcnt of those who partake of it. Furthermore, the mutual affirmation
here (regeneration o f history as a part of self-creation and self-creation as the indispensable
analog o f maintaining tradition) is profoundly erotic; tradition and self can begin and end
"the instant you (Sleeping Beauty) are really kissed"(48).
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At the outset o f the poem (paragraphs 1-4) in establishing "simply” how the poem 
came from life (an essential and, I think, effective gambit without which the theme of the 
whole poem would perhaps become obscured by its local effects) here is the paradigm for 
the "other-speaking" o f the poem: there is a mode o f self-creation which accepts all the 
elements o f history, good and bad, mythic and actual. To deny the existence o f any 
element would be to annihilate the integrity of that element and thereby to annihilate parts 
o f the self. The writing of the poem is, however a denial, a destruction, and a revolt 
insofar as it sets up an original ego in opposition to social fictions about the self and 
thereby annihilates those fictions. In the poem the self turns against objective versions of 
the self in order to create a subjective self with an individual consciousness. This 
consciousness is of a transcendent variety in that it is introspective and it feels the pain of 
being the object of knowledge, a sensibility always alone and separate; it, like the hero, is 
"awake/ And so knows the horror o f being/ Only a dream." The poem incorporates that 
painful knowledge in its mode o f expression. The voice o f the poem exists in the 
occasional moment in which it is other: eternally if  it acknowledges the other, never if it 
fails to do so. Carruth contrasts this voice with the voice of objective egoism, the kind of 
willful individualism which, as we have seen earlier, he assigns to Thoreau. The writing of 
a poem which has this kind o f voice is the decisive creative act, an act of transcendent 
subjectivity which allows us "to go forward without disaster in a condition of reality"
(SI,11).
In regard to the absolute necessity o f including the other, of making a voice which
is composed o f other voices if there is to be any self-realization at all, I would like to
evoke the relation made earlier between Carruth and Saitre. Both insist upon mediation and
reflection as the sine qua non o f self-creation. Sartre:
I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself except through the mediation of 
another. The other is indispensable to my existence, and equally to any knowledge 
I can have o f myself.4
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I want you to have me. I want you in order to have me. I must have you in order to 
have myself. Without you I do not exist. Is this not the bedrock statement of the romantic 
seducer’s sell-beguiling complaint? It is a facet of the paradox of the erotic urge. Isn’t 
this kind o f erotic longing largely expropriative, i.e., primarily an urge to self-affirmation 
rather than a gift o f the self to the beloved? If it is, then to pursue that urge is to exploit 
the other’s integrity and thus radically to destroy the self. But the same erotic urge is also 
natural; it also creates happiness. In Hegel’s account o f this psychic dilemma the spirit 
"reduces that opposition [between self and other] to a transparent form, and therein finds 
itself."5 For Carruth this reduction to transparency is simply another side of self-obliterating 
domination. Earlier Hegel had written o f another kind o f resolution, also in a kind of 
unity:
Love completely destroys objectivity and thereby annuls and transcends reflection, 
deprives m an’s opposite of all foreign character . . .  In love the separate does still 
remain, but as something united and no longer as something separate.6
The corporate will is even clearer here, as is the urge toward an idealistic unity, an
incarnation which melds opposites, e.g., voluptuousness and virginity. The existentialist
rejects all such authoritative ideals o f  the human. (Yet, what is the nature of this other, that
other, who can guarantee the self if not an idealized guarantor, a goal?) Even if, on
Hegel’s account, objectivity (the sense o f separation) is destroyed by the erotic urge, it is
nonetheless recapitulated in the consequent concept o f unity. A medieval definition of
allegory was "other-speaking", alieni + loquium, speaking for the other. The impulse of the
allegorist is to imbue the other with an impersonal reality. We see this impulse in the
Hegelian model above. In this mode "which transcends reflection" the other is in the
absolute power o f the self. The allegorist says, without you I do not exist, and the
melancholy o f this situation
causes life to flow out of [the other] and it remains behind dead but eternally 
secure, then it is . . . unconditionally in his power, that is, it is now quite incapable
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o f emanating any meaning or significance o f its own; such significance as it has, it 
acquires from the allegorist. 7
Carruth understands that this allegorical impulse is the Romantic, idealistic, Hegelian
impulse against which the existentialists, especially Kierkegaard, are reacting. The move
toward unity by means of the murderous impulses inherent in erotic desire is the essential
Romantic impulse. Against this, Carruth asserts that the act of self-creation can only
legitimate itself by acknowledging that same act on the part o f any and every other. For
Carruth this acknowledgement is also necessary in the personal incorporation o f human
evidence in history. Any act (politics and art are one) which endangers the integrity of
another invalidates the self. Even to assume sympathetically the right to speak for the other
is an act o f domination.
In "Speaking For Them" (Snow) the seemingly natural, epiphanic descriptions are





has rubbed her neck on barbed
wire against the flies,
which return, crawling 
in her eyes. She looks up, 
a sorrow, raising her great 
head in slowness, brown eyes rising 
like pools in the earth.
Then the elms. There marching 
down the knoll by the fence slowly, 
a dead march. Shall we have
Memorial Day for the elms, 
those veterans? Here are the oldest 
stricken and proud, lifting
poor broken arms in sleeves 
o f ragged bark.
Black-eyed susans bow their heads,
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crazy swallows
turn somersaults in the air.
There is nothing apparently ironic in the feeling, tone, and depth o f perception of this 
poem. Yet, at the same time the flat diction and friable structuring of the "deep-image" 
poem popular in the late 1960s and early 70s are habilitated, the poet, with thorough irony, 
metaphorically attributes an anthropomorphic face to the universe. Man and his mind 
become the flawed and inevitable paradigm. First, the poem evokes the melancholy pity 
which, on Benjam in’s account, characterizes the allegorist. The cicadas’ carapaces become 
split and ruptured skins. The cow is the victim of malevolent flies and shows in her 
brutally liquescent eyes a sorrow. Her eyes become pools, her head an earth. The elms are 
mourning soldiers in rustic weeds. The elm-disease fungus is an enemy of the elms and of 
the elm-loving humans. By extension, the beetles that carry the disease are secret agents. 
The black-eyed susans, named according to their appearance o f battered humanity, have 
petitioning noggins, and bam swallows become gymnasts. The lyrical qualities of this poem 
almost hide the furtive expropriative urge, die urge o f likening, of metaphor, which Carruth 
sees as perhaps fixed in language and in human imagination but nonetheless "intrusive upon 
natural order," different from "images set down in purity, without the forcing of metaphor" 
(EF, 101-06). If one sees elms as veterans, can one therefore assent to the logical 
implications o f that relation? This logical falsity "ideationally embodied" in metaphor 
results in the kind of distortion to which Carruth objects so strongly in Walden. But it is 
nonetheless deeply felt; it is humanly true, but morally reprehensible. The need to speak 
for nature carries with it the will to dominate interpretively and, consequently, a 
self-destruction.
How in a work o f art, especially in the "self-expression" characteristic of the lyric, 
can one speak for the other or let the other speak? How, when, as in SB, the theme is 
itself o f self-creation and its history? How, when writing itself is an erotic act and full of
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wrong? The questions o f identity in eroticism and of the determining ground of sell and 
other in the erotic, aesthetic personality are also themes o f Kierkegaard’s Either.
II if a
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Carruth’s poem and Either are so profoundly similar in theme that they seem almost of a 
piece. Although Carruth read Kierkegaard when he was in graduate school at the 
University o f Chicago in 1946-47 and has read commentators on the existentialist writers, 
Kaufmann, Bree, et al., he came to Kierkegaard in a mature way only after he had read 
Heidegger, Camus, and Sartre, and he has said, "As far as I am aware consciously 
Kierkegaard had no great influence on my ideas or feelings."8 Regardless of direct 
influence, Kierkegaard’s theme in Either corresponds with the theme of The Sleeping 
Beauty: how, given that the Romantic-aesthetic personality regards elements of the world 
as objects of desire to use for its own appropriation, thereby depriving them of their own 
existence, how can that personality create a perspective which will help it realize and 
overcome its limitations? In other words, how can the aesthete overcome merely 
imaginative existence and come through to actual existence? A comparison of how this 
question is addressed and answered is mutually illuminating. In particular, Kierkegaard’s 
identification o f a conflict between two types o f sensuousness, the psychically determined 
and the spiritually determined, elucidates the precise ground of existential conflict in The 
Sleeping Beauty.
Either is the first volume of a work that, as the "editor," a Victor Eremita 
(conquering hermit, secret conqueror?), writes in the Preface, was arranged by Eremita from 
a cache o f papers he accidentally discovered in a mahogany secretary. The papers, he says, 
were clearly divisible into two sets according to content and style. Clearly, he asserts it is 
the work o f two different authors, whom he calls "A," author of Either and "B," author of
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Or. A is an enigma, but B appears to have a name, William, and an occupation, 
magistrate. Eremita arranges the papers, easily in the case o f B, in whose writing there 
seems to be a sequential order. In the case o f A, Eremita cannot determine any such order 
and so leaves them as he finds them, "without being able to decide whether this order has 
any chronological value or ideal significance" (E,8). A ’s papers fall into eight sections: a 
section of aphorisms, six "aesthetic essays," and a "story entitled Diary of die Seducer, of 
which A does not acknowledge him self as author, but only as editor."
I have pointed out the tactics used by Carruth to efface the traditional authorial 
role. He ascribes authority to the dreaming woman and to coincidental voices in the 
poem. Here Kierkegaard’s distancing of himself from authority is even more labyrinthine, 
especially in regard to the fourth-hand removal of Diary o f the Seducer. I leave to 
Kierkegaard scholars the exploration of the personal and philosophical motives for this 
pseudonymity. Its essential purpose (which I simplify here in order to move directly into 
an examination o f the first aesthetic essay) is to allow the aesthetic to speak in a directly 
revelatory way for itself in an antiphonal exchange with the less passionate, rationalistic, 
ethical sensibility of B. An additional dimension o f Kierkegaard’s narrative framework here 
is that of intention and error and o f intentionally admitted error: whether or not Eremita is 
accurate in reporting that the arrangement o f Either is aleatory, he invites the possibility of 
other arrangements which the reader, invoking his or her own aesthetic sensibility, may 
authorize. This possibility emphasizes the element o f subjectivity inherent in creation and 
interpretation. Granting then the importance of being wrong, I will proceed to the first 
aesthetic essay, "Immediate Stages of the Erotic," to explore how A ’s discourse on 
sensuousness and its representation in art defines the authorial structuring of The Sleeping 
Beauty.
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On Kierkegaard’s account, there are two types of sensuousness or sensuality (the
Danish word is sandseligk psychically determined and spiritually determined.
Sensuousness psychically determined is not opposition, exclusion, but harmony and 
accord. But precisely because [psychically determined] sensuousness was 
harmoniously determined, it appeared not as a principle, but as an enclitic 
assimilated by assonance. (E,60)
"Enclitic" is a grammatical term denoting an accentual interdependence, originally in Greek
grammar though also applying to other languages. An enclitic is a word that takes the
quality o f its accent from the last stressed syllable in the previous word. Its Greek
derivation is important, for it was in the pre-Christian Greek culture that Kierkegaard posits
this kind o f harmonious sensuousness. Insofar as sensuousness is like an enclitic it is a
constituent, non-assertive part of a whole. It is included in that whole in a manner that is
like assonance, like the unity that exists between the same sound, separated by time. The
evaluative dimension of the grammatical metaphor is also significant. Kierkegaard stresses
again and again in this essay that o f the media of expression it is writing which is most
subject to ethical categories. (E,63) Language, for example, depends upon the limited
definitions o f words, on their truth or falsity, rather than on what Nietzsche calls "degrees
o f apparentness."9 This grammatical metaphor implies that there can be qualifications,
similitudes o f sensuousness that have ethical dimensions, meaning by "ethical" not an a
priori category o f behavior, but a state which transcends the limits of ordinary desire. In
the metaphorical context this means that adjectival descriptions of sensuousness, especially
this one, are more than merely descriptive; they are evaluative. Psychically determined
sensuousness has a positive ethical value. But it is, in fact, A himself who makes this
distinction. According to Eremita, A is the aesthete. He is perhaps coherent, but is he
coherent in a way which he himself can understand? W hat does this imply about him and
about the nature o f his judgement here? Harmony existed once, before Christianity, but no
longer. A divides history along lines of modes of artistic representation: "In ancient times
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the sensuous found its expression in the silent stillness o f plastic art; in the Christian world 
the sensuous must burst forth in all its impatient passion" (E,97). Is this very dichotomy 
between types of sensuousness a result o f  the limited, expropriative aesthetic perspective, 
and therefore at least partially an error? Perhaps there are "really" no opposites in regard lo 
the determinants o f sensuousness, but subtle gradations o f harmony. A has made an 
aesthetic choice in choosing one aspect o f culture as a means o f detennining historical 
epochs. He is therefore exclusive, oppositional in his thinking, his feeling; he "suffers" 
from the intellectual analog o f the ethically inferior sensuousness -  a spiritually determined 
intellect, with all o f its concurrent capacity for moral error. The entire essay itself is an 
attempt, A admits, to do the impossible, to "prove" that M ozart’s Don Giovanni is the 
perfect artistic unity o f subject and form.
What is the nature o f spiritually determined sensuousness and its negative ethical 
valence? Spiritually determined sensuousness, the kind that Don Juan has, was, on A ’s 
account, introduced into the world as a principle by Christianity, which exiled sensuousness 
from its psyche and, by that exclusion, created it as a principle equivalent in reality to 
spirituality. Kierkegaard suggests that, in psychically determined sensuousness, spirit (or 
what Nietzsche calls will) is not yet present as such, is not yet "posited" as a "principle."‘0 
In Christianity, sensuousness, or better here "sensuality," with its moralized connotation, is 
that which the spirit is not. The "genius," or the inhabiting spirit o f spiritually determined 
sensuousness is a result of that "aut-aut," that absolute disjunction -  the same disjunction at 
the heart o f A ’s dichotomy, and of B ’s, whose aut-aut is absolute when "truth, 
righteousness, and holiness are lined up on one side, and lust and base propensities and 
obscure passions and perdition on the other" (Or,161).
Spiritually determined sensuousness is essentially oppositional, reactive in a mutually 
exclusive conflict between two elements, the self and the other, that in pre-Christian
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civilizations existed in harmony in the individual psyche and, consequently, in art and in the 
social polity. If, as I believe, Carruth assents to this kind o f division of sensuality, he does 
not subscribe to A ’s historical applications o f it. A assigns psychically determined 
sensuousness to chivalric love: "The erotic in the age of chivalry had a certain resemblance 
to the Greeks" (E,87); "Chivalrous love is also psychical" (E,93). Of course, the trappings 
of chivalric love may have led the aesthete into error. In The Sleeping Beauty Carruth 
gives explicit attention to the nature o f chivalric love. In paragraph 63, Herr Husband in 
his "parlit gentillesse" is her "knightly teacher whom none but you had taught." In 85, a 
troubadour voice sings, "Oc, Dieu d ’amour . . . Quora me dona joi, quora m ’en ven 
dolor," " Oh, god of love, who has given me so much joy, who has brought me so much 
grief from it." Again the paradox o f spiritually determined eroticism. Carruth’s reviews of 
deRougem ent’s Love Declared (W,76) and Six Troubadour Songs translated by 
W.D. Snodgrass (Ef,281) confirm that he attributes a more spiritual eroticism to the 
period.'1
Regardless o f when each kind o f love has prevailed, psychical love is faithful, 
spiritual sensuousness "absolutely faithless" (E,93). This faithlessness "becomes in fact only 
a constant repetition." The aesthete desires to have the moment of most intense 
apprehension over and over. Like Sartre’s Genet, the typical aesthete is "a man of 
repetition: the drab, slack time of his daily life . . .  is shot through with blazing 
hierophanies which restore him to his original passion, as holy week restores us to that of 
Christ.'"2 Faced ultimately with a series o f self-obliterations, a serial suicide, the aesthetic 
self posits repetitions o f the first moment: "I seek the immediate. It is the eternal element 
in love that the individuals first exist for one another in the moment of love" (E,376).
And, one adds, therefore do not exist, to the point of being otherwise expendable.
179
The spiritually sensual aesthete does not participate in the world except to extract its
moments o f beauty for the purpose o f immediate self-gratification and for a paradoxical
effect, a momentary self-perpetuation:
his life is the sum o f repellent moments which have no coherence, his life as 
moment is the sum o f moments, as the sum of moments is the moment. (E,95)
But the self-perpetuation is only momentary because, unlike the psychical lover, his object
is always radically other and must willfully and insistently be apprehended as such. Carruth
sees the irresponsibility inherent in this type o f aestheticism, willed self-destruction and its
social correlatives at the heart of the Romantic-aesthetic impulse:
What
Is human authenticity then but a nullity 
Striving to create a value and getting beauty 
Instead, dripping with blood. Will 
Is the will to e x p lo it.( lll)
To this will Carruth links Hom er’s Helen and her "coupling habit," " a torrid/ Duplexity of
love and death (or fact/ And fancy, real and ideal)", as well as the "stupid heroic pride" of
Hector (7). And so from the god o f this love we get war. War, as Plato tells us is Love:
"And so, when Homer writes that some god ‘breathed m ight’ into one of the heroes, we
may take it that this is what the power o f love effects in the heart o f the lovcr."‘3 The
erotic, if it is spiritually determined, will always ultimately fail as a way of being in the
world, as an ethos, precisely because of its conception of love, love which is, at its best,
only pity, and pity "only domination in another style" (20).
Each o f the two types o f sensuousness also lends toward a separate mode o f sexual
identity. The psychical is androgynous. For A there is a similarity between the unity of
psychical sensuousness and the "first stage" of desire in spiritual sensuousness; in neither is
there a separation between the lover and the object o f his desire. They exist androgynously,
"in one blossom" (E,76). This kind o f androgynous identity is shared by the hero o f the
Sleeping Beauty, who, in 43, experiences the "real thing" in his dream of male parturition.
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In paragraph 76 the poet says, "Without this synthesis/ How could we be,alone or together,
whole?" Androgyny is the natural state for psychical sensuousness, but an extreme state for
spiritual sensuousness, in which androgyny is either dormant potentiality or pathological
impotence. Carruth repeatedly uses this dichotomy between the androgynous and the
exclusively sexual. The face o f the woman statue which appears throughout the poem is
the key to the dynamic o f overcoming the error o f spiritually determined sensuousness. The
face is introduced in Paragraph 16:
In half-relief the head
Looks upward through the rippling water,
Askance, half-turned back, caught 
As if by its origin in the earth again.
There beneath the water flow
And changing reflections, pine trees, sun, and rain,
A face, although people come and go
And Rita has gone and the secret is all that stays,
As the presences o f the poem alone can know.
A wom an’s face looks up from the water, always.
In paragraph 17 the poet evokes the mythic valence o f that feminine face: "Naiad alive in
the stream,/ Ophelia drowned in eternity." And as a piece o f stone she is "the eternal
moment,
the feminine in a face o f stone,
Unchanged, there in cold water, the face o f sleep.
Wind in the pines. Dream sound. Snow. Alone.
Woman. Forever. Water. Watching. Deep.
The face is momentary in its femininity, eternal in its stony meaning. In 46 "the charmed/
Obsessive image" appears again, partially sanded over, "a few oak leaves have collected/
For her dccolletage./ She is half-taken by nature, she is half-accepted." "In all her
repetitions, image on image,/ She gazes from time beyond time, from poems deep in the
poem." She is "Lady o f paradox, drowned and alive" (47). Carruth means to emphasize
the operations o f the expropriative urge, o f allegorization, o f mythopoeia with all o f their
troublesome consequences. The face in the water haunts the perceiver with its sexual and
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moral plasticity. In 64, in a configuration whose poetically structural significance I will
discuss later, she reflects the light o f  her sister, the moon. Paragraph 75 discusses the
symbolic sexual identity o f the face:
Why is the face in the water a woman? Because
Rita made it? Because she said it? But it could
Be a man, indistinct there, that gaze
Across eternity. Would
Other women see a man in the water, a case
O f anima/animus? No they all always
Know that the water-person is a woman,
Just as the poem knows, the poem
Which is both. Then is it convention, the cultural
Input: Naiad, Ophelia?
Partly perhaps. But it is more a question of structural 
Consciousness. For the image is basal,
From before the beginning o f all imagining,
The a priori o f all human feeling, ineffaceable 
For good or for ill,
and as such it is, it must be, feminine.
Naiads are, specifically, the nymphs of brooks. Their general benevolence is not complete.
The naiad Salamancis, repulsed by Hermaphroditus, son o f Aphrodite and Hermes (see 62),
caused herself to be united in body with Hermaphroditus. A fatal androgyny, for the lake
in Caria where the union occurred received, by Salamancis’ curse, the property of causing
bathers to lose their viriliLy. In the following paragraph, in the shade of this myth, Carruth
questions the ambivalent nature of the sense o f union that can come from making love.
Why is the feminine aspect in man hidden? How, as in paragraph 69, can desire be
coincidental with sexual impotence? Why does Ham let’s "thought that someone somewhere
might be free" (104) mean that Ophelia must die, and to what extent is his thought a sane
or insane emanation of Ophelia’s own dreaming? "And how can freedom prevail/ When
every lover’s gift is a day in hell" (106)?
In an essay on M iddlemarch. Carruth describes the clandestine, basal way in which
the full meaning of any work of art "slips" into our consciousness. (SI, 156) Perhaps the
full meaning of human identity is androgyny. That union, as in the androgyny of the
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poem, is the only place where meaning can exist without diminution. If the a priori ol 
human feeling is feminine, is the a priori o f thought masculine? And the poem then the 
erotic union o f thought and feeling? This is what The Sleeping Beauty suggests, that there 
is a third being, "the poem, who must make/ Presence from words, vision from seeing,/
This no one that uniquely in sorrow rejoices/ And can have no pronoun." Not only the 
poem can do this, but any truly realized work of art. The wom an’s face (a sketch of which 
adorns the book cover) also has these qualities, created by Rita in "ecstasy: out of herself 
. . .  the thought and feeling/ A meaning" (53).
In 107 Hermaphrodite appears in the process o f metamorphosis from man to 
androgyne, his "body/ Altering in starlight, one and one and one." The dreamed hero of 
the Sleeping Beauty has, to her own horror, lost his masculinity. And finally the transition 
o f the poetic sensibility to androgyny is complete in the penultimate paragraph:
there in the sky is the known face half-hidden 
In rippling lights askance, the eternal other 
Toward whom the poem yearns, maiden 
O f the water-lights, brother 
O f the snow-fields, Androgyne!
"Askance" is used in paragraphs 16, ("half-turned" in 46 and 47), 64, and here to describe
the face. It is a word with a contextual history here, e.g., from Wyatt (For as she lookt
askance/ Under a stole she spied two stemying eyes) and Milton (The Devil with jealous
lear maligne/ E y’d them askance). Here the half-turned, side-glancing face invites in an
ask-ance. It is a soliciting otherness. Psychical sensuousness is characterized by androgyny
and by this soliciting otherness within the psyche, inclining the personality toward inner
unity, toward self-love, toward giving, and toward continuance in time. In contrast, spiritual
sensuousncss is known by its psycho-sexual division and by a sexually exclusive mode of
being; the spiritual aesthete is Don Giovanni, expropriative, endlessly repetitive, and
tending to disappear in time. Carruth connects this disappearance with aging and with
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sexual folk myth:
He thinks how often when his semen spews 
It feels like blood. A hot leakage, burning.
How awkward! He remembers the Hindus --
Do they not wake in mourning
Invariably, their seed unrenewable? They choose
Each night between loving and dying. Then she -- does
It bum  her too? Are we joined,
Victim-lovers, everyone, in this wound 
O f fire forever? Do all m en feel their lives 
Taken in the heart o f love?
Does it mean something? Anything?
Thus he contrives
Enigmas from horror. He would prove 
That the simplest human realities unfold 
M ysteriously, and that in this knowledge he may move 
Without change. Yet daily he sees himself grow old. (25)
How awkward! But how felicitous. Pound said that the natural object (act) is always the
best symbol. Perhaps, in the long run, for the aesthete with his spiritually determined
sensuousness there is either loving o r dying, an absolute disjunction. Perhaps this is true
for any sensuous human being and we are all joined in that fate, the inevitable consequence
of all sexual beings. But the knowledge o f fatality does itself, as knowledge, transcend
momentary limitations. The feeling of desperation combines with the thought of death or
the thought o f survival in a true human meaning, contrived and actual. The passage above
reminds us o f Quintillian’s dictum that the extreme form of allegory is enigma.'4 Horror is
allegorized, made mysterious and eternal and so redeemed. This redemptive power is of an
existential variety because o f its attention to the allegorical process. The allegorist admits
to you what he has done. His figuring becomes inorganic, artificial, but nonetheless valid.
It is not only humanly exigent, but personally necessary; the poem is the only place where
the allegorist exists. It is finally the poem that yearns for the other, only the poem that can
include the other without destroying it. The poem has the only personality. Carruth repeats
this with choric insistence: "only the poem weeps" (24); " the poem crawling upward
through the dark" (30); "the poem moves north" (34); "the poem knows" (75). The poem,
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the made-in-language, exists in time contingently, like music,; it is the ethical ground upon 
which one may go
from dreamt objectivity to the forthrightly
Seen, subjective, brilliant, undamaged.
The poem moves alone now, but without loneliness.
Self has been left among the objects that fashioned it.
Action and knowledge are one, free, far in the depths of
consciousness. (120)
Thus the voice o f the poem is united and fragmentary. It shares this quality with music, 
especially, for Carruth, with improvised jazz and blues, "A hot flowing of the eternal, 
many-colored, essential plasm/ As they leaned outward together, away from place, from 
time,/ In one only person, which was the blues" (SI, 133).
The concepts o f place and time are only feelings, or only thoughts. Death and life, 
subject- and object-ivity, the same. To understand any o f these abstractions as absolute, as 
anything except conventions, is error. Carruth does not mean to purify human experience 
o f error, but instead to acknowledge error as a part o f existence and creation. This effort 
brings us again to Either. One must hold in mind that every division and evaluation in 
Either is made by A, who is an aesthete, a man self-refined along a unique and relatively 
exclusive vector o f apperception. A ’s need to differentiate between types o f sensuousness is 
itself the kind o f error that is probably inherent in human intelligence, and is definitely 
inherent in the attempt to establish a self through erotic domination o f another. But A
him self cannot know this; if the aesthetic is coherent and progressing toward a higher state,
the ethical, it is doing so in a way that cannot be grasped by it. In The Sleeping Beauty 
the aesthetic masking is finally dropped and there is a moment o f truly existential horror 
unavailable to the aesthete, the very moment which the aesthete lives to avoid:




She begins her weeping. (114)
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The poem is explicit about the revelation that comes in the wake of the destruction of the 
mask:
the shattering 
O f his dream-mood, all that mattered,
The loving and lovingkindness, the steadfastness 
In existential sorrow,
The hard and human need to share -- all blasted.
Could he accept it? ^
Sorrow, sorrow,
The deeper wound in loving.
That it was force,
Power, even in the giving, this was his sorrow.
He was man, a man, flawed in his very source. (9)
The admission of this flaw is a beginning; it comes early in the poem, and it is an essential
part o f the aesthetic self-critique.
In his note to paragraph 15, Carruth states, "The fragments quoted from songs were
set down as remembered at the lime of writing and are sometimes incorrect. The case for
leaving them uncorrected has something to do with the essential meaning and structure of
the work." The contingent creation of voice and personality on the page; the role of flawed
memory in self-creation; self-creation as a aspect of history; the resistance o f the
rationalistic urge to quantify and to bring proof by comparison with some ideal standard or
version, e.g., the correct words to the songs; and most importantly, the purposive admission
of error into self-creation; -  all o f these are elements o f the existential search in both of
these works. Nietzsche makes a description of this kind o f admission which is salient to
both works:
I meant to say: Christianity has been the most calamitous kind o f arrogance. Men, 
not high or hard enough to have any right to form man as artists; men not strong 
and far-sighted enough to let the foreground of thousand-fold failure and ruin 
prevail, though it cost them sublime self-conquest.‘5
For Carruth the admission o f "thousand-fold failure and ruin" is the beginning of
self-conquest. One way failure and ruin are put into the poem is by the numerous
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allusions to figures from Western culture beginning with the letter "H." The hero is
demonic and his faces are legion. A brief list o f his names and his qualities will perhaps
suffice to establish that Carruth accepts cultural and personal error as a pan of himself:
Helen, who had "caught the coupling habit;" "the stupid heroic pride of the prime
defector,” Hector; Herod, "willing to do what nobody else would do;" "litigious" Hesiod;
Hannibal, who embodied "the human idea o f leniency;" Holderlin, who thought "Beauty was
worth/ Its every sorrow, m ind’s fading or world’s ending;" Hermann Hesse, artist of
"music and cruel story;" Hilarity; Hegel; Heraclitus, who saw war as a process of
regeneration; Hermes; Hendryk Hudson; Hitler; the blessed Hestia; the manufacturer of
napalm, Honeywell; Harlequin; Heathcliff; Hamlet, Hennaphrodite; and Hydrogen Bomb.
Carruth rejects the optimism that assumes one has the choice of denying that Honeywell is
a part o f the self. Heathcliff? "Heathcliff would kill everybody on earth in order to
possess Cathy.Ml6 The destructive power o f love is, in part, a result o f hope for a
consummate union, a unity both of personalities and o f the external elements of the world
in some coherent vision. This union assumes a progressive evolution of history toward
. . . toward Hegel? Hegel describes a method by which "Spirit comes into being;
this way o f becoming presents a slow procession and succession of spiritual shapes 
(Geistern), a gallery o f pictures, each o f which is endowed with the entire wealth of 
spirit and moves so slowly just for the reason that the self has to permeate and 
assimilate this wealth of its substance.!7
This would seem to describe the structure o f The Sleeping Beauty: a gallery o f lyrics which
are assimilated by the self in the poem. But Hegel continues,
In thus concentrating itself on itself, Spirit is engulfed in the night o f its own 
self-consciousness; its vanished existence is, however, conserved therein.
The spirit then proceeds as if all of its former incarnations and characteristics "were lost,
and as if it had learned nothing from the experience of the spirits that preceded." Granted,
the poem comes "out of nothing" and is made by "no one," meaning by no single voice.
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But has the poem really learned nothing from history? In the paragraph on Hegel, the poet 
writes,
He saw
Straightway to the end o f the brave Tristan 
And the beautiful Iseult,
How they must die, Oh, most needfully die, their own
Hands upon it -  for the sake o ’ th ’ higher synthesis. None
Saw it keenlier, none the entire
Realpolitik, how Romance doth aspire
(From those souls bound and dying) to life in the mass,
Freedom in history,
Being in cosmos. (51)
To see "straightaway" is to see narrowly, and in constructing a vision it means that one
ignores the parts that do not contribute to the organization o f the whole, ignores evidence
that contradicts coherence. Hegel’s vision confirms the subversion of the individual in the
crowd. Freedom only in history is not freedom (and the poem finally moves beyond
history). Hegel’s error is his belief in progression, in a higher synthesis. Carruth sees this
error as "the sentimentality o f progress and the motive o f the progressive state" (SI,36).
About the reactions of existentialists to this progressivism he has written,
For the existentialist who insists that reality is only what he himself knows and 
experiences, this [Hegelianism] is meaningless. Not only that, it is cruel and 
coercive. The existentialist knows that the self is not submerged, it is present, here 
and now, a suffering existent, and any system o f thought that overrides this 
suffering is tyrannical.'8
This is the climate, then, against which Kierkegaard and Carruth react, the Hegelian reason
"which is little content with the cold despair that submits to the view that in this earthly
life things are truly bad or at best only tolerable."‘9 The existentialists insist that one must
admit error, suffering, and despair.
The existentialist also lights against blind hope. In After the Stranger: Imaginary
Dialogues with Camus, the character Camus makes a "distinction between legitimate,
inevitable desire and illegitimate hope; a man who is truly aware o f absurdity will never
permit one to turn into the other." In response, the character Aspen, who is a painter and
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who represents, insofar as the book is autobiographical, Carruth, replies
But then the danger, the absurdity, arises from this same natural condition, either in 
men or outside them. Like the natural danger of converting desire into hope.
T hat’s the whole history o f religion, isn’t it? And it kept men happy for five 
thousand years or more, and drove them to despair and frenzy and murder, too. 
Maybe it is the history o f art, o f your own writing? The natural act works both 
ways, in other words, creating happiness and everything that is desireable, but at the 
same time leading to death and all the other aspects o f absurdity, including human 
error. (ATS, 44-45)
This is a particularly lucid moment for Aspen,“ who is an aesthete, and it is significant that
this awareness comes as a result o f  a dialogue. He has made the connection between a
theory of hope and his own life. The original point o f departure for the dialogues with
Camus is a discussion o f The Stranger, whose main character, Meursault, is also essentially
aesthetic. He is detached from his own life because o f his aestheticism. Before his own
trial for m urder a policeman asks him if he is nervous. M ersault replies, "No," and that
"the prospect of witnessing a trial rather interested me; I ’d never had occasion to attend one
before" (103). He is always watching himself, a tendency which, in his case, leads toward
paralysis. "Aesthete" is from the same Greek root as "theory" and "theatre", the Greek "to
sense or perceive." At the theatre as in theory, we look at things in which we are not
involved. And this is the problem for the aesthetic Aspen, and for Kierkegaard’s A. In the
first part o f Either, "Diapsalmata," A has the same type o f feeling about love that Aspen
voices above; "So it is with all joy; life’s supreme and richest moment of pleasure is
coupled with death." This insight, however, is not thought over with the degree of
apperception which would turn it into a statement about A ’s own part in producing tine
paradox. Rather it is voiced aphoristically, with attention only to its truistic, ringing,
rhetorical effect. Nor is it clear that Aspen can avoid turning natural desire into hope.
Later in the book Camus asserts that erotic love leading to solidarity, the best that can be
hoped for, is only fortuitous, not necessary. Aspen ventures that
The pain, frustrations, the transitoriness, these are the fortuities, introduced into our 
own erotic existences by the absurdities o f death and society. But erotic love itself
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is genuine, and when it is consciously and intelligently elaborated in the creativeness 
o f the dynamic sensibility, it becomes a genuine act o f revolt, a genuine 
self-assertion, leading to lucidity, happiness, and dignity. (134-35)
So Aspen apparently believes that erotic love can establish a real self in opposition to social
fictions about die self. This is his hope. But it is certainly not the final answer. Just as it
rejects a priori principles, existentialism rejects final answers, and, at any rale, Carruth,
Camus, and Kierkegaard are, here at least, writers, not metaphysicians. The poet, as
Sydney distinguishes him from the historian and the philosopher, "nothing affirmeth and
therefore never lieth.” There is no final authorial resolution o f how to overcome
Romance. There is no final answer. After The Stranger ends with a suspension, not a
resolution in its plot. But again, in The Sleeping Beauty. Carruth suggests that there is a
way out o f the labyrinth o f "centuries o f wrong,"
from dreamt objectivity to the forthrightly 
Seen -  subjective, brilliant, undamaged.
The poem moves alone now, but without loneliness.
Self has been left among objects that fashioned it.
Action and knowledge are one, free, far in the depths of consciousness.
In the final paragraphs the poem itself moves northward, into Canada, past Montreal,
"beyond earth and history, the nets o f essence," toward the "eternal other," toward the
soliciting otherness which is both its goal and an equivocal voice on the page. This boreal
yearning is in the same direction which Frankenstein and his monster disappear. It is the
opposite pole from that where the Ancient M ariner is reduced to nothing. The polar desert
is the land of anti-Romance and anti-aestheticism. There are no objects to watch.
Anything that man is there, he has made o f himself. It is the place "beyond the north, ice,
and death — our life, our happiness," where, Nietzsche says o f himself, the anti-Christ, and
his fellow Hyperboreans, "we have found the exit out o f the labyrinth of thousands of
years.’"9
This cold freedom is the result of an artistic act, an erotic act. There is nothing
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terminal about it. The contingency and the efficacy of the vital artistic act is the subject of
the poem that ends Contra M ortem :
Such figures if  they succeed are beautiful
because for a moment we brighten in a blaze of rhymes
and yet they always fail and must fail
and give way to other poems
in the endless approximations o f what we feel
Hopeless it is hopeless Only the wheel
endures It spins and spins winding
the was the is the willbe out o f nothing
and thus we are Thus on the wheel we touch
each to each a part
o f the great determining reality How much 
we give to one another Perhaps our art 
succeeds after all our small song done in the faith 
o f lovers who endlessly change heart for heart 
as the gift o f being Come let us sing against death
The act o f making figures, o f writing, a kind o f existential self-writing that Carruth, in 
discussing Thoreau, has called "autobiogenesis," is a way by which one realizes the 
Kierkegaardian "decisiveness of spirit which forms and establishes the personality" (FT,16). 
The poem, as a process of art, is a sensuous form; it includes self and other in an enclitic, 
interdependent way and is thus an example o f a psychically determined form. The poem is 
the interstice of time and space, where ego. and the world, desire and object come together; 
it is thus a convention, a psychical convention o f understanding. It exists in opposition to 
the conventions of idealizing, spiritually determined eroticism. This rebellion is, of course, 
social as well as artistic; insofar as one exists only in the poem, there is no difference 
between the two spheres. Carruth means to be conventional;
He thinks o f classical women:
Helen, Julia
Thais, Amarintha . . .
Amarintha? He smiles 
In disdain, in love. It was mythopoeia,
The convention that beguiles
Itself and its successors in a pure euphoria
O f idealization. Julia had no wart? Or
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Cynthia no straggling yellow tooth?
Then they were mere conceptions, youth 
Feminized, sexual but eternal, held 
In the long access o f rhyme 
That you, dear dreamer are inventing,
romance unwilled
And unrelenting.
And yet that lime,
He thinks, was actual; they lived, unknown women,
Flawed and misnamed, their soft rank bodies prime 
For idealization. Convention is also human. (78)
Carruth is inserting his poem into the whole Western rationalistic, erotic tradition, e.g., into
the Symposium, where love is seen as directed only to the beautiful aspect, not the ugly,
and there is an ascent motivated by the desire to overcome this partiality in a more perfect
object. Sexuality and eternity are mutually exclusive qualities which the allegorist
nonetheless insists that his conventional women embody. These women are held in the
long access of rhyme (and reason) so that the aesthetic-romantic sensibility may go to them
repeatedly, e.g., through allusion, with the illusion of novelty and immediacy. The essential
faithlessness o f the spiritually determined convention appears in its violation o f the personal
integrities o f wart, of straggling tooth, and in the constant repetition of the mutilated image.
This is all, o f course, morally problematic, but humanly true. It exhibits the error of all
human convention, conversion, conjugation. But the evidence of the error in the poem is
antidotal. If the poem is a convention, and convention is also human, then the poem is
also human -  and instructively humane, i.e., ethical. It is a means o f possible solution.
Authorial voice is also a convention, a structuring o f a literary work which is like
the structure o f grammar, like a lyric poem, where there must be a subject, an "1." But
this, too, is a spiritually determined convention. Kierkegaard tells us that psychically
determined sensuousness is exemplified by the Greek god Eros, whose erotic power is not
in him "but in all the individuals that refer it to him; he is himself, as it were, powerless
and impotent, because he communicates his power to the whole world"(E,62). This is the
192
kind of determination o f the erotic toward which Socrates points in the Symposium. Love 
is the love of something which one lacks: the beautiful is the beloved: therefore love has 
no beauty. Love has no power. The god o f Love has no authority himself. Eroticism 
itself, in the psychical sense, is not abstracted and concentrated in an idealized, conventional 
form, a mere conception, but it emanates from a point which does not possess it. The 
Greek conception of Eros is the converse o f the Christian doctrine o f Incarnation, wherein 
the "incarnated individual, as it were, absorbs the power from all the rest, and the fullness 
is therefore in him, and only so far in the others as they behold it in him" (E,62). The 
incarnated god of Christian love, Christ, is the inhabiting spirit, the spiritual agent, the 
expropriator, the Seducer. He is Hegelian Unity Incarnate. But in psychically determined 
sensuousness and its representations there is no authoritative possessor. This is what the 
poetic voice o f The Sleeping Beauty reflects. Kierkegaard sought to remove traditional 
authority in Either through pseudonymous authorship and the other distancing devices, 
including the fictional editor, Eremita. Carruth docs it through admitting characters from 
history, each of whom has a story which reinforces the destructive and paradoxical aspects 
o f love. Although so far I have attended mainly the authorial voice of the poet, the poem 
is in fact equally lull of other coincidental voices. The speaking voice o f the poem exists 
in discovering the large extent to which it is other, the large extent to which it is erotic, 
given the psychical definition o f eroticism; the voice emanates from a point which does not 
possess it. The poem possesses a self only in as much as it emanates that self. It has an 
ethical voice only inasmuch as it is the voice of others.
In this poem the traditional authorial voice empties itself, allows itself to become, as 
it were, allegorized, not against its will but on purpose. This psychic disgorgement is a 
formal effacement of the poetic ego, a resolution consistent with the nature of psychically 
determined sensuousness. Desire and the object of desire exist together erotically, "in one
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blossom," and the voice o f the poem where they so exist is psychically erotic. The voices 
o f the others come into the poem coincidentally, but not accidentally; they are bidden. In 
12 a medieval woman describes how she was burned alive by sexually masochistic pillagers. 
In 15 Joe Turner sings,"Baby, you so beautiful and you gotta die someday." In 18 a 
sixteenth-century woman sneaks out o f bed at night to write, only to have her "scriving" 
found by her husband and burned. In 28 Lilith appears as the typically abused woman. In 
35 the voice o f a supposedly dead Vermonter, Amos, is introduced. Amos talks with the 
poet for a large part o f the remainder o f the book, and it is Amos who does much of the 
"preachifying" in regard to social deterioration. (Am os’ attitudes are discussed fully in my 
chapter on Carruth contra Thoreau.) In 42 a contemporary woman describes her sexual 
problems with her husband, who finally "went gay" about the time she entered menopause.
In 52 Bessie Smith sings, "Oh, I ’m a young woman . . . and I a in’t done nothing wrong."
In 55 a country girl who has become a member of a seraglio describes her training in the 
Formulary of Submissiveness. In 56 Carruth quotes the poet Fulke Greville: "None can 
well behold with eyes/ But what underneath him lies." In 73 a fourteenth-century peasant 
woman is raped and impregnated by vandals and her baby is butchered. In 90 a Chinese 
woman describes the pain of having her feet bound, "bent backward underneath like a 
broken book," and she wonders if there is "another system . . . where girls run and a 
daughter/ Smiles." In each case the voice tells a story which is a consequence of 
domination. The voices are interspersed with episodes from history: a car crash, a chain- 
saw accident, the poet’s own institutionalization and its aftermath, and the fire-bombing of 
Dresden. The result o f this choir o f voices and events is a very idiosyncratic quality of 
vocal presence. "Dialogic" perhaps describes the relationship o f the author to the individual 
parts at the time he was writing, but not his relation to the poem as a whole, nor to the 
presence that comes from the pages to the reader. The voice o f the poem is derived
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organically, as it were, out of the nature of its theme. I briefly mentioned paragraph 64 
earlier. Here Carruth describes the face o f the woman in the water as it is seen in the 
moonlight:
This is a spectral insistence,
Light as it is in dreaming,
Its twice-angled remoteness a transcendence 
Or an alluding sourcelessness, a seeming 
Which only mythological sisters may embody 
In this world. Cycle and stasis. Gleaming 
and obscure. These two, together and solitary.
The voice of The Sleeping Beauty is a reflected voice. The source of the speaking self of
the poem is remote; it is lunar, reflective, transcending the ego’s urge to express itself
directly. Through admission o f other voices and the conventional allusive inclusion of
figures from history whose names begin with "H", including "Hayden," the poem attempts
to transcend the rationalistic logic that would posit a controlling subject for every
phenomenon. M oonlight is Carruth’s constant symbol for this quality, "reflected light,
reflected again on snow/ but beauty is lonely, lonely . . ." (CM). "Lonely, lonely," the
echo creates a companionship which seeks to ameliorate the human valence o f the word.
There is a way o f expressing loneliness which counters the misery of loneliness. There is a
way of expressing desire which counters the destructive consequences o f that desire. This
mode o f expression m ust accommodate the paradoxes of cycle and stasis, glimmer and
obscurity, loneliness and community. It must accommodate history and presence, the echo
of tradition and the free play o f individual talent. It must emanate from a point, or points,
which do not possess it and so reveal its erotic nature. It must accommodate any and all
others and admit therefore to a certain self-effacement, which is the necessary condition of
self-creation and survival.
Roland Barthes defines the Greek atopos as "unclassifiable, of a ceaselessly
unforeseen originality."20 "Originality" here means source, not novelty. He goes on to
explain that atopia is "linked to Eros . . .  the other whom I love and who fascinates me is 
atopos. I cannot classify the other, for the other is precisely, Unique, the singular image 
which has miraculously come to correspond to the specialty of my desire. The other is the 
figure o f my truth, and cannot be imprisoned in any stereotype (which is the truth of 
others)." The voice o f The Sleeping Beauty comes from unforeseen sources, unforseen even 
by the poet as he improvised the words on the page. For Carruth, since the poem has 
personality, it also qualifies as an "other," as an object of his desire and fascination, which 
is also unclassifiable. And destructive effects o f the attempt to classify the other is the 
great theme of his poem. He opposes the destructive consequences o f convention by using 
convention in a revelatory way. The voice o f The Sleeping Beauty is not dialogic, but 
atopic. In its "alluding sourcelessness" is its preeminence not only in Carruth’s work, but 
in twentieth-century poetry.
If the mode o f voice here is a way out of Romantic error, it also points back to the 
impossibility o f completely escaping from that error. Isn’t the very urge to be someone 
else, to speak in their voices, especially to be the psychic ventriloquist o f the Sleeping 
Beauty herself, a quintessential^ Romantic and appropriative impulse? Doesn’t it suggest 
that, as Kierkegaard’s seducer says, "My thoroughly reflective soul enfolds your pure deep 
being" (E,402)? To what extent can any suggestion o f irony defuse this kind of 
appropriation? The sensibility that creates poems is inevitably an aesthetic one, and it must 
use conventions, e.g., woman as vessel. The seducer reports in his diary that he perceives 
Cordelia like this:
She listens to another’s speech, she understands it as her own; she hears the voice
o f another as it echoes through her; she understands this echo also, as if it were her
own voice, which is manifest to her and to another. (E,384)
This is, of course, part and parcel o f the seducer’s allegorical and self-destructive urge. 
Kierkegaard means us to understand the limiting nature of the seducer’s evaluation of
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Cordelia — limiting both to her and to the seducer, and consequently to and of the world at 
large. So there is an irony here, a romantic irony that seeks to maintain the ambivalence 
between natural and unnatural, between self and world: the opposition inherent in 
spiritually determined sensuousness. We must see even the conventional topos as ironic, 
employed in a manner that seeks not to obliterate but to reveal the genesis of the 
convention. The Sleeping Beauty acts only in dreaming; she is the reflective source. When 
the seducer describes feminine qualities as reflective Kierkegaard is, as Henry Sussman 
remarks,
drawing on a rather conventional sexual model in Western thought in which the 
woman is too sublime to act. "Reflection" is analogous to thought as opposed to 
action. The aesthete’s purely reflective women exist on too high a spiritual plane to 
exercise their volition. Yet the notion o f reflection also exists in Kierkegaard’s 
work on the more general level o f articulation. In this broader sense, all linguistic 
and erotic activity is reflected, even the most strenuous efforts at moral restraint.
By implication, if  the figure of the woman is the generic locus of reflection in 
Kierkegaard’s writing, both aesthetic excess and moral choice fall under the aegis of 
the feminine.21
Certainly, the Sleeping Beauty is in her sleep, dreaming all o f history, "the generic locus of
reflection." She has a reflective vision that creates beauty, which is always caught aging,
echoed, as we say, in the eye o f the beholder. She is the a priori o f feeling, which, to
presume upon Sussman’s lack o f inclusion of feeling, must be the generic locus of action.
She is the forlorn author o f the poem, the poem "who uniquely in sorrow rejoices/ And can
have no pronoun," no noun. She is an author of a selfless work, the female Eros, source of
the referred voice. One points this out with a sense of repetition, because Kierkegaard and
Carruth explain why they use a conventional concept of woman. Kierkegaard does this
most directly, as he has the aesthete explain:
I use a feminine [for the tragedy] because I firmly believe that a feminine nature 
will be best adopted for showing the difference [between ancient and modern 
tragedy]. As woman she will have substantiality [immediacy] enough for sorrow to 
show itself, but as belonging in a reflective world, she will have reflection enough 
to mark the pain.(E,151)
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Kierkegaard ascribes ethicality to sorrow and pain; "sorrow and pain have not the 
contradiction in them which is characteristic of melancholy and heaviness, nor the ambiguity 
which is the sweetness in the melancholy" (E,75). This is a typical Kierkegaardian 
hierarchy o f feeling and mood. Melancholy is the merely aesthetic mood; sorrow and pain 
are beyond the category o f "mood’ because they are a manifestation of an ethos developed 
out of felt existence.
The speaker o f The Sleeping Beauty is also conventionally feminine, i.e., reflective, 
in his realization that his loving is force; this is his sorrow, existential sorrow unremitting, 
in which he stands steadfast. The use o f the conventional feminine creates a figure in 
which the poet can explore and express his own participation in the convention with all of 
its moral consequences. The result is a self-transformation taking place as the writing 
happens in the moment on the page, a transformation, in part, from an exclusive sexual 
being to a more meaningful being, a sexually male one whose feminine qualities are no 
longer hidden. This is a freedom.
Carruth turns the conventional Romantic aesthetic on itself. In order to oppose
sexual exclusivity, expropriation, destruction o f the other and therefore o f the self, he
confronts voice with echo, the voice o f an aesthete, himself, with his own sad history and
that of his tradition. This is not a revenge against the sexual self or against life; it is a
confrontation as full of love as any act. As Carruth has written elsewhere, "Politics is love,
anger is love, and poetry is love." The standard measure o f the degree of psychical
eroticism is love, a standard which informs Carruth’s great admiration o f that other reviser
o f Romanticism, Pound, who insisted over and over " Amo ergo sum, and in just that
proportion" (Canto LXXX). Carruth has noted admiringly the motto on Pound’s St.
Elizabeth stationery:
J ’ayme done je  suis 
Je soffre mais je  vis
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Carruth has also written in his excellent essay to which I gave much attention in Chapters 
One and Two, "If the reader is an authentic personality he, like the poet who created the 
poem, passes into the purity o f spiritual existence. His work to is an act of love" (W,
228).
In addition to his striving for community, his emotional and intellectual honesty, and
his affection, Carruth’s vision carries with it a belief in the power of art to generate
sympathy for and a commitment to the alleviation o f human suffering: an ethos. This
ethos is not doctrinal or programmatic; it is improvised in the moment of composition and
reception, "the instant you are really kissed." It is transmitted even to the object of poetic
desire. By the end of the poem the Romantic urge to mythopoeia has to some extent been
overcome, and without a diminishment o f mythical beauty:
Princess, the poem is bom and you have woken.
A world’s undone.
And it is no easy thing,
With brave romance and conquest broken,
Still to love and sing;
To love and sing without the necessity o f the destructive features o f Romance, yet,
nonetheless, in the environment o f Romance. This is an existential lyricism, "a doctrine
that affirms that every truth and every action imply both an environment and a human
subjectivity."22 The final paragraph continues:
The tapestry is unthreaded, lovesong’s unspoken 
Horror spills out.
Yet you in yourself betoken 
Love’s amending, for you are Rose Marie,
Pure in transcendent being, free
From history, though the Domroschen is keeping
Your beauty for us forever.
The sun
Will rise on the snowy firs and set on the sleeping 
Lavender mountain as always, and no one 
Will possess or defile you where you belong,
Here in the authentic world. The work is done.
My name is Hayden and I have made this song.
Her personality has been renovated, and she is freed from history. Yet, her personal beauty
has become a determining part o f the convention of History. The poem ends with a
recollection o f all o f  the presences o f the poem, including the reader, into an authentic
world. The writer, who in the beginning suffered to some extent from a kind of Kantian
heteronomy, asserting then that the poem was made "by no one," has won through to a
moment o f autonomous being. Having looked in the mirror of history and seen Honeywell,
Hitler, and Herod, now he can look at the mirror o f the present, his poem, and see Hayden,
a man self-created in his song. Self and other, the poet and his song are united in a
fashion that Carruth presaged in a much earlier poem, Contra M ortem, at the time he was
entering his mature mode:
So upon ragged changing seas
the poem which is a ship
buoyed by its hollowness on the abstruse
coordinates o f meaning carries the loop
o f its horizons forever with it Scan
this circle vanishing across the deep
It is contrived it is actual it is a man
The Sleeping Beauty finally creates the possibility o f self-knowledge within its 
nexus o f desire and suffering. It exhibits a way of writing that is not a representation or an 
expression o f existence, but existence itself, "the experience o f immediate sensory 
apprehension and simultaneous mental comprehension" (SI,49-50). Like Kierkegaard,
Carruth seeks existence in the difference, perhaps artificial and conventional, between the 
androgynous unity o f psychical desire and the exclusively sexual divisiveness of spiritual 
desire. Perhaps the romantic-aesthetic urge is inescapable in the convention of the single 
authorial voice. Carruth’s assignation o f personality to the poem and its atopic, other­
speaking voice are an attempt to solve this apparent impasse -  as is Kierkegaard’s 
antiphonal presentation of the aesthetic and the ethical. Unlike Kierkegaard, Carruth claims 
no "higher" stage of human progress. Nor does he claim the kind o f direct social agency
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for art proposed by the atheistic existentialists like Sartre. He rejects the first on the 
grounds o f the "centuries o f wrong" produced by Christianity and its spiritually determined 
conventions. He refuses the second because he is an author, not an agent. Any insistence 
that the poet should do more than try to speak for him self overrides and obliterates the 
poet’s uniquely personal commitments and contributions. Carruth understands Blake’s 
revolutionary meaning in his introduction to M ilton, "Would to God that all the Lord’s 
people were prophets." Each person should interpret the past and articulate that meaning in 
a vision of the present. This requires a creative use o f the elements o f history, not a 
rejection o f it as, e.g. in the French Revolution, in regard of which Carruth mockingly 
exhorts, "Sing, Robespierre,/ O f how your loves look, trundling past to die" (54). The 
choice of Robespierre emphasizes the self-destruction of this kind of rejection. The 
individuating process o f the poetic revision o f history is, because it is private, more 
radically revolutionary that abstract political revision.
Carruth is not a Marxist, not a liberal. He lives, as he insists repeatedly, not in 
Boston or Concord, but in Western Vermont (a distinction which many readers may 
appreciate immediately and which I will address at length in consideration o f Carruth’s 
relation to Thoreau, Frost, and Lowell.) His affinities with William James arc more than 
geographical. Carruth "was raised a radical agnostic and a relativist" (Ef',1). In paragraph 
82 Carruth quotes James: "the universe has only/ The unity possessed by any heap." In 
After The Stranger, published twenty years earlier, the main character holds to the same 
talisman:
One of the mottos pined to Aspen’s wall was: "Prima facie the world is a pluralism; 
as we find it, its unity seems to be that of any collection." Such a world, the 
world defined by William James, offered, Aspen thought, a place for imperfectibility 
and radical failure, a place for suffering; such a unity left room for the disunited. 
(ATS,29)
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One o f these quotations is inaccurate. Perhaps Carruth transformed Jam es’ dictum for the 
contextual poetic power o f "heap," and, like the fragments quoted from songs, this changing 
o f "fact" in personal memory over time is a part o f the meaning o f The Sleeping Beauty 
and o f all art. At any rate the admission o f error, failure, disunion without obliteration is 
characteristic o f Carruth’s vision. Disunity in unity, the absurdity of democracy, and his 
essential refusal to capitulate or, in rebellion, to intrude upon the claims o f others -  these 
are the qualities that make Carruth an existentialist o f the Yankee variety. Aside from the 
special lyrical pleasures o f The Sleeping Beauty, it is these qualities, along with Carruth’s 
recognition o f the destructiveness o f the cult o f  Romance, that make his poem a significant 
contribution to the current of existential thought.
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Chapter Six
Dionysian Pessimism: The Recent W ork of Hayden Carruth
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On Carruth’s accounts, particularly in his critical fiction After The Stranger: Imaginary 
Dialogues W ith Camus (1965) and his long poem The Sleeping Beauty (1983), the turn 
against Romanticism involves a turn against hope, even though it might not be consistent 
with a theory of radical pessimism to believe that effacement possible. Hope is 
philosophical and moral error because it encourages ignorance o f the depersonalizing forces 
in the present. So, "to hope" is closer in meaning to the friabilities o f "to wish" than to 
the natural prospecting of "to expect." Hope is sentimentality. Sentimentality, as he shows 
us in The Sleeping Beauty, has m eant destruction and death. Though it has been a theme 
in all o f his mature work, the turn against cultural and psychological optimism has become 
an even more profound and radical motive in Carruth’s more recent work.
Pessimism itself has always been evident in the two main influences on Carruth’s 
thinking, in the Romantic tradition and in existential theory. Yet, in both, the pessimism 
that denies man certain consolations creates other opportunities, that is to say, it is not 
completely cynical. "Pessimism" was first used in English by Coleridge, but it is Blake 
who proposes the particular qualifications of the concept that are salient to Carruth’s 
thought. Jerome McGann has pointed this out in his recent book, Toward A Literature of 
Knowledge,
Crucial to Blake’s work is his understanding that art solicits error, without which
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there can be no possibility o f truth . . .terror] enters by the will deliberately . . 
when Blake observed that "There can be no Good Will Will is always Evil"(Ann.lo 
Swed.: Love), he was glancing at what we should call the ideology of art, and the 
way ideology enters imaginative work.l
The "evil" (Carruth would probably say "unintentional") effects o f will are those of the
aberration that is human intelligence. This is a tenet o f secular existentialism from as far
back as Dostoevsky’s Notes From The Underground, and the belief in the radical
malevolence o f will is shared by another writer who has been a great influence on Carruth,
Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s will is a blind, unintentional force, a guarantor of perpetual
struggle. As Bertrand Russell puts Schopenhauer, "Will, though metaphysically
fundamental, is ethically evil — a opposition only possible to a pessimisi."2 For Carruth, to
acknowledge this agent o f constant stress is to avoid illusion, to be lucid. Like
Schopenhauer (and Dostoevsky) Carruth has always rejected the idea o f human progress
through the organizations of the Stale.
B lake’s belief, displayed lor example in his "notorious personal mythology," that
"reality is what it is made to be," 3 and Schopenhauer’s insistence upon an unblinking
recognition o f the will connect directly with the existential ideas which Carruth found so
attractive. Existentialism is pessimistic insofar as it asserts that the universe is valueless;
man assert him self (as Blake asserted his own system) in the face o f this valuelessness.
And existentialism refuses the "permanent risk for self-deception" (Sartre) concealed in
consciousness.
I have discussed the implications of Carruth’s objections to Walden on the grounds 
o f its utopianism. Camus, in The Rebel, makes a further warning about the dangers of 
utopian hope:
Confronted with the possibility that the idea (any idea) may be realized in the 
future, human life can be everything or nothing. The greater the faith that the 
estimator places in this final realization, the less the value o f human life. At the 
ultimate limit, it is no longer worth anything at all.4
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This "final realization" is the error o f the Hegelian system. The romantic absolute of 
"everything," the nihilist absolute o f "nothing," are errors. And the consequence of these 
errors as Camus sees it, is murder, murder o f the kind that Carruth has shown us in The 
Sleeping Beauty.
This existential response to Hegelian rational optimism is important in regard to
Carruth’s pessimism, especially given the current unpopularity o f existential ideas and the
increasing interest in applications o f Hegel’s phenomenology to the study of literature.
Hegelian methodology is optimistic without qualification. It assumes complete
comprehension, a synthetic "final reality." At the end of his preface to the Philosophy of
Right Hegel asserts a relationship between Bacon’s notion that true philosophy leads to
God, to Truth, and his own meaning of
reason, which is little content with the cold despair that submits to the view that in 
this earthly life things are truly bad or at best only tolerable . . There is less chill 
in the peace with the world that knowledge supplies.5
To acknowledge any inherent undesirability about the real world is, for Hegel, unthinkable,
despite whatever rhetorical or logical gambits are necessary to maintain affirmation. But
what if, like Carruth, one sees an inherent hopelessness in the world, what if this is one of
the meanings o f ones vision? Constructive Hegelianism as a critical technique must either
ignore Carruth’s work, or, worse, distort it by a rationally selective interpretation wherein
Carruth’s poems seem no longer to contradict the method, the methodical, -  the institution -
- the academy.
For the Hegelian critic the definite is worth more than the indefinite. Individual 
voices like Carruth’s which are profoundly and apparently resistant to systemization are 
ignored because in theory everything must become rationally cogent and affirmative in 
relation to other parts, other voices, each and all orchestrated by the theorist. Nothing 
seems lost. Everything is rendered in terms o f its increasing significance in the closed 
circuit, the class-time of the theory. And any part of the work synthesized later is eo ipso
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more valuable. Value, understanding, and knowledge increase in a cumulative way through
time. Again as Russell notes about Hegel’s phenomenology, "The lime process . . .  is from
the less to the more perfect, both in an ethical and in a logical sense. "6
Does the truly ethical lie always ahead of us, never here? This is utopian, and
progressive, and Carruth calls this way of thinking simply the opposite side of
sentimentality, which is "the motive o f the reactionary stale," it is "the sentimentality of
utopian progress and the motive of the progressive state" (SI,36).
W hen the utopianism that insists on coherence is grafted onto the
unexamined vestiges o f the Amoldian critical program, that is, that art is a criticism
of life, and, "therefore critics could and should be assessors, instigators, moral
henchmen," (SI,34) the result is a critical methodology that has huge blind spots in
its view of the variety and significance of much of twentieth-century writing,
especially in verse. As Carruth writes in his introduction to Nausea, "Pain and
ecstasy, doubt and intuition, private anguish and despair -  these cannot be explained
in terms of rational categories." The work should not be submerged in the
interpretive apparatus.
Carruth’s radical opposition to optimism is also therefore an opposition to
the cultural apparatus -  the literary apparatus from which he has been mostly
excluded — in part because o f his opposition. And the rift is not cutting off only
Carruth, some of whose criticism goes right to the heart o f specialization and
fragmentation in the academy, where many are miserable and few communicative
enough to say why. Carruth’s remarks in "The Defeated Generation" (SI,90) are
worth quoting at length:
How does this happen? How is that those who wished forty years ago to 
desanctify the imagination, reduce it from the vatic role it had acquired in 
the romantic idealization of human intelligence from the fourteenth century 
to the early decades of the twentieth, how is it that these writers are today 
derided as Humanists by the advocates o f deconstructivist criticism, those 
who now call themselves Theorists? This is an old Marxist ploy, o f course,
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though Theorists are not all necessarily Marxists; yet for most of them, 
anyone who is anti-Hegelian enough to speak up for individuated 
consciousness is a de facto Humanist with a capital H. Well, name-calling 
is not discourse and ultimately is unimportant. What is important is just the 
experience o f individuated consciousness that the existentialists were talking 
about, and we know that in reality we are collectivized, we are 
depersonalized, we are enslaved and corrupted and inauthentic, and all the 
"freedom" that we have inside our skulls is not enough to afford us any 
reasonable plane on which to exist. We may disacquiesce until we are blue 
in the face, but we are still at the mercy o f every power in and out o f the 
universe. In short, the existentialists were as right in their intentions as all 
philosophers are, including the Marxists, but in their technical, so-to-speak 
professional adumbrations o f theory they foundered, again like all others, on 
the radical incompatibility o f intelligence and actuality. The question of art 
and reality is at the root o f every problem, and it is unanswerable.
The pretense to knowledge is the means by which rationalistic criticism occludes the 
social polity which it purports to serve. Its pretense to wisdom and truth creates a 
function which guarantees its existence only on the horizon between author and 
reader, as a wall on that horizon. It disqualifies itself as a cultural apparatus for the 
understanding o f art made by increasingly alienated and ragged individual 
sensibilities.
Carruth, on the other hand, wants to show us how tilings are truly bad, and
that we are responsible. Anyone who says different is not only in error, but is
probably an ideologue. In the 1965 introduction to Nausea, Carruth wrote
In a universe grounded in Nothingness, the anthrocentric vision o f reality 
that characterized rational humanism from the Renaissance to the Nineteenth 
Century is, clearly, untenable.
In Sitting In (1983) he writes
If the change in the ancient world was theo-centric, and if  that o f the 
Renaissance was anthropo-cenlric, then the change in our own consciousness 
is anthropo-eccentric. We are discovering the unimportance and 
adventitiousness o f human existence.(SI,6)
This discovery has come from the area o f speculation to which Carruth’s secular
existentialism, along his observations o f what man is doing to the planet, have led
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him. That adventitiousness probably means extinction, as he writes in a recent
uncollected poem, "Catalogue" (Sulfur #24). It is a downward-spiraling list of
destructions: desiccation o f the planet due to ozone depletion, global contamination
of seas, acid rain, denuding o f Amazon basin, cancer epidemic, drought; "The
extinction o f species -  say again, the extinction of species -  continues at a daily
measurable rate;" immanent exhaustion o f fossil fuels, slaughtering of porpoises and
waterfowl, starvation, loss o f midwest topsoil, toxification o f groundwater -  Carruth
flatly lists the current events and concludes, "Will it ever end? O f course. Of
course it will end."
Again in Sitting In he writes,
I have never doubted that the predicament of technological society in 
extremis is more the consequence of Hegel’s ideas than of Francis Bacon’s. 
(74)
It is possible for mastery of the natural world to be accomplished in a manner than
includes stewardship, but Hegelian optimism is a terrible illusion because
fundamentally we make our choices less as human beings than as vital 
beings, one species among the many that are animate. It is not a question 
o f the value o f humanity, but o f the value o f life, the whole "ecosystem."
For me this means equivalence; one kind o f life is neither more nor less 
valuable than another. (SI,75)
Carruth asserts that the necessity of choosing without the notion of value, without
the hope o f appeal or o f ultimate salvation is "the only alternative to suicide." This
definition o f the choice to endure "reconciles [his] youthful need for authenticity,"
that is, his existentialism, his non-violent anarchism, "with [his] experienced
recognition of blindness and error," that is his pessimism.
This expression of moral philosophy, developed as a result of personal
history, is even stronger in the essay "With Respect To the Infuriating Pervasiveness
o f Optimism." (SI) Carruth explains how Pound’s entire poetic program took place
within the confines of an American brand of optimism. On Carruth’s account
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Pound’s late statements about the incoherence o f the Cantos presumes the possibility
of coherence and a failure o f personal vision, rather than an acknowledgement (not
available to the optimist) that "the incoherence lay not in the elements of the poem
but in the world." Other critics have noted this also, as did Pound, implicitly, when
in an interview with Donald Hall in 1960 he remarked, "somebody said that 1 am
the last American living the tragedy o f Europe." Carruth points out that Lite tragic
view is based on optimism:
The tragic view o f life and art, which pits human intelligence against the 
incoherence of fate and celebrates, however negatively, the authenticity, 
solidity, and value o f human experience, this tragic view, I believe, from
Sophocles to Shakespeare to Schopenhauer to Sartre, is at bottom not only a
mode o f optimism but essentially more optimistic, not less, that the 
progressivism o f Hegel and Whitman and Henry Ford, to say nothing of 
Plato. Yet a work begun in the optimism of tragedy is self-contradictory.
It must admit failure in the face of incoherence to make its point. It 
becomes a comedy, what we call a black comedy. And I am by no means 
the first to point out that the Cantos, like King Lear, are comcdic.
Nor is he the last. McGann, too, points out that the Cantos are not tragic and that,
as the title of his chapter on Pound indicates, Pound’s was a "Truth In
Contradiction." Pound meant them as a tragedy, but unintentionally they became
coinedic, because o f their self-contradiction. But isn’t it almost shockingly
contradictory to hear Carruth say that Schopenhauer and Sartre are more optimistic
than Hegel and Ford? The next paragraph elaborates and explains:
Is optimism then an inevitable component o f any constructive human effort, 
meaning any effort aimed at change? . . . My own historical imagination 
suggests to me, however, that another mode is possible, a mode in which 
optimism is not present at all, either positively or negatively, a mode in 
short based on the ante-modern belief that time is linear and eternity is 
circular.
What could this other mode be? Before of course going ahead to the poems in 
Carruth’s Asphalt Georgies, which is more or less contemporaneous with these 
essays, and where we might expect to find something in this other mode, it is useful 
to speculate on the characteristics o f this mode, for that speculation, along with the
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previous speculation in this chapter, will be a tool in understanding the final works 
of Carruth’s to be treated in this study.
If a a
i t i t i t
The connections between Carruth and Nietzsche, especially on the grounds 
o f their anti-Hegelian and anti-Romantic impulses, have been discussed in previous 
chapters. The ubiquity o f N ietzsche’s genius makes him a natural companion for a 
myriad of thinkers and writers; I do not mean to imply more than 1 say about the 
relation between Nietzsche and Carruth, but it is Nietzsche who, in making the turn 
against the currents noted above, comes to a concept which, it seems to me, is 
remarkably similar to Carruth’s qualifications o f a "different mode." I shall lake the 
liberty o f making only minimal intrinsic connection within the structures of 
N ietzsche’s own thought, which would be an entirely full and separate endeavor.
In discussing Thoreau’s romanticism I referred to Nietzsche’s description of 
the romantic and the anarchist in section 370 of The Gay Science. The section 
begins with an account o f pessimism. Nietzsche originally thought it a great 
achievement, but here he recants: "You see, what I failed to recognize at that lime 
both in philosophical pessimism and in German music was what is really their 
distinctive character -  their romanticism." Now he realizes that this romantic 
pessimism (a la Schopenhauer) comes from "the impoverishment o f life." The 
romantic pessimist has a tragic view of life, which comes from the need to "seek 
rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or 
intoxication, convulsions, anaesthesia, and madness." On the other hand "he that is 
richest in the fullness o f life, the Dionysian god and man, can not only afford the 
sight o f the terrible and the questionable, but even the terrible deed and any luxury
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of destruction, decomposition, and negation." For Nietzsche Epicurus (Camus
strongly objecting here) and Christians seek "optimistic horizons;" They are
romantics. Furthermore,
The desire for destruction, change, and becoming can be an expression of an 
overflowing energy that is pregnant with future (my term for this is, as is 
known, "Dionysian); but it can also be the hatred of the ill-constituted, 
disinherited, and underprivileged, who destroy, must destroy, because what 
exists, indeed all existence,all being, outrages and provokes them. To 
understand this feeling, consider our anarchists closely.
We have seen how this consideration o f motive can be applied to a romantic
optimist like Thoreau. In this passage it applies to the pessimist as well. And it
applies to artists o f both persuasions:
The will to immortalize [eternalize] also requires a dual interpretation. It 
can be prompted, first, by gratitude and love; art with this origin will always 
be an art o f apotheoses, perhaps dithyrambic like Rubens, or blissfully 
mocking like Hafiz, or bright and gracious like Goethe, spreading a Homeric 
light and glory over all things.
Yet this same impulse can also be, as I suggested in Thoreau’s case, a mean and
expropriative urge, a destruction, a romantic pessimism, really only disappointed
optimism. I will continue quoting from section 370 o f The Gay Science because
Nietzsche makes the culminating point with characteristic alacrity.
That there still could be an altogether different kind o f pessimism, a 
classical type -  this premonition and vision belongs to me as inseparable 
from me, as my proprium and ipsissimum; only the word "classical" 
offends my ears, it is far too trite and has become round and indistinct. I 
call this pessimism of the future -  for it comes! I see it coming! -  
Dionysian pessimism.
The implications o f this passage for considerations of many kinds of writing arc
immense, and especially salient to Carruth. As I have noted before, Carruth has
cherished Camus’ definition o f classicism as "only romanticism subdued,” and that
seems to be close to what Nietzsche is suggesting here. Or does he mean
romanticism suffused with more energy? At any rate, romanticism modified and
transformed. This "Dionysian pessimism," I assert, is indeed very close to what
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Carruth is suggesting as his "mode in which optimism is not present at all, either 
negatively or positively." If  this is so, then this mode will be also another attempt 
to efface the romantic self-contradictions of the tragic view, and it will include the 
temporal qualifications o f time and eternity, as well as embodying substantively and 
tonally a Dionysian, dithyrambic mode. We will come back to this passage of The 
Gay Science as we try to find the mode in Asphalt Georgies and in his most recent 
poems, essays, and actions.
i t  i i  f f
Trrrrr
Asphalt Georgies
W hat is a "georgic"? The OED tells us that it comes from the Greek word for 
husbandman, or earth-, root-worker. It relates to agriculture. It is obsolete except 
in semi-humorous use, where it means agricultural or rustic. "Georgic" is the title 
of Virgil’s four-volume work on husbandry. A root-work, indeed. Carruth wrote 
the poems in AG when he had taken up his roots in Vermont and put them back 
down in the industrial canker o f greater Syracuse, New York. The poems are 
rooted in his horrification at the incredible ugliness, the waste, the depersonalization, 
o f the place -  and, as ever, in his intellect and temperament, his sense of black 
comedy and his Dionysian, almost desperately energetic but lucid pessimism.
Carruth’s "georgic" is a syllabic quatrain, lines o f 8, 6, 8, and 6 syllables; 
the six-syllable lines are indented three spaces and rhymed (yes, in the vernacular 
"a" rhymes with "the"). The stanza creates many hyphenations, logo-clasticisms that 
are decorous for both the topics and the personae, people who speak in real, 
contemporary American speech, with a sense of humor that thrives in spite of what 
they live through: a black list, the worst: agonies of sickness in helpless old age; 
the ugliness, the evil facades of consumer society; endemic pollution, political
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imprisonment and torture, insanity, impotence, poverty, indifference, divorce, 
loneliness, alcoholism, suicide, murder, sorrow, nuclear annihilation, racism -  every 
kind o f death-in-life and then . . . oblivion. In short, Carruth’s usual subjects, but 
these are unusually depressing. Some of the writing is as bitter as anything Carruth 
has ever written: "the saturated fats/ o f  so-called living filled the so-/ called air" 
("Names"). And yet if one has already an ear or can begin while reading to hear 
the texture of the voices of these characters, it is impossible to keep from laughing, 
with and at them. The humor o f these characters is not the malevolent Frostian 
laughter o f the M iller in "The Vanishing Red," it is warm, affirmative, 
compassionate, and heroic. The contest between tragedy and comedy finds a human 
resolution:
Tragedy (read life 
has its comic aspects, 
granted, usually produced
by genius, the effects
of machines malfunctioning; but 
tragedy still dissents.
Comedy is the somehow need­
ed poet’s misfeasance. ("Names")
Genius is the malfunctioning of a malfunction, o f a supernumerary thing, the man-
machine. The two components o f tragedy, o f the tragic mode, optimism and/or
lucid existential rebellion both assert m an’s self in the face of the void. Carruth
uses "comedy" and "tragedy" with the full range o f their meanings. Comedy (play,
reveling, singing) is "somehow", that is, fortuitously, necessary (a paradox of course)
for (is it the needed poet?) the poet’s "misfeasance," his imposition, his stepping in,
with a wrongful application of his (legislative?) power. What seems here at first to
be a straightforward and fairly abstract dictum dissolves upon careful reading into a
thicket of paradox, mal-execution and error — which is precisely the philosophical
dynamic o f Carruth’s poetics of pessimism.
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Comedy is rebellion in both an historical and a metaphysical sense. This is 
implied in the poem above and Carruth says it explicitly elsewhere, in "The Guy 
Downstairs" (SI):
We have yet to produce either an American or an existential epic, though 
* we have had a few near misses. (I am uncertain what to say of A la 
recherche du temps perdu. It might qualify. In that case we need a second, 
and we need an epic that deals with America and American violence.) In 
one way or another the Cantos. Paterson. Conquistador, and the works of 
American novelists (including Faulkner) all fall short; and so do the 
collected films o f Charlie Chaplin, although I think they come, closer than 
anything else.
A lyric epic is perhaps a generic contradiction in terms. But the existential epos of 
Carruth’s collected works nominates it for inclusion in the short list of American 
existential epics.
Asphalt Georgies is at the heart of his epos. The Chaplinesque combination 
o f sadness and humor pervades these poems. The book begins with a long poem, 
"Names," in which the speaker changes identities in a seemingly haphazard fashion, 
and quickly, effectively, as a result, he has no name. The first speaker, Sam, and 
his wife, Poll, are driving to the "K-Mart up in/ Seneca Mall" to return a defective 
electric percolator. Suddenly, Sam begins quoting Eugenio Montale, in Italian, 
which he translates, "the past is nothing and we/ are in love with it. Prag-/ 
matically speaking we are/ in love with nothing." (Surely this is a partial answer to 
one of Carruth’s critics, Philip Booth, who was troubled about the past tense o f the 
title o f Brothers, I Loved You A ll, wondering if  it meant that all o f Carruth’s loves 
were over.) Sam ’s anacoluthic voice shows us the vast space between any two 
thoughts, a space in which anything can happen. He reflects on baseball, "our 
venomous// American aggressiveness/ confined to balls and bats," on how an atheist 
can pray , and suddenly we realize how a trip to the K-Mart can become occasion 
for beautiful mysteries. On the way to the mall Sam "was on fire,// so was Poll
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next to me, so was/ the whole world. To get through,/ get to the K-Mart, probably/ 
was all I asked." But even that is a huge petition, "Just a hope,/ like a rabbit 
frozen/ under a bush when the hounds come,/ no sense in it." No sense in the 
hope, no sense in the rabbit, no sense in the man, in man. In anything. The clerk 
refuses to take the percolator back because
"You didn’t but that here." We
showed her the slip, the re­
ceipt from the cash register. "Why," 
she smiled, "that’s dated more 
than a month ago. And besides 
This is a different store."
Well, o.k. We went outside, wilt­
ing right off, and looked back 
up, and sure enough, the sign said
Ames, though we could see black
letters on the wall, sort o f scorched 
there, that still said K-Mart.
I ’m Arthur. I always liked that
name. Molly calls me Art.
It is absurd to keep insisting that one’s name is always changing, but is it any
crazier than K-Mart becoming Ames? In Contra Mortem Carruth wrote that the
child is "stranger to the pronomial itch," that is, to the assertion o f the self in the
objective world in the form of an "I." Here everyone’s identity is unstable,
creating, along with disastrous depersonalization, a vertiginous kind o f fun, an
instability which emphasizes the existential belief that we make our identities
moment by moment. The speaker changes his name again, to Ted (his wife to
Dolly), then to Julio, and then he changes gender and religious status, to Santa
Julia:
It was necessary, 
this change o f gender, to make such 
an extraordinary
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transition, as was the change from 
mortality to sub- 
blimnity, which I know now is 
not the angelic club
I once believed bout a state of 
mind at least theoret­
ically attainable by
all those who must forget
themselves completely and abso­
lutely in order to 
pass through and beyond the pain that 
surpasses knowing...
Julio is a political prisoner who is being cruelly tortured, made to live in a box.
H e’s covered in his own shit. He is a sorrowful figure whose story is interrupted
by "Jacky," a promiscuous woman who has been mentioned in the poem before as
som eone’s daughter. The poem ends with "Johan," "which is both/ John and Joan,
but m ostly/ in my case the former; which is/ appropriate, I be-// ing masculine both
in nature/ and in history."
To identify oneself by naming, with a name, in a world where the system
works to depersonalize one every minute o f one’s life is nothing short of heroic.
Are these Syracusans tragic heroes and heroines? If optimism is linked to the tragic
view o f art and life, perhaps this pessimism, this funny business in Asphalt
Georgies, is the Dionysian kind that Nietzsche foresaw. These characters seem to
see something like that too:
There may be ground
for thinking I ’m not smart, I be­
lieve there is, but I know 
this: the system around here can’t 
be fixed or beaten. No
way. You don’t have to be an i- 
deologist to see 
w hat’s wrong. It’s too big . It’s so big
nobody can agree
what it really is, much less con-
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trol it, not even that 
Reagan and his gang -  they’re in it 
thick as thieves.
This is Jake the Dope speaking. And Jake is right. He sees farm land taken over
for businesses, those businesses gone bankrupt, families falling apart, changes in the
weather due to pollution, change occurring at an inhuman rale, all rushing toward
extinction. All right there in Syracuse, beside Lake Onondaga, "the oldest/ dead
lake in North America./ Well, if you can’t be best// you might as well be worst,
that’s how / we look at it." If these poems cannot speak to contemporary audiences
about their lives, nothing will, and then like the speaker in "Plain Song," we will all
then "won-/der what it would really take to/ grab people’s attention."
"Reflections" is an explicit manifestation o f the brave and almost careless
will to rebel which is summoned up in the face of the horrors o f lucidity:
Dead souls! Yes we are.
We shiver in our nonexist­
ence, our rejection. Far
and near, early and late, we tried 
our best to belong, some 
o f us, maybe the best o f us;
never enough. Then come
you randy whatsit, seize us all, 
fling us out there among 
the false lights, I who am old, my 
son David who is young:
We know you well enough to know 
you do not care whether 
we care or not, and so we choose 
not to, now or ever.
This profound denial comes from the learning o f the past, that nothing, and goes on 
into the next poem, "Lost." Before, in "Names," one speaker says, Many/ paths in 
the forest have chosen/ me. I go on any..." The agony of choice and the 
inevitability of being lost is a choreic theme for Carruth. He shares the obsession
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with Camus. In The Stranger, M eursault reflects on his own chances:
I passed my life in a certain way, and I might have passed it in a different 
way, if  I ’d felt like it. I ’d acted thus, and I hadn’t acted otherwise. 1 
hadn’t done X whereas I had done Y or Z. And what did that mean?
That, all the time, I ’d been waiting for this present moment, for that dawn, 
tomorrow’s or another day’s, which was to justify me. Nothing, nothing 
had the least importance, and I knew quite well why.
This tough acknowledgement o f the aleotropic vectors and the radical emptiness of
existence is the theme o f Carruth’s essay "Authenticity in the Age o f Massive,
Multiplying Error"(SI), and it is the theme o f "Lost," wherein he rejoins the idea
from "Names" verbatim in the first line, wondering whether fate or chance has made
him in the moment, lost. At the end o f the poem (and mezzo del cammin), he says
I think I sought it. I think I
could not know m yself un­
til I did not know where I was.
Then my self knowledge con­
tinued for a while while I found 
my way again in fear 
and reluctance, lost truly at
last. I changed the appear­
ances o f myself to m yself 
continually and 
losing and finding were the same, 
as I now understand.
The syllabics are functioning well here, both aurally and by way of establishing 
temporarily cogent fragments of meaning which reform and accrete into larger 
structures as the reader moves forward through the stanza with expectations of the 
conversational diction. In the first line, doubt gives way to a clipped cogito, which 
in the next line reverts into a paradox, accentuated by the terminal p-un (myself un 
= m yself one). Then the third line alone implies something like the idea of 
"thinking oneself silly," or a failure o f rationalism, or, in Kierkegaardian terms, the 
despair which is conscious o f being despair, as it is conscious of being a self. This 
self is nonetheless laboring to obscure this fact from itself "with a certain acuteness
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and shrewd calculation, with psychological insight," but he is not in a deeper sense 
clearly conscious o f what he does (I speaking o f the speaker here of course, not 
Carruth), o f how despairingly he labors, etc.(SK, Sickness, 180-81). Then in the 
poem comes the quick ambiguity o f "I changed the appear-// ance o f myself to 
myself/ continually." Changed appearance to reality? Or simply substituted another 
subjective illusion o f self? Both. They are the same. All o f the peregrinations 
culminate in the final paradox, that "losing and finding were the same," and the 
equally ambiguous "as" (adverb, or causative?) the speaker "knows."
"Marge" is a poem very complicated in its relationship to the actual events 
in Carruth’s life, and it is terribly moving. Margery was the name of Carruth’s 
actual mother, whose birth and death dates, 1896-1981, follow the title in the book. 
Her final, lingering illness was like that o f Marge in the poem. Yet, the speaker is 
not Carruth but an alcoholic retired contractor in Liverpool, NY, Charlie Spaid, who, 
after bottoming out, rents a room in M argery’s house. He joins AA, where he 
meets a "little guy named Cheever," whom Charlie asks why he’s quitting drinking 
at sixty-five: "at your age I ’d go on/ out sozzled," Charlie says. Cheever responds,
Yeah, that’s one way of looking and 
then there’s another. Dead
I can take, but who want’s to die 
puking all over some­
one else’s furniture?
This is a record o f an actual exchange between Carruth and Cheever, long-time
acquaintances.8 Carruth and Cheever managed to survive their alcoholism (though
not entirely intact), but Marge, not Charlie, gets cirrhosis, has a series o f strokes,
and dies after a horribly extended agony.
"Cave Painting" continues on the theme of extinction. Dedicated to the poet 
Clayton Eshleman, the poem describes how the vestiges o f all of the exterminated
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and deceased species remain with us:
We were with them. They went away.
And now every bell in 
every tower in every vil­
lage could toll the tocsin
of our sorrow forever and
still not tell how across 
all time our origin always
is this knowledge o f loss.
Then there is monologue by Septic Tanck, the only unstanzaed poem in the
book. Tanck is a poet with a poetic name, he thinks, "The/ ending up place for
everything, don’t you/ know, everything that comes down." Tanck also published
his poems in the magazine Pulpsmith (vol. 7, no .l). These poems were awarded the
first Smith Series o f Older Poets Award, and Tanck was given a night with a
younger person o f either sex. One o f Tanck’s songs, "About Youth and Age,"
concludes, "Only now in old age and bad luck/ do we see the importance o f a good
fuck." And this dictum is the theme of another poem in AG, "Capper Kaplinsky at
the North Side Cue Club." But Capper has a subtle and, though somewhat effete, a
sweetly poignant feeling for the female form:
I can still gloom onto
the things that make life worth living 
and sex still has something 
to do with it, and always will, 
even if I a in’t been
loo sharp at explaining.
The ultimate poems in the book are full of affection and communion. Art 
and Poll return from the suburbs to their old neighborhood and find the 
predominately black neighbors to be beautifully helpful, find that the place is now 
truly "gemutlich," unlike it was before with "Krauts, Harps, Hunkies, Wops going 
at/ each other with no mer-// cy every weekend ..."
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Finally there is a eerie poem, a slipping, falling, floating monologue, "Shake, 
Well Before Using," in which the speaker contemplates the drifting o f whispy 
panicles from his neighbor’s smokebush:
O.K., I wouldn’t 
tell it to everyone,
but days like this, windy, it sort 
o f feels like the end of 
the world, all them stiff gray dead things 
blowing loose just above
the asphalt, drifting like some kind 
o f trash with that scratchy 
sound. C an’t you hear them right now ev­
en at night? You ask me,
its one hell o f a scary sound.
Ora pro nobis, that’s 
what we used to say. Ave M a­
ria. Hissing like rats’
feet, like them smokers — that’s the sound.
Asphalt Georgies is an orison for us. It concludes:
W hat a mishmash — the suburbs! You 
know it. So I pray for 
Crawford, the street, the smokebush, the 
works. I pray for no more
Reagan. Well, you got to keep your 
wig on, you can’t give in 
to the dead. So what if  it don’t
mean much. It means something.
This is an assertion o f a value in human relations, in a place not unlike the settings
o f Cheever’s stories, but from the perspective of the underprivileged; their lives arc
given meaning by their own contingently improvised creations against death. The
message is: don’t give in.
i t ii i i
i t  tf i f
A "system" suggests the cutting off,
i.e., in channel morphology, the reduction,
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the suppression o f texture to simplify: 
to understand a man or a woman, growing 
old with eagerness you first consider 
the sensuality o f death, an unacknowledged 
surprise to most.
- J im  Harrison, "The Theory and Practice 
o f Rivers"
D on’t give in to the dead. "You can’t give in to the dead." It has always been a
temptation for Carruth, for, along with his intellectual pessimism, in a synergy, to
use a popular metaphor, he has always suffered from a solemn forlomness of spirit,
pathological, if  we consider the sources of it in his chronic manic depression. He
has constantly felt that he had to fight against his fatally passionate sense o f the
beauty of the world, his Romantic W eltschmerz, his sense of beauty that is "worth
its every sorrow." His existential beliefs have helped him, but the temptation to
obliterate him self has always been strong:
I see you, brothers and sisters, Randall, John,
I see you all, Sylvia, Anne, your slow
ragged troupe wandering
holding your flambeaux
so listlessly, calling out, your voices wan
and quavering. I hear you. Oh, it could be done
quickly you say, only a step,
a trigger’s click, a drift of sleep,
that’s what you sing -  in that awful music o f Mussorgsky,
you in your valley of mist,
in your smoky flame-light, calling, calling to me.
Come, you sing, come to us, listen
to this singing here forever where you belong
in this valley, we are your brothers and sisters
only a minute away, a second, or a song. ("A Paragraph,"
Cry,81)
This poem was written before 1983. As factors in Carruth’s life, factors with which 
I am not concerned except as they surface in his work, as they worsened, the awful 
music in the valley of mist became more insistent. In a long poem, "Essay on
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Death," (American Poetry Review vol.7, no.5, Sept-Oct.1988, p. 17) written early in 
1987, Carruth recapitulates years of feeling and thought on the subject of death.
The poem begins with a horrible scene of gratuitous torture and murder. 
Prisoners are being decapitated and their necks cauterized as two Potentates wager 
on how far the headless corpses can run. From this scene, the speaker looks out 
"Here in this// apartment complex in Syracuse where I live" at the Christmas lights, 
wondering, "Is this another carnage?" Is the eagerness "for the bright impossible 
rationality/ which the people o f the caves// thought they had glimpsed when they 
knew that they/ had minds" simply another horrible illusion? He writes a card to 
his daughter in Arizona, "miles away in a country o f desiccated, smoldering/ grass." 
It is a loving gesture, poignant. I won’t continue the paraphrase; as always, even 
in this scaringly painful mode, Carruth is perfectly clear. The nobility of the 
suffering human imagination prevails, prevails in its precise ignorance of death. It 
prevails with the pessimistic nobility o f unsupported, insupportable, even foolish 
desire — desire for life. That is the meaning o f the decapitated current of corpses. 
As the poem continues, Carruth abjures Jung’s previsions o f death; they arc an 
illusion of Romance. Yet, he suggests that Jung’s dreaming partakes of the urge 
toward human beauty, which is the natural movement of all creative action. But, as 
always, things seem to be getting worse:
Its true, a joy
is in it, joy in the power o f killing, even 
on television. But nothing is known. Killer 
and killed whorl in a stupid vortex of 
ignorance. No
story any more, no tale, no adventure. The three 
bears have gone to work for Disneyland, 
and Goldilocks committed suicide 
in 1962.
Even the dangerous beauty o f romance seems over. "Nothing is known": ignorance
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and the vision o f the void finally coincide. Hope, dream, love are dead .with no 
successors:
Age, the romanticists say, is vision and simpli­
city and brightened consciousness, but I say, Fraud, 
fraud, blinded by the light. Even 
the trees are reeling.
This is the same stanza that Carruth has used in his "Essay poems" ever since his
first book. Here he is speaking with in quite naturally, which is something of a
triumph, but not cause for jubilation. Instead, the obscenities of the age seem to
have collected in Carruth’s voice, in his personality, in his vision o f us. This is his
importance. The reeling trees are not just a symbol o f psychic nausea. The pine
trees of his Vermont, assailed for generations, are now finally being killed by the
rain. And we are dumb to our own suicide, as far as having "knowledge" about it.
Carruth imagines
a pair o f pudgy hands, like my little 
grandson’s hands but spotted with age, pushing 
against a huge gray leathery limp 
bag o f nothing
that fills the room.
The kneading o f the dry teat o f Nothing, the flaccid bag of imagination; it is the
nightmare of age. But does it also, in its image o f the infant, imply rebirth? The
poem ends with that ubiquitous thing, the electronic blip. An appliance has been
turned on
or perhaps the great grid of energy,
civilization itself, has faltered far 
away. And my candle
grows a tall flame that flutters and dies and 
leaves a rancid smell.
The poem could end here, as it could have ended anywhere all along; it was always
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ending, but the sixty quatrains do finally end,
...and the Christmas lights
are bright, but not as bright as they were 
a moment ago.
As we know, the moment is part memory and part prevision. And here all
the elements are dimming. "The past is nothing," and he is in love with it. The
future, as it is suggested by the possibilities and defined by the necessities of the
moment, is now nothing. And he is in love with it.
In February 1988 Carruth, as he tells us in the very last work 1 will
consider here, "Suicide,"9
intentionally and massively overdosed m yself with every pill I possessed . . . 
I had a pretty fair collection o f partly used bottles o f  medication. I opened 
them one after another and washed the contents down with loathsome port 
wine which someone had sent me from California. I was surprised, not 
disagreeably, by the quickness o f the effect. It seems to me that I began to 
feel myself going under almost immediately and that the process itself, the 
going under, lasted no more than a few seconds — though I know from 
what I was told afterward that this cannot be true -  just long enough for 
me to experience a sense o f relief amounting to euphoria and to tell myself 
that this was the first time I ’d been happy in years.
Miraculously, despite the toxic intake, despite his age, his chronic emphysema, his
heart’s condition, his will to die, Carruth (obviously) survived. And what he wrote
about his experience is a stunning record of a man in dissolution. The essay is not
only true, it is almost harshly analytic, Wordsworthian in extremis, that is, powerful
feelings o f non-being recollected in rebirth.
Carruth does not tell us why he committed suicide, and I say committed
rather than attempted for reasons that will be apparent directly. "The circumstances,
including peripheral actors, are private and should remain private." The document is
not a veiled public shreiving, not a gush of personal confession, but an analysis of
the actual experience of death, complete with clinical details, with close-ups o f the
medical apparatus, with descriptions of the physical attenuations o f the attack ("120
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hours of insomnia"), how the doctors "loaded him with charcoal," which made him 
vomit. He inhaled the vomit and suffocated and got pneumonia. The doctors 
pushed a rod into his lungs; "it was a rape, it was terrifying, one o f the most awful 
things that ever happened to me." His physical appearance is horrible. His "skin 
was dark and bruised, covered with tiny lines as if it were tanned cowhide. I 
looked 85 years old. In fact I looked like my mother when she had been 85, 
paralyzed by stroke and dying." It is all sufficiently gruesome, and in its most 
physical moments probably only o f interest to intimates or horror buffs, who 
sometimes share perversity.
But then Carruth begins to reflect on the experience, on how he had 
changed. When he arrived at the hospital he had no vital signs, but he was not 
dead, and in that state what he saw was not Jung’s floating castle, but "blackness," 
a blackness which he goes on to describe in a variety o f ways. He says that when 
he awoke he remembered the blackness, and the memory made him happy, "Not in 
the sense o f ecstatic as we normally use the term now, meaning sexual or generally 
appetitive transport, but rather in the sense of blissful, a replete eontcnledncss. It 
was a state o f mind I had never experienced before, and I think I mean that 
literally." That state o f mind, he says, has "the sense o f strange and new, altogether 
astounding happiness has remained with me as well."
Carruth had become another person. The experience o f death, which he 
claims to have no knowledge of per se, had made him happy. Hap-py. The 
resolution to die had been perfect, and so the return to life was a fortuitous return -  
to another life. O f course this is not a general prescription. Carruth was crazy, by 
all ordinary standards. But the suicide was a success.
The free act of suicide, and the fortuitous rebirth, Carruth finds -- and finds 
a genealogy o f precedents for his finding -  has liberated him from sequential time.
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This takes us back finally to his definition o f  an "alternative mode in which 
optimism is not present at all, eithe* positively or negatively, a mode in short based 
on the ante-modern belief that time is linear and eternity is circular."
As he notes in "Suicide," "
Poets and theologians have insisted from the beginning that happiness is an 
escape from time, human time, either through a life after death, or before 
death, through an experience o f spiritual communion or mystical or aesthetic 
transport. But a third way, as mythology attests, is to die and to come back 
to life.
This seems to be a way based on a time system of linear temporality and circular 
eternity. Art, poetry and music especially, control human time by the fact of their 
existence in and manipulation o f it, but they do not transcend it. They are in this 
sense less effective than action, especially the act of self-obliteration. And art that 
is totally unconnected from its social function has of course no effect; the artist and 
his product are rendered void. Art cannot bring solace to people who have no 
control over the time of their (slow or instantaneous) annihilation. On Carruth’s 
account, this is the state o f art in the late-twentieth century.
The eeriness o f "Suicide" comes not just from its discomforting themes.
There is also the irritating sense that it is true. And if it is true, Carruth has 
literally come back to life. And then there seems to be some kind of equality 
between life and death -  which is one of the tenets o f Carruth’s particular brand of 
pessimism. This kind of rebirth is, as Carruth has noted, mythological. The 
particular myth that applies here is that o f Dionysus.
In the same section of The Gay Science in which he speculates about a 
"dionysian pessimism," Nietzsche talks about an "art o f apotheosis" dithyrambic and 
blissful in tone. "Suicide" certainly has these qualities, especially toward the end. 
The dithyrambic tone is Dionysian. Dionysus is, in Plutarch’s words, the god who 
is destroyed, who disappears, who relinquishes life and then is bom again."9
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Furthermore, Dionysus was taken as a fetus out o f his mother, Semele, lover of 
Zeus, when she was incinerated by the fiery vision o f Zeus. Zeus enclosed the 
fetus in his own thigh until it was ready to be bom, and it is to this double biith 
that Dionysus owed the title Dithyrambos. Dionysus is also the Greek form of the 
Vedic god Soma = a drink ("that loathsome port"), a god, prince of poets, 
personification o f the moon. At this point, I hope that I don’t have to recapitulate 
anything in asserting that this myth applies to the personal travails o f Carruth. And, 
as James Hillman has written, "the mind made on the moon has lived with Lilith, 
so that its thought can never be naive, never cease to strike deep toward the 
shadows," 10 that is, this mind, even in its dithyrambic expressions is always lucid, 
astringent, pessimistic, never progressive or utopian. The cult of Dionysus is 
ecstatic, with the implications of a profound change in personality, exactly what 
Carruth’s suicide accomplished.
Coda
At the beginning o f "Suicide" Carruth writes about the necessities of beginning 
again, in a different mode professionally, because o f his inability to deal with his 
suicide in writing. In fact he deals with it quite admirably, and in a mode, the 
autobiographical essay, which is a recent development in his work. He has in 
these essays dropped the modernistic technique o f the mask, yet he has lost none of 
the force o f his previous modes, and he has continued to write poems in a variety 
o f different voices. At considerable personal cost Carruth has started over, as he 
started over after the war, after his institutionalization, after his move to Vermont,
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after his move to Syracuse.
One o f Carruth’s most incisive critics, R.W. Flint, wrote that "the theories of 
autobiogenesis that seemed so provocative 20 or 30 years ago seem less so now, 
have begun to look like a convulsive attempt to recover the freshness and energy 
that marked the real evolution o f nearly 200 hundred years ago." If one agrees with 
this, and if  one agrees with many o f  the critics o f existential theory, with Marcuse, 
with Adorno, with Blanchot 12, in castigating such concepts as intensity, 
responsibility, authenticity, etc., one must also see that in Carruth’s life-work self­
creation has been vital, not theoretical. As Galway Kinnell notes in his 1985 
introduction to his selection of Carruth’s poetry, "More than in the case of any other 
poet, Carruth responds to W hitman’s words, ’I was the man, I suffer’d, I was 
there.’" And the following sentence, written before Carruth’s self-annihilation, has 
even more meaning now: "We are lucky to have him among us."
Carruth has continued to produce poems of great beauty and force, and they 
appear in his forthcoming collection (Tell Me Again How The White Heron Rises 
And Flies Across the Nacreous River At Twilight Toward The Distant Islands, New 
Directions, 1989). In many places, especially in his long essay, "Paul Goodman and 
the Grand Community" (American Poetry Review, 1983. Rpl. forthcoming in a 
book of prose from the U. o f Michigan Press, 1990), Carruth has expressed his 
great debt to and his admiration o f Paul Goodman. And Goodman, in describing 
the qualities of one o f his own masters, Kant, touches the quick o f the personal 
correlatives o f Hayden Carruth’s work o f the last thirty years:
Through middle age and a good old age, his work flowed on spontaneous, 
vigorous, brave, endlessly inventive and continually maturing, minutely 
attentive and boldly synoptic and with a fine rhythm of style. We have to 
ask if his way of being obsessional is not a good way to cope with the 
nature of things in order to live on a little. I repeat it: the proof of a sage 
is that he survives, he knows how.
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